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i 
Abstract of a thesis examining a role for discursive design within public policy 
analysis. There is growing concern regarding the inability of contemporary societies 
to adequately deal with social and environmental problems. This thesis identifies the 
epistemolOgical assumptions of much contemporary policy analysis as a Significant 
component of this problem solving debility. Specifically, the assumptions of 
objectivism, positivist methodologies and instrumental rationalities are charged with 
having flawed epistemologies, resulting in partial and parochial knowledge. Feminist 
standpoint theory, Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermas's theory of 
communicative rationality are used to produce an epistemology more appropriate for 
policy analysis. Knowledge is conceptualised as socially situated, and a case for strong 
objectivity is argued. This results in increased inclusion of marginalized voices into 
policy processes. 
Habermas's 'ideal speech situation' is discussed, and identification and 
mitigation of systemic communicative distortion in policy processes is proposed as 
a critical requirement for producing improved policy relevant knowledge. Discursive 
design is examined and proposed as a practical link between epistemology and real 
world policy processes. Finally, four criteria are developed for identifying locations 
of communicative distortion in policy processes. 
A case study is carried out on the Christchurch Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Management Strategy. Using both structural and phenomenological analyses, the case 
study addresses three questions: To what extent does this particular policy process 
fulfil the requirements of the four criteria?; How useful are these criteria in identifying 
communicative distortion in this policy process?; and What can be learnt about 
ii 
discursive design from this case study? The analysis reveals there was significant 
communicative distortion produced by some aspects of context and the structure of 
the process. Critical issues were exclusion or potential exclusion of marginalised or 
unidentified stakeholders, and the difficulty in producing communicatively rational 
policy when discursive task groups do not have decision making authority. The 
discursive deliberation of task group members within the process was relatively free 
from communicative distortion. Reasons for these conclusions are examined and 
critical reflections on discursive design takes place. 
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There are times in life 
when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks 
and can perceive differently than one sees 
is absolutely necessary 
if one is to go on looking 
and reflecting 
at all 
Michel Foucault (cited in Millar 1993:36) 
iv 
Preface 
A Note on Language 
This thesis uses theory which argues for greater inclusivity of currently 
marginalised individuals and groups in policy processes. Language, and specifically 
discourse, is a central component in ensuring inclusiveness. I have avoided gendered 
terms in this thesis. Rather than use common artifices as he/she, which I consider 
somewhat inelegant, I chose to use pronouns which may be commonly thought to be 
plural. For example, rather than say, "You must ask the analyst what his/her views 
are", I replace the tenn 'his/her' with 'they'. Therefore, "You must ask the analyst 
what their views are". The pronoun 'their' is used either as singular or plural. The 
same applies for 'they' and 'them', the context providing the indication as to whether 
they are singular or plural. 
This approach avoids the need to specify gender, except when it is either 
obvious, as in, for example, reference to the Governor General of New Zealand 
(currently a woman), or when gender is a necessary part of the argument. There is a 
historical basis for neutralizing unnecessary gender discrimination. For example, 
Casey Miller and Kate Swift (1977:145) argue that ''for more than 400 years, reputable 
writers and speakers of English have used they, their, them and themselves as singular 
pronouns for indefinite antecedents" (emphasis in original). This seems to be a way of 
retaining some elegance of style while retaining inclusivity. 
Where quotes contain inappropriately gendered terms such as 'he' or 'all men' 
when referring to both women and men, I ha~e not altered the text, but retained 
historical accuracy. I usually signify such language with 'sic'. 
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1 
Introduction 
There has been much attention given over the last few decades to the apparent 
failure of governments to solve social, economic and environmental problems. Much 
of this attention has focused upon the epistemological assumptions of modernityl, 
assumptions, it is claimed, which undermine the problem solving power of the State. 
This thesis is located within a particular theoretical tradition which offers potentially 
powerful remedies to this malaise. It involves iT"~reased attention to 'discursive 
design' (Dryzek, 1990a)2 in policy analysis, thereby increasing the quality of public 
participation in policy production. This, it is argued, will improve the quality of 
public policy itself. This introduction explores the themes and directions which shape 
this thesis. It sets the scene, rather than providing the substantive content; that, of 
course, is the role of the thesis itself. Therefore, I explain the problems which 
prompted this research, outline the research's significance, define some key terms and, 
lastly, provide a brief introduction to each chapter. 
Two general themes aroused my interest in this research. The first concerned the 
growing inability of public policy makers to resolve some of the major problems faced 
by our world. Environmental crises, energy crises, the welfare state's inability to 
resolve problems of crime, poverty and inner city decay, international conflict, and 
so on all present apparently intractable policy challenges (Dryzek, 1990a). This is 
coupled with widespread pessimism about the possibility for effective government 
planning (ibid). While this is a very broad claim, the problem solving ability of 
1 Modernity refers to the organization of social life that emerged from the European Enlightenment, and is 
typified by its belief in rationality, bureaucratization, science and progress. 
2 I use two forms of referencing in this thesis. When a reference first appears in the text, the author's name and 
publication date are given, e.g.; Smith (1985). If relevant, a page number is added, e.g., (1985:21). If I have already 
just introduced the name and date, and shortly after quote or"cite the author specifically, rather than become 
repetitious, I simply add, e.g., (pg. 53). This way, I retain clarity in referencing without undue repetition of names 
and dates. 
2 
governments has demonstrably altered over the last few decades. As Dunn (1981:29) 
argues, contemporary society has undergone fundamental changes which demand 
new problem solving strategies. For example, most contemporary problems are "ill-
structured" or "wicked" in character (Rittel and Webber, 1973), resulting in an inability 
to agree about a problem definition, let alone a solution. Therefore, the apparent 
failure of public policy to resolve some pressing social and environmental issues was 
one theme which attracted my attention. 
The second important theme concerns a particular critique of this failure. Much 
of the failure of public policy is attributed to the assumptions of those policy 
processes. In Dryzek's words, "The diagnosis is that many of these ills have much to do 
with the decline of once-confident and still pervasive forms of rationality" (1990a:l). 
Specifically, I identify objectivism, pOSitivism and instrumental rationality' as critical 
assumptions of much contemporary policy analysis. These assumptions are pervasive 
in their influence in policy analYSiS, but I argue they are seriously flawed in their 
current formulations. They have been subjected to serious criticism from a number 
Qf quarters. 4 The critical angle I take is epistemplogical, involving hermeneutics and 
standpoint epistemology.s 
Questions concerning knowledge and truth have always engaged my 
imagination. What is truth? Can we know for certain? This preoccupation with 
epistemology, i.e., the study of theories of knowledge, drew the two themes together 
3 These are briefly defined here and explored in depth in Chapter One. Positivism maintains knowledge can 
only be produced by deducing causal laws from basic assumptions which are verified by empirical experience. 
Objectivism maintains there exist universal standards available to all rational individuals and assumes a "realm 
of basic, uninterpreted, hard facts that serves as the foundation for all empirical knowledge" (Bernstein, 1976:111). 
Instrumental rationality is defined as the "capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends" (Dryzek, 
1990a:4). 
4 See section '1:2 A Critique Of These Assumptions'. 
5 Hermeneutic theory is explained at length in Chapter Two, while standpoint epistemology is used to critique 
objectivism in Chapter One. Please refer to these sections for definitions. 
3 
epistemology, i.e., the study of theories of knowledge, drew the two themes together 
into one coherent study. In essence, I proposed the troubles faced by contemporary 
policy analysis had, in part at least, epistemological causes. 6 The solution involved 
a reconstruction of these assumptions. Specifically, the epistemological assumptions 
used in policy analysis produced distorted and partial knowledge. The irony here is 
that it was believed these assumptions elimintlted distortion and partiality by 
producing a true account of the natural world and social relations. I propose a 
rigorous theory of knowledge which can produce improved or more appropriate 
policy relevant knowledge. 
This improved knowledge emerges from policy processes which are discursive. !l 
By discursive, I refer to processes which produce intersubjective understanding 
between participants. These processes focus on communication of values and norms 
as much as on technical concerns. They provide opportunity for a wider range of 
knowledge to enter the policy process. Known as discursive deSigns, they constitute 
a practical expression of the epistemological theory I develop. In other words, I 
identified a problem in policy analYSiS, drew together a number of theories into a 
coherent response to the problem and developed a theory of application into real 
world situations. While this account simplifies the process, it captures the essential 
flow of my thinking. However, I had one more concern. 
Although some significant theoretical developments regarding discursive design 
exist, there has been little application in practice. Until recently, most of the attention 
given in the literature to the application of discursive practices in policy making has 
been theoretical (for example, see Dryzek, 1990a:40; Fischer, 1993:172; Hayward, 
6 These epistemological causes are also explored by Bobrow and Dryzek (1987) in their study of 'policy design', 
and by Diesing (1991) in relation to social science. 
4 
1994:1; Healey, 1992). Any application of discursive design theory to real world policy 
analysis appears incipient. There is need for the theory to be applied in the real 
world. My search for such a real world policy process led me to the Christchurch City 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Strategy (SHWMS). This strategy was 
produced via a process which involved a Citizen's Task Group, thereby differing from 
the more usual approach of analyst centred policy development. The SHWMS process 
used a 'discursive' approach and therefore goes some way towards modelling the 
theory of discursive design. The SHWMS process formed my case study, enabling me 
to apply the discursive theory in practice. 
Having established the theoretical framework for the thesis, I now explain the 
significance of the research. What does it contribute to policy analysis? There are three 
specific contributions. The first concerns my application of Gadamer's (1975) 
hermeneutics, aspects of Habermas's (1971a) communicative theory, and Harding's 
(1991) standpoint epistemology with discursive design theory. I argue this theoretical 
synthesis produces a particularly compelling justification for using discursive design 
in policy analysis. 
A second contribution of this thesis is the development of four criteria for 
evaluating the extent to which unconstrained discourse occurs in policy analysis. 
These criteria are central to my analysis of the SHWMS process and provide critical 
insight into opportunities for stakeholder participation in policy development. This 
provides a coherent link between theoretical development and real world policy 
analysis. 
This research is also significant because it applies the theory to the real world 
through the use of a case study. This has a number of outcomes. First, it enables an 
assessment to be made of the extent to which the SHWMS process complies with the 
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requirements of my theory. Second, it enables the practical usefulness of the 
discursive design criteria to be assessed. Third, it provides an opportunity to improve 
our understanding, and hence practice, of discursive design in policy analysis. 
Because of the limited application of discursive design theory to practice, this thesis 
contributes to our understanding of such practice. 
There are a number of terms used throughout this thesis which may need 
clarification. Most of these are defined or explained in the text, but there are two 
wide-ranging terms which keep reoccurring throughout the thesis. I explain them here 
to assist the reader in adapting to my particular approach and style. These terms are 
discourse and reflexivity. 
According to Dryzek, a "discourse embodies a shared set of capabilities that enable the 
assemblage ofwords, phrases, and sentences into meaningful "texts" intelligible to readers or 
listeners" (1990a:159). Put simply, discourse is a way of speaking which is shared by 
a group of people. This way of speaking embodies particular norms, values and 
assumptions shared by the speakers. One of the sociological functions of discourse is 
to close off possibilities, that is, to determine what can and can not be said or thought 
(Abercrombie, et al., 1984:71). The term 'discursive', on the other hand, captures the 
idea of moving between discourses (Webster, 1971), a communicative process between 
discourses. For example, reference to 'discursive' policy analYSis implies analysis 
which involves interaction between different discourses. Likewise, 'discursive' 
epistemology implies a form of epistemology grounded in discursive interaction. The 
term 'discursive', then, always implies interaction between discourses. This is more 
thoroughly developed in my theory of communication, but this initial explanation 
ought help orientate the reader to my approach. 
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Reflexivity is the second important term used throughout this thesis. Giddens 
argues that: 
reflexivity is a defining characteristic of all human action. All human beings routinely 
"keep in touch" with the grounds of what they do as an integral element of doing it 
(Giddens 1990:36). 
This means human beings, constantly faced with new information, find themselves 
in a position of having to reconsider their current views. Reflexivity involves turning 
back one's experience upon itself (Mead, 1962), enabling an ongoing reconstruction 
of both the experience and self. This constant dynamic of moving from current belief 
to the consideration of new information, and then to the possible reforming of the 
original belief, is the essence of reflexivity. I attempt to be reflexive in this thesis. This 
means that nothing in this thesis is beyond critical reflection and reconsideration. 
There is a subtlety here, for one of the theoretical assumptions on which the thesis is 
built is that there may be better ways of achieving the aims of this thesis than those 
I have chosen to use. Note that I am not denying the role of rational argument. 
Rather, I alert the reader to a thematic undercurrent essential to the intent of the 
thesis, the role of reflexivity.7 
So far, I have given a general overview of key themes in this thesis and 
explained the development of my thinking. The next stage of introduction is an 
overview of the chapter contents. 
7 Reflexivity is examined more fully in section '2:2:1:2 Reflexivity and Design'. 
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Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One: An Analysis of Public Policy Analysis 
This chapter examines some dominant assumptions of public policy analysis. 
These assumptions are epistemological, that is, involve theories of knowledge. I begin 
with an examination of the origins of contemporary policy analysis and argue policy 
science developed, in part, from a practical need w provide decision makers with 
accurate information for social problem solving. This involved a reliance upon 
quantitative and teclmological approaches, characterised by Majone (1986) as the 
'received view'. This view carries with it a limited concern for wider social, political, 
cultural or administrative issues characterising many contemporary policy problems. 
These characteristics of policy analysis involve a number of assumptions about 
rationality. First, the role of positivism in policy analysis is explored. This examines 
positivism's orientation towards empirical methods of knowledge production and its 
legacy to contemporary policy analysis. Objectivism, based on the assumption 
universal standards for knowledge exist, is explored in some detail. This involves 
examination of three Enlightenment thinkers, Descartes, Hume and Kant. I argue 
objectivism assumes there is such a thing as THE truth about the world, and that this 
forms the basis for contemporary conceptions of rationality. Finally, instrumental 
rationality is discussed. Defined as "the capacity to devise, select, and effect good means 
to clarified ends" (Dryzek, 1990a:4), it is one of the dominant forms of rationality used 
in contemporary policy analysis. It is generally assumed to be value free and 
emphasises its requirement for efficiency in attainment of ends. 
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These assumptions of policy analysis provide conditions for the emergence of 
technocracy. While not an assumption of policy analysis, technocracy is an outcome 
of these assumptions. It refers to the significant influence of policy experts in the 
production of policy relevant knowledge. I argue the epistemo~ogical orientation of 
Western administrative states is instrumental and analytic, governed by impersonal 
technique. This results in the increasing subjection of modern society to cultures of 
specialised expertise, increasing the communicative distance between experts and 
citizens. 
Having examined these assumptions of contemporary policy analysis, I offer a 
critique. The central claim is that policy analYSis is flawed to the extent it relies 
uncritically on the assumptions of positivism, objectivism and instrumental rationality, 
and supports technocracy. The critique begins by arguing objectivism fails to take 
account of the social-situatedness of knowledge. For this reason, analysis proceeding 
on the assumptions of objectivism produce, ironically, less objective knowledge. The 
argument is developed in three stages. First, it is argued that knowledge is social-
situated, that is, can never be value-free or neutral, but always embodies the social 
context of the knower. Second, standpOint epistemology is developed to provide 
further criticism of objectivism, opening up possibilities for the development of 
preViously marginalised or excluded sources of knowledge. The question of relativism 
is then raised, for if objectivism is rejected, it may seem to follow that some form of 
relativism is the only alternative. In other words, the critical question for policy 
analysis concerns how one can distinguish between knowledge claims. Finally, strong 
objectivity is introduced to argue some knowledge claims are better, or more accurate 
or appropriate, than others. Objectivism is therefore rejected as an inadequate 
assumption for policy analysis. 
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Positivism's reduction of knowledge into quantifiable empirical data is also 
rejected on epistemological grounds for being too narrow and dogmatic. Empirical 
research is not rejected, but I argue greater attention to its hidden values and 
assumptions needs to take place to avoid the dogmatic tendencies of positivist 
empirical research. 
Three specific critiques of instrumental rationality are explored The first is 
instrumental rationality's insensitivity towards ends. It both claims to be value-free 
while at the same time serving particular value interests. I then criticise it for an 
inadequate analytic methodology, where its method of de-composition of problems 
into manageable analytic components can result in concealing other important aspects 
of the problem situation. Finally, instrumental rationality's impOSition into the 'life-
world', the world of culture and symbolic interaction, is examined. I argue this 
introduces inappropriate forms of technical control into human culture and 
individual's life experiences, thus excluding more appropriate or life enhancing 
cultural practices. 
Finally, I provide a critique of technocracy, arguing the pre-occupation with 
technical solutions to public problems, while appropriate in some instances, results 
in the exclusion of alternative rationalities and knowledges which may be better 
adapted to contemporary problem situations. The central theme in this section is 
criticism of a particularly narrow conception of knowledge resulting in epistemically 
inadequate methodologies for policy analysis. Standpoint epistemology was 
introduced partly as a criticism of objectivism, and partly to indicate the direction I 
take in a reconstruction of the policy process. 
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Chapter Two: A Reconstruction of the Policy Process 
This chapter explores more fully the philosophical nature of knowledge 
production. I argue a profound shift is occurring from a 'legislative' reason, rooted 
in the Enlightenment search for cognitive certainty, to an 'interpretive' reason which 
recognizes the social construction of all knowledge. I begin with an examination of 
the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer (1975). Gadamer argues 
understanding emerges from the interplay between the observer and that which is 
observed. This produces a notion of truth which is never final or completed, but is 
inherently dynamiC. Understanding, then, is the product of on-going communicative 
interaction rather than purely the product of scientific technique. 
What is needed, I argue, is an approach to policy analysis which incorporates 
the hermeneutics of Gadamer as well as an alternative to instrumental rationality. For 
this I turn to Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality (1971a). 
Communicative rationality is based on production of intersubjective understanding 
and offers a means for rational deliberation on norms and values. These issues are 
generally excluded by objectivism, positivist methodologies and instrumental 
rationality, but form a critical component of many problem situations. According to 
Habermas (1971a), communicative rationality only emerges from situations where 
speakers are competent, that is, are able to use speech acts to produce intersubjective 
understanding. There are four types of speech acts presupposed in any 
communication. Perfect fulfilment of these speech acts produces what Habermas calls 
the 'ideal speech situation', where only the 'force of the better argument' determines. 
the validity or appropriateness of a belief. Such a situation can act as a counterfactual 
ideal against which real world situations can be assessed. There are a number of 
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Clmstraints on the possibility of reproducing the 'ideal speech situation' in the real 
world. These constraints are described as systemically distorted communication, 
rt~ferring to a non-symmetrical distribution of chances to engage in speech acts. In 
t)ther words, systemic communicative distortion results from the exclusion of some' 
it1terests from a communicative process, e.g., in deliberation over policy. To illustrate 
this, I recount an example from Kemp (1985) regarding the 'Windscale Inquiry', a 
large scale public hearing examining a proposed nuclear waste disposal plant in 
England. This demonstrates the practical, as well as the theoretical usefulness, of 
Habermas's communication theory. 
In order to facilitate communicatively rational policy analYSiS, I propose 
discursive deSign, i.e., a purposively designed discursive process which provides the 
conditions for communicative rationality. In the previous section, I identified systemic 
communicative distortion as a major impediment to communicative rationality. 
Discursive processes, then, need to be designed to eliminate or minimise 
communicative distortion and produce the most communicatively friendly conditions. 
I examine some limitations of design and articulate a theory of reflexivity. This is 
explored in some depth because it forms an important theme throughout this thesis. 
I then relate the role of reflexivity directly to discursive design. A Foucauldian notion 
of power is developed, particularly the role of power in discourse and the need to 
design opportunities for marginalised discourses to challenge the hegemony of 
dominant discourses. Finally, I revisit the 'ideal speech situation' and examine the 
'force of the better argument'. This concept is criticised for concealing a persistent 
rationalism which deemphasises emotion, rhetoric, metaphorical and non-linguistic 
aspects of communication (Young, 1995). 
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The general character of discursive design is now discernible. My next step 
involves an examination of the participatory policy analysis theory of Durning (1993). 
He suggests four perspectives on participation in policy analysis, each involving a 
different relationship between analysts and other stakeholders. Two of these are 
rejected for falling short of the ideal speech conditions. The other two, 'interpretive 
participatory policy analysis' and 'stakeholder policy analysis' both entail a shift in 
analytic orientation, not from expert to non-expert, but from analytic domination by 
analysts to facilitation by analysts. This involves epistemolOgical reorientation by 
analysts to sustain conditions for communicative rationality. 
A specific relationship between the ideal speech situation and discursive design 
is now explored. In order\to design a discursive policy process which meets the ideal 
speech conditions, I propose four 'ideal speech criteria'. These are the criteria of 
accessibility into a discursive policy process, equality of discursive opportunity, 
reflexivity and, lastly, equal access to information. They provide a framework which 
can shape the development of any discursive design or critique an existing design. 
Chapter One presents a critique of some key assumptions informing 
contemporary policy analysis. Chapter Two develops a theory which I argue 
overcomes the epistemic limitations of those assumptions. Yet questions remain, 
particularly concerning the real world applicability of discursive deSign. Can the ideal 
speech situation actually produce communicative rationality in a real world situation? 
What can the 'ideal speech criteria' tell us about a particular policy development? In 
order to address these questions I use a case study. 
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Chapter Three: Christchurch City Solid and Hazardous Waste Management 
Strategy: A Case Study 
This chapter begins with an overview of the Christchurch SHWMS process. The 
process used a task group consisting of 14 stakeholders representing a number of 
interests to produce a long term solid and hazardous waste management strategy. The 
task group was made up of representatives from the manufacturing sector, 
community groups, environmental organizations, tHe Christchurch City Council and 
the waste management industry. This task group produced a strategic document 
recommending a long term waste management policy for Christchurch City. This 
document was accepted as Christchurch City Council policy with only two minor 
modifications. The purpose of the case study is to analyze the level of communicative 
distortion in the SHWMS process and assess the usefulness of the 'ideal speech 
criteria'. The case study also offers opp6rtunity to improve our understanding of 
discursive policy processes. These form my three research questions. 
This is followed by an elaboration and justification of my methodology and 
methods of analysis. Two forms of analYSis are used. The first I call a 'structural' 
analysis, referring to the physical, procedural, social and political environments in 
which the SHWMS took place. The second is a 'phenomenological' analysis which 
explores the participant's experience of the SHWMS process. These forms of analysis, 
which incorporate the 'ideal speech criteria', provide a means of addressing the three 
research questions. 
Following the methodology section, data collection is examined. Two forms are 
used, the first being a literature search, and the second, face-to-face interviews with 
the task group participants. I explain why I used the interview technique and discuss 
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some problems with this method. The interview process is discussed in detail, 
including an examination of the interview questions. Finally, the question of ethics in 
interviewing is examined. Having discussed the methodology and methods used in 
the analysis, I tum to the analysis itself. 
Chapter Four: Analysis of the Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Strategy 
Process 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the extent of systemic 
communicative distortion in the SHWMS process. The context of the task group 
process is examined first, revealing Significant locations of communicative distortion. 
Although much of the context provides opportunities for communicatively rational 
deliberation, this is circumscribed by some institutional limitations which are 
discussed in detail. In particular, the requirement that the SHWMS task group only 
recommend policy, thus deferring final decision making authority to the City Council, 
is explored as a major potential source of communicative distortion. 
The discursive process is then critically analyzed, with particular attention being 
paid to the four 'ideal speech criteria'. This section of the analysis is divided into two 
parts, agenda setting and policy formulation. Agenda setting presents some critical 
locations for communicative distortion while policy formulation proves to be a 
relatively communicatively rational process. Some of the critical issues discussed in 
this section concern the involvement of Tangata Whenua, gender and socio-cultural 
make-up of the task group. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
The final chapter is centred around the three research questions. Here, I provide 
some answers to the questions, along with specific reflections regarding the SHWMS 
process and discursive design. The conclusion also provides a reflexive moment, for 
it affords opportunity to reevaluate the theory for which I argue throughout this 
thesis, as well as demonstrate the usefulness of the 'ideal speech criteria' in the 
evaluation of a discursive design. 
The first research question addresses to what extent the SHWMS process fulfilled 
the theoretical requirements of the 'ideal speech criteria'. I argue the context and 
agenda setting process produced a Significant level of systemic distortion due to the 
advisory nature of the task group vis-a.-vis the Council and institutional practices. This 
aside, there was a high degree of fulfilment of the 'ideal speech criteria' in the 
deliberations and I conchide the SHWMS was a successful process of discursive 
deliberation. The second question addresses the usefulness of the 'ideal speech 
criteria' in identifying communicative distortion. While I identify some important 
modifications yet to be made to some of the 'ideal speech criteria', I argue they 
demonstrate considerable utility in identifying communicative distortion and conclude 
they constitute useful tools for discursive policy analysiS. Finally, I explore some 
issues raised by my analysis. These range from the role of independent facilitation 
the problems technical complexity presents to communicative rationality. I identify 
some arguments suggesting limitations to the application of discursive design, and 
offer counter-arguments and suggestions to mitigate such limitations. Finally, I 
identify a number of areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
An Analysis of Public Policy Analysis 
In his preface to Discordant Harmonies, Daniel Botkin (1990) seeks to create a 
kind of mystery story in his attempt to explain some pressing contradictions between 
contemporary ideas about nature and many of the actual facts about nature. 
At the surface were the activities of our society: scientists doing research; legislators 
signing bills; government officials dealing with policies. Underneath these was a layer 
of belief, myth, and assumption, of symbol and metaphor .... (pg. vii). 
By a careful examination of the assumptions, as well as the practices, Botkin provides 
insight into the roots of many of our environmental problems. This is the strategy I 
undertake in relation to public policy making. I am not concerned to catalogue 
contemporary practices, but to do something I think is more valuable, examine the 
basic assumptions informing contemporary policy making. The reason for this is quite 
Simple. In order to understand and effectively respond to the growing problems faced 
by policy analysts and decision makers, it is necessary to comprehend the inherent 
limitations of the assumptions, myths and beliefs upon which these problems and 
related analyses are based. This thesis proposes a theoretical and practical remedy to 
some of these limitations. However, a proposed solution will only make sense to the 
reader when they are convinced that a problem exists, so what follows 'sets the scene'· 
for the introduction of discursive design in policy making. 
This thesis is concerned with the epistemological assumptions of policy making. 
By this, I refer to theories about knowledge, and ip-volves explanations as to what 
knowledge is, how it is derived and how it is used. I use the term 'epistemology' in 
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ill somewhat wider sense than the usual stricter philosophical view which is 
traditionally concerned with what ought count as 'true' knowledge, that is, how to 
justify a particular belief. 1 I am also interested in how particular beliefs can be 
justified, but my concern is broader than just that. An epistemology is grounded in 
particular assumptions about the nature of the world, human beings and social 
relations. These assumptions enable the production of certain types of knowledge, 
certain ways of viewing the world, that have direct consequences for public policy 
analysis. Depending upon the assumptions used, the subsequent analysis will be 
shaped along certain paths, and any resultant policy will bear the limitations and 
advantages of those assumptions. 
There is an extensive (and growing) critique which charges mainstream policy 
making with a technocentric bias, inadequate conceptualization of knowledge, an 
over-reliance on pOSitivism and problems with public legitimation (Dryzek, 1990a; 
Fischer, 1990). I present a profile of the dominant assumptions currently informing 
mainstream policy analysis and then offer a critique. By that stage, the reader will be 
in a better position to understand the context for my arguments in part three, and, 
perhaps, be more sympathetic to the case for discursive design in policy making. 
1 See, for example, Quine and Ullian (1978), The Web of Belief. 
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1:1 SOME DOMINANT ASSUMPTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
Public policy making has a history, and this history has shaped the particular 
directions and applications of policy analysis today. This history also enables us to 
better grasp the nature of contemporary policy analysis, and with it, the critical 
assumptions that concern me here. I will look briefly at some key factors which have 
shaped this history. 
1:1:1 Origins of Contemporary Policy Analysis 
Although the very earliest attempts at producing public policy occurred nearly 
four thousand years ago (Dunn, 1981:14), my concern begins most noticeably in the 
social tumult surrounding the Industrial Revolution. For many hundreds of years, 
Europe experienced political instability, in stark contrast to the significant social 
stability experienced during the ~ame period, where change occurred only very 
slowly. In the words of Plumb (1973): 
(T)he majority of the population knew only an unchanging world in which the patterns 
of belief, of work, offomily life and social habits changed with glacier-like slowness. Wild 
political conflicts and instability had curiously little effect on this immobility of social 
habit (pg. 12, quoted in Dunn, 1981). 
With the political and economic changes that took place just before and during the 
Industrial Revolution, political instability gave way to the political stability necessary 
for industrial capitalist development. The ensuing "accelerated societal complexity and 
unpredictability" (Dunn, 1981:15) led to an urgent need for reliable information to 
enable the government, industry leaders and managers to effectively manage and 
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control the rapidly changing social environment. The sorts of questions being asked 
were practical ones: 
How much did members of the urban proletariat need to earn to maintain themselves 
and their families? How much did they have to earn before there was a taxable surplus? 
How much did they have to save from their earnings to pay for medical treatment and 
education? (ibid, pg. 16). 
In order to answer these questions, policy makers had to tum to the applied social 
sciences, firstly statistics and demography, and later sociology, economics and public 
administration. Science, while greatly assisting the burgeOning technologies of 
industrialism, was not the central impulse behind these policy developments. Most 
significant was the practical need to engage in social management and control, as well 
as recognition that the old methods were no longer appropriate. Two things of import 
ought to be noted here. The first is that the types of knowledge needed were of a 
quantitative nature, and were thus amenable to the growth of statistical analysis and / 
scientific methods of empirical observati0fl:: The second was the embryonic 
development of technical expertise and professionalism (Dunn, 1981:15). 
The appeal to empirical facts and the growth of technical expertise can be 
understood histOrically in relation to what Torgerson (1986) calls the 'dream of the 
abolition of politics'. This refers to the promise and hope of the Enlightenment, where 
knowledge, freedom and science would dispel the myth, dogma and superstition of 
the pre-modern era.2 The intellectual, cultural and scientific awakenings that occurred 
during this period carried with them powerful hopes that humanity could, through 
2 By pre-modem I refer to the period prior to Descartes. This is not an uncontroversial view (for a brief 
discussion of the problems in defining 'modem' and thus pre-modem, see Smart (1990». Because the orientation 
of this thesis is epistemological, this division of history is useful. De~artes can be seen as a symbolic break from 
tradition into what Solomon (1988) calls the 'transcendental pretence' associated with the self. This 'transcendental 
pretence', an arguably unwarranted confidence in human rationality, among other things (ibid, pg. 4) is critically 
examined throughout this thesis. 
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the use of objective methods, overcome many if not all of the problems that had 
plagued the human race. Politics, too, was a chaotic affair, subject to all types of 
human vicissitudes. Therefore the: 
dream of the abolition of politics - of putting an end to the strife and confusion of 
human society in favour of an orderly administration of things based upon objective 
knowledge ... (Torgerson, 1986:34) 
was very attractive. Its attractiveness lay primarily in the belief that the analytical 
precision of modern science could relieve politics from a commitment to theology or 
metaphysics, and instead provide an objective basis for determining the true and 
lawful order of the world. In this sense, science, not politics, would determine social 
order. Of course, this was not so simple in practice, for the clear division between 
facts (science) and values (politics) did not go unchallenged. Weber, for example, 
though insisting upon a distinction between empirical knowledge and value 
judgements, clearly saw that social science was not a value-free inquiry, but often 
masked its values in the guise of a value-free activity (Weber, 1949, cited in Brecht, 
1959).3 Nevertheless, the roots of policy analysis are firmly planted in the empirical 
sciences of the nineteenth century, a heritage, as we shall see, which continues to exert 
a powerful influence today. 
It is important to note, especially in light of the following critique, that this 
science was seen as emancipatory, as a means of achieving human progress and 
containing a commitment to democracy and human dignity. Essential to this end was 
science's commitment to value-free knowledge, empirical facts beyond manipulation 
by political elites. This commitment can be seen from our end of the twentieth century 
as well meaning but naive. This emphasis on democracy and policy did not cease, but 
3 See also, Dunn (1981:20). 
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became an underlying orientation of the 'policy sciences movement'. Harold Lasswell, 
generally considered the founder of policy science, was instrumental in developing 
policy analysis as a special part of the social science discipline (Dunn, 1981:19). But 
this 'science' had a wider objective than merely predicting what might happen and 
was to "contribute to the establishment of conditions for the gratification of human existence" 
(ibid, pg. 19). This science emerged post world war two and was seen as an important 
part of the reconstruction of the post war world. Thus, it was "to be grounded in a 
fundamental moral objective: the production and furtherance of democracy in America and the 
world" (Fischer, 1993:167). Policy science, therefore, was grounded in a practical 
orientation and motivated by a strong moral agenda. It had practical questions to 
resolve and therefore was very open to an instrumental focus. However, despite the 
influence of the social sciences in public policy, the Significant developments came 
from other diSciplines. 
It was the activities of applied mathematicians, engineers, operations researchers, 
and systems analysts, professionals who were not formally trained in social science, 
that shaped the orientation of policy analysis (Dunn, 1981:21). This policy orientation 
has been described as the 'Received View' (Majone, 1986:61). Majone argues that, 
despite changing and multiple disciplines involved in policy analYSiS, there exists: 
a continuous conceptual thread [which] runs from the early studies of military and 
industrial operations, of strategy and logistics, through the broader concerns of systems 
analysis in the 1960s, to much of contemporary policy analysis (ibid). 
This conceptual thread contains some basic categories of analysiS involving the 
decomposition of problems into analytic components. The components are empirically 
and quantitatively distinguishable, and therefore amenable to some system of logic. 
Ideally, this logic ought to lead to the maximization of some end. This maximization, 
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Majone says, relies upon an intuitive notion that to be rational involves maximizing 
something. For example, it would appear rational to maximise the harvest of some 
natural resource if it would increase public wellbeing. But, in the case of policy 
science, this maximizing concept of rationality has led to an overemphasis on 
allocation problems, decisionism, unitarianism and intellectualism. These, according 
to Majone, are the "main reductionist features of the policy science model of policy making" 
(pg. 62). A brief analysis of each of these features will clarify the nature of the 
'received view'. 
Allocative problems are the mainstay of contemporary economics and much 
public policy analysis. Decisions about the distribution of scarce and contestable 
goods take on a technical focus, determining the point, for example, where the costs 
outweigh the benefits of a particular programme or development. Microeconomic 
theory provides the 'logic of choice' for this policy approach. Although highly 
developed, microeconomic theory has not escaped severe criticism on a number of 
fronts, including its reductionist approach to the 'economic man' model of the rational 
self-maximizer. The Received View, then, is characterised by a technical orientation 
and its reduction of policy problems to rather narrow concerns. 
Policy making is also popularly construed as decision making, though exactly 
what decision making is remains problematic (Majone, 1986:64; Hogwood and Cunn, 
1984:15). When construed as decision making, it attempts to situate all decisions 
within the immediate situation, ignoring the wider context. Such situations are then 
analytically resolved by modem decision theory. It deals with what immediately 
confronts the analyst and the probable consequences in the present situation (Majone, 
1986:65), but whether all problem situations can be adequately analyzed through this 
reductionist approach is an open question. If a situation' is analytically closed, that is, 
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consists of a relatively closed and simple system, then decisionism may be 
appropriate. But its ability to deal with 'wicked problems' (Fischer, 1993:172) is at best 
suspect.4 Decisionism is considered a feature of the Received View because it not only 
features prominently in contemporary policy analysis, but more significantly, it 
reflects an underlying commitment to a certain kind of analytical reductionism. 
Another feature of the 'received view' is unitarianism. This refers to decisions 
carried out by a single unified actor who has full authority and control over a 
situation. Though this idea has been treated as myth in much policy literature, Majone 
nevertheless argues this is "a dominant faith among supporters of the Received View and 
infact, a logical consequence of the standard model ofchoice" (1986:66). He draws a parallel 
between traditional policy analysis and traditional theory of the firm where "both 
organizations take decisions as monolithic units and carry out their choices in a frictionless 
and peifectly foreseeable manner" (ibid, pg. 67). To the extent that analysis relies upon 
this model, it is in danger of the serious flaw of assuming an actor's responses are 
unproblematically uniform and predictable. This form of technical control is consistent 
with the technical orientation of the Received View. 
Finally, Majone charges policy analYSis with being overly intellectual. This over-
intellectualization consists of a tendency to assume 'correct' decisions can always 
exist, and an emphasis upon technical aspects of a situation. Solutions are found by 
'calculation', and therefore tend to preclude skill or social interaction (ibid, pg. 68). 
As will be seen in Chapter Two, this proves to be a serious flaw. 
4 Fischer uses the term 'wicked problems' to refer to a class of problems without solutions, or only temporary 
or imperfect solutions. In contrast to the more 'malleable' problems governments have traditionally solved (local 
infra-structure), wicked problems come with no criteria for their resolution. NIMBY (not in my backyard), is a 
good example of a wicked problem. See also Rittel and Webber (1973) for an extended discussion of 'wicked' 
problems. 
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What typifies the Received View also characterises, to some extent, what has 
been called the 'analycentric' perspective (Dunn, 1981:73-75; Buhrs and Bartlett, 
1993:15-18). This perspective carries with it a very limited concern with the wider 
social, political, cultural or administrative issues affecting problem situations, and 
tends towards technical definitions and solutions for optimising outcomes (Buhrs and 
Bartlett, 1993:16). Biihrs and Bartlett note that most environmental policy uses an 
analycentric approach, and suggest that although the analycentric perspective has 
been useful in dealing with only a small range of issues, it "has become the standard 
conception of what policy analysis is in the minds of most politicians, citizens, and analysts" 
(pg. 17). This is not peculiar to environmental policy, but a tendency attributed to 
public policy generally (Dunn, 1981:21). 
I have presented general tendencies of contemporary policy analysis. They 
primarily tend to rely upon quantitative methods and technolOgical approaches to 
problem solving. They all involve some conception of rationality. By rationality, I 
simply mean they seek a coherent and consistent approach to problem solving. The 
goal of policy analysis is the solving, or mitigation of problems, and this requires the 
application of some form of rationality. It is to the assumptions of these rationalities 
that I now turn. 
1:1:2 Rationality 
The rationality informing analycentric policy analysis emerged out of, and thus 
is profoundly influenced by positivism. McCarthy (1978:137) notes that the term 
''functions more as a polemical epithet than as a designation for a distinct philosophical 
movement .... (I)t is difficult to specify a common "positivist ,; perspective". Having thus been 
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cautioned, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to the legacy of positivism (ibid). 
In order to understand what effects this legacy has, I need to explore its background. 
1:1:2:1 Positivism 
During the Enlightenment, Europe was in social and intellectual ferment. Central 
to the intellectual developments was the work of Isaac Newton (1642-1727)5 and his 
search for the underlying order and logic governing the universe. The universe could 
be described metaphorically as a large clock functioning through cause and effect. 
This model presupposes an ordered and consistent universe. The political significance 
of this can be seen through the work of Saint-Simon (1760-1825) who argued that the 
disintegration of the old political, intellectual, and cultural unity of Europe was best 
addressed by its reunification through the non-political, i.e., objective rule of scientists 
and technicians (Fischer, 1990:68-71). The creation of a new system ruled by 
technocrats fitted neatly with the growing mechanistic view of the world. But it was 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) who most fully developed the science for this project. It 
was from his writings that the idea of 'positive knowledge' was developed. "Comte 
emphasised that real knowledge (defined as empirical knowledge) is obtained only by the use 
of the "positivist method"" (Fischer, 1990:70, emphasis in original). This method was 
rooted in "the epistemological canons of the physical sciences" (ibid), and sought, through 
a unified system of knowledge for both the physical and social worlds, to discover 
general scientific laws of the natural and social world. 
5 His publication in 1687 of Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica had a major and lasting impact on 
scientific development. For a brief but useful discussion see Lund et aI., (1972:161-175). 
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One of the interesting outcomes of this approach is the way it deals with values. 
Essentially, only empirically derived propositions can be considered as candidates for 
truth.6 But value judgements, seen as emotional responses to life conditions (ibid, pg. 
73), cannot be considered 'true' in any scientific sense of the word. Scientific 'facts' 
relate in some direct way to a common and empirical experience of the world. 7 But 
values belong to the realm of the subjective and cannot be empirically assessed by 
positivist scientific methodologies. Nevertheless, they inform a large part of human 
behaviour, and therefore it would be foolish of science, in attempting to explain and 
predict social life, to ignore values. The response of positivist social science to this is 
the incorporation of utilitarian decision-making theory. This body of theory is 
designed to provide a normative decision criteria appropriate for values and bridge 
the fact/value divide. It does this by assuming there is no way to prove the 
superiority of one value system vis-a.-vis another, and then treating all value 
judgements, or value preferences, as empirical data. Once the data (value preferences) 
have been gathered and collated, the 'objective' principles of utility are engaged. In 
other words, values are 'givens', and utilitarianism simply seeks to maximise the 
values so the greatest amount of preferences are catered for, producing the maximum 
satisfaction for the greatest number. In effect, this approach allows an empirically 
driven science to derive 'facts' from social values. These 'facts' are then used in policy 
decisions. In Fischer's observation, this turns 'norms' into positivist 'facts' (ibid, pg. 
74). Positivism thus claims to avoid the problem of subjectivity and personal bias 
6 There could be another ground for a proposition to have truth value. If a proposition is tautological it can 
make a truth claim. For example, the statement 'a bachelor is an unmarried male', is true by definition, and does 
not have to refer to any empirical reality. However, a tautology, although a logical truth, is a vacuous proposition, 
and tells us nothing of the real world. 
7 In section '1:2' I address the epistemological issue of the existence of a 'real' world. For now, my aim is to 
explain the way in which positivism reduces all experiences to quantitative data. 
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(values) corrupting the production of knowledge, for only that which can be 
positively known to be 'true' need be admitted into policy analysis. 
Positivism forms a methodological backdrop to contemporary policy analysis. 
In Torgerson's view: "Policy analysis today bears the unmistakable imprint of the positivist 
heritage .... (/ts) influence ... has been persuasive not only in letter, but also in spirit" (1986:33). 
In part, it has provided a sense of optimism for social scientists and policy analysts 
that they could enjoy success similar to that of the natural sciences (Diesing, 1991:3,84; 
Barber, 1984:47). This hope has tended to lock policy analysis into a (positivist 
informed) methodological orientation highly receptive to certain types of analysis, 
usually involving forms of data quantification.8 While many analysts would admit 
this approach carries certain limitations, and they are sensitive to the various needs 
of the publics they serve (Durning, 1993:299), the positivist legacy shapes the way 
they think about the problem, the way they analyze it, and their proposed solutions. 
In short, it is a form of rationality that produces a particular view of the world. The 
adequacy of this view in meeting the needs of society is in question throughout this 
thesis. 
The form of rationality which emerged from the Enlightenment is not only felt 
through the legacy of positivism, but through the impact of two other demands, 
objectivism and instrumental rationality (Dryzek, 1990a:3-4). They provide, in 
Dryzek's somewhat wry view, "a complete guide for the would-be rational individual" 
(ibid). Given their importance as assumptions or motivations in contemporary policy 
analysis, I will outline their basic features. 
8 Martin (1990) suggests policy advice in New Zealand is necessarily biased towards 'things that can be 
quantified' (pg. 133). This is a potentially disadvantageous outcome of state sector reform, and highlights the 
influence of positivist orientations on current policy analysis. 
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1:1:2:2 Objectivism 
Objectivism9 can be understood as the dogmatic belief that human action ought 
to be guided by a set of criteria which appeal to universal standards available to all 
rational individuals. It assumes a "realm of basic, uninterpreted, hard facts that serves as 
the foundation for all empirical knowledge" (Bernstein, 1976:111) exists. Appeal to these 
'facts' legitimates empirical claims about the world. In other words, objectivism 
provides the only valid route to truth. In attempting to do so, it demonstrates a 
dogmatic character. 
Objectivism provides an underlying motivation for much of contemporary policy 
analysis (Dryzek, 1990a), as well as mainstream social science (Bernstein, 1976:112). 
This epistemological backdrop is important to my analysis for it shapes the types of 
analyses considered appropriate for the public sector and indeed, most rational policy 
analysis. In other words, it seeks to legitimate certain types of knowledge through 
appeal to the concept of objectivism. Given the widespread influence of objectivism, 
some understanding of its history will sharpen our perception of it. 
The assumptions of objectivism are rooted in concepts of Enlight:nment 
rationality, and revolve around the belief that our world is subject to laws which are 
able to be apprehended by rational men. lO This world was not only potentially 
coherent but epistemically stable. In its Kantian form, truth was transcendental, that 
is, transcended the particularities of individuals and communities. In the words of 
Harvey: 
9 In this thesis I differentiate between objectivism and objectivity. Objectivity retains the idea that there are 
indeed real empirical facts that can be known. Objectivism is rejected as epistemically inadequate. Please refer to 
section '1:2:1:3 Strong Objectivity' for this argument. 
10 Women were not considered to be rational in this way. This has significant epistemic implications and is 
examined in section '1:2'. 
 
 
 
 (t)he enlightenment project ... took it as axiomatic that there was only one answer to any 
question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered 
if we could only picture it rightly. But this presumed that there existed a single correct 
mode of representation which, if we could uncover it, (and this is what scientific and 
mathematical endeavours were about) would provide means to enlightenment ends 
(Harvey, 1989:27).  
Perhaps these ideas can best be illustrated by briefly looking at three key 
enlightenment thinkers, Descartes, Hume and Kant. Rene Descartes (1596 -1650) 
believed that through the rigorous use of reason 'clear and distinct ideas'  would 
emerge, ideas that were indubitable. These ideas would form the foundations of 
intellectual thought, and thus one could build a picture of 'reality' which was true or 
accurate. This knowledge was objective and therefore accessible to all rational persons.  
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 -1776) had a very different 
perspective on how one gained knowledge.   Unlike Descartes, who saw true 
knowledge derived ultimately from the process of thinking itself, Hume argued it was 
our mental perceptions of the world,  our  experiences,  which provided us with the 
truth about the world.   The world imprints itself  upon our minds much in the same 
way as light waves imprint  themselves  on a photographic film.  Our mind is viewed  
as a blank sheet upon which our sensory perceptions of the world are indelibly 
imprinted.  These sensory impressions become  the source of a clear and accurate 
picture of reality. This is known as Hume's empiricism.  
Kant (1724 -1804) took yet another approach with his transcendental or critical 
idealism. What we perceive through our senses is nothing but a set of undifferentiated 
sensory experiences. Unlike Hume, who argued that when we perceive a particular 
object such as a tree,   we experience the tree as a tree because it is imprinted upon our  
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minds like a photograph, Kant believed it was the structure of our minds which gave 
shape to our sensory perceptions. In other words, 'reality' does not mechanically 
imprint itself upon our minds, but rather, our minds shape otherwise undifferentiated 
sensory data. In one sense, we 'create' reality in our minds. More correctly, it is the 
inherent structure of our brains which grants us our view of reality. Our brain accepts 
this undifferentiated data which we receive through sensory experience, and shapes 
it in a particular way. This mental structure, according to Kant, is inescapable, and is 
common to all rational beings. Thus, human beings are able, according to the logic 
here, to come to a common understanding of reality. 
This last point is very important. Although differing in the details of their 
epistemology, these philosophers all share a common assumption, an assumption that 
lies at the heart of objectivism, namely that such a thing as THE truth about the world 
exists, and this truth is common to all rational beings. And if it is common to all 
rational beings, then there is a correct way to view the world. Those who do not share 
this view are not objective, and therefore irrational or sub-rational. This underlying 
idea of a fixed and rationally discernable reality informs objectivism and manifests 
itself in much contemporary policy analysis. 
1:1:2:3 Instrumental Rationality 
Objectivism provides an influential, though not necessary, assumption of 
instrumental rationality.l1 This form of rationality is defined by Dryzek as the 
"capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends" (1990a:4); it is without 
11 In section '1:2:3' I explain why the assumption of objectivism is not necessary for instrumental rationality, 
This first requires the critique of objectivism found in section '1:2:1', 
  
 
 doubt one of the dominant forms of rationality used in contemporary public policy 
analysis (Fischer, 1990:217, 347). Its influence can be assessed both historically and 
technically.  
Historically,   instrumental  rationality  was subjected to significant, and for a 
period of time,   unrelenting  criticism  in the wake of the social revolutions that took 
place in the 1960s.   The optimistic expectations of previous generations of policy 
analysts  and  social  scientists  gave  way  to  a search for 'social relevance' (ibid, pg 220).  
This was produced through a realization that many of the social policies of the 'Great 
Society' had failed. Continuing poverty, the urban crisis and the Vietnam War all 
'provided fuel for a rethink of the relationship of policy knowledge to power. Theories 
such as phenomenology12  and  a  resurgence  of  social  and  political  philosophy were 
put forward as solutions to the inability of positivist and instrumental rationalities to 
generate lasting and emancipatory policy.   A  primary  question  addressed  concerned  
the   fact/value   dichotomy  essential to instrumental rationality.     Should policy analysis  
continue to deal only with 'facts', and if not, given the growing recognition that 'facts' 
were  themselves  social constructions, what methodology could adequately deal with 
values?   Both  phenomenology  and  social and political philosophy were criticised as  
too normatively orientated and not able to generate a workable methodology "as they 
offered  no procedure for inference between competing hypotheses" (Fischer, 1990:223).  
An alternative diagnosis of the perceived failure of positivist methodologies 
charged  the problem was not the positivist or technical focus of policy science,   but 
rather its lack of 'empirical rigor'.   The solution was to increase the rigor of social 
science, thereby improving the empirical accuracy, and hence usefulness, of data.   This 
was the favoured approach in policy science, as Fischer notes:  
 
 
 
12 For a definition and examination of phenomenology see section '3:2:1:2 Phenomenological Analysis'.  
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supported by a rigorous statement of systems theory and its empirical methodology, the 
technocratic conception of social science managed to maintain its hold on the disciplines 
(ibid, pg. 223). 
Reassertion of a positivist orientation was central to this renewed scientific endeavour 
and was a significant factor in the ongoing development of instrumental rationality. 
If instrumental rationality can be understood in its (albeit recent) historical 
context, its influence on policy becomes even clearer when one examines its technical 
nature. This nature was transparent to the German sOciolOgist, Max Weber, who was 
convinced the rationalization of society taking place would lead to an 'iron cage' 
where human beings would become increasingly subservient to the power of 
bureaucracy and its instrumental rationality. As Alford notes: 
[Instrumental rationality] has done a great deal to liberate man's productive powers but 
little to liberate man himself .... [Through it] (m)en and women come to see themselves 
and others in terms of their role in the productive process rather than as individuals 
(1985:16). 
1his statement expresses an inherent dichotomy essential to a perceptive 
understanding of instrumental rationality. On one hand, there is the technical 
apparatus for gaining increased control over the natural world, and on the other hand 
there is the life-world, the world of culture and social interaction (Dryzek, 1990a:5). 
liabermas labels the inherent rationalities underlying these two components 
, 
Purposive-rational action and communicative action respectively (McCarthy, 1978:22). 
But it is the imposition of purposive-rational action into the life-world that is of 
Critical concern to Habermas (I will deal with some of these concerns in the next 
section '1:2 A Critique of these Assumptions'.) This concern leads Haberrnas to 
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undertake a lengthy examination of the nature of purposive-rational action 
(instrumental reason): 
"By "work" or purposive-rational action I understand either instrumental action or 
rational choice or their conjunction. Instrumental action is governed by technical rules 
based on empirical knowledge. In every case they imply empirical predictions about 
observable events, physical or social. These predictions can prove correct or incorrect. 
The conduct of rational choice is governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge. 
They imply deductions from preference rules (value systems) and decision procedures: 
these propositions are either correctly or incorrectly deduced. Purposive-rational action 
realises defined goals under given conditions. But while instrumental action organises 
means that are appropriate or inappropriate according to criteria of an effective control 
of reality, strategic action depends only on the correct evaluation of possible alternative 
choices, which results from calculation supplemented by values and maxims" 
(Habermas, 1971b:106, emphasis in original) 
Communicative action, the other component of human activity, will be dealt with at 
length in Chapter Two. Staying with the statement of Habermas on purposive-rational 
action, there needs to be some clarity about his distinction between instrumental 
action and rational choice. I have subsumed these in the concept of instrumental 
rationality. This may appear an illegitimate move in view of the above distinction, 
but, while there is an analytiC distinction between them, it is not between two types 
of action. Rather, "(r)ational decision and the application of technically appropriate means 
appear rather to be two moments of purposive-rational action" (McCarthy, 1978:24). 
Because these concepts can be considered as 'moments' in an otherwise unified and 
coherent action, their conjunction into the singular concept of instrumental rationality 
is justified. 
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Instrumental reason, then, is orientated towards the achievement of pre-selected 
ends. Given that it has no role in the generation of such ends, it is, ostensibly, value 
free. Its rationality is centred on effectiveness, the ability to achieve ends in the most 
efficient manner. Efficiency is, in a world of scarcity, an important measure of 
effectiveness in that a desired outcome will be framed within a context of limited 
resources. The idea that positivist rationality involves maximization, as discussed 
earlier, is also true for instrumental rationality (Fischer, 1990:227). Efficiency is an 
outcome of application to technique and knowledge of empirical reality. This focus 
on technical appropriateness and probability of success characterises instrumental 
reason. 
The relationship between instrumental rationality and objectivism ought to be 
clearer now. By assuming objectivism, instrumental rationality is provided with a 
basis for trusting in the efficacy of technique and evaluation of empirical reality. 
Objectivism's assumption of the availability of impartial knowledge is also assumed 
by instrumental rationality and this forms a (assumed) non-problematic basis for 
trusting empirical predictions and analytic technique. Instrumental rationality could 
adopt a form of pragmatism, and ignore the larger theoretical questions of 
epistemology. However, instrumental rationality is historically reliant on the older 
tradition of objectivism, at least in informing its basic confidence in its analytical 
abilities. I am not arguing a causal connection between the two, for instrumental 
reason developed largely through the technical requirements of the industrial 
revolution and growing bureaucracy. Causal connection or not, instrumental 
rationality would appear to accept the basic objectivist concepts of the stability of 
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knowledge and a value-free methodology.13 In this, it can be conceptualised as a 
methodology of objectivism, at least while it remains in the form I have explicated. 
One final dominant assumption needs to be examined. It is really an outcome 
of the preceding assumptions and is sociological in nature. I refer to the 
Institutionalization of technique and those who possess it, that is, technocracy. 
1:1:3 Technocracy 
Strictly speaking, technocracy is the governing of society by technical experts, 
a vision, incidentally, that enthralled Comte. However, this does not describe western 
liberal democracies, for the authority to govern is legally concentrated in the hands 
of elected representatives. More accurately, technocracy is the product of political and 
research institutions committed to a comprehensive and almost exclusive reliance on 
technique (defined below) to produce public policy. These analysts are highly 
specialised and form a professional class of expertise which exerts a Significant 
influence over policy research and advice. 
This technocratic orientation forms a type of culture within which policy analysis 
takes place. It is in no wayan omnipotent culture, but it does characterise the 
analytical landscape of much public policy. There are two parts to this. The first is the 
nature of technique, while the second describes the way technique is institutionalised 
and reproduced. I will deal first with the nature of technique. 
Ellul (1964) defines technique not as machines, technology, or various ways of 
achieving an end. Rather, "technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and 
13 A useful definition of methodology is "an attempt to reconstruct the working logic of the investigatory process" 
(Fischer, 1990:219). See section '3:2' for a more detailed elaboration. 
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having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" 
(pg. xxvi). This involves a number of characteristics, including rationality. In Ellul's 
words: 
(t)his rationality, best exemplified in systematization, division of labor, creation of 
standards, production of norms, and the like, involves two distinct phases: first, the use 
of "discourse" in every operation; this excludes spontaneity and personal creativity. 
Second, there is the reduction of method to its logical dimension alone. Every 
intervention of technique is, in effect, a reduction offacts, forces, phenomena, means, and 
instruments to the schema of logic (ibid, pg. 79). 
In Ellul's analysis, modern culture is fundamentally technologically based. Technique 
governs every aspect of human behaviour and therefore has come to underpin the 
norms and values of society. While this analysis may be too sweeping, and does not 
account for the growing resistance to technocracy of social movements such as 
environmentalism (Roger, 1985:213), it does indicate the instrumental orientation of 
much of modern culture. With reference to the administrative state, it reinforces the 
view that its epistemological orientation is instrumental and analytic (Dryzek, 
1990b:99) and governed by impersonal technique. Efficiency becomes the ultimate 
criterion in evaluation. The outcome of this is a methodological 'capture' of policy 
analysis by technique and the elimination of other forms of knowledge gathering and 
analysis, forms that do not fit with the assumptions of technocracy. Once again, my 
argument is not that technique is unnecessary, but that it is only one component in 
the creation of effective public policy, particularly when dealing with 'wicked 
problems'. 
The second aspect of technocracy deals with the way technique is 
institutionalised and reproduced in society. It concerns the organization of knowledge 
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and makes some assumptions about power. But first, a necessary disclaimer. Much 
of the literature on technocracy leans towards the view that the 'expert classes' exert 
significant power (e.g., Giddens, 1980:Chapt 14). However, it is not yet clear how 
technocracy affects the relationship between knowledge and power in Western 
societies. Indeed: 
we must be equally suspicious of the notion that ... power is becoming 'diffused 
downwards' among those with specialised technical expertise, as we must of the idea that 
the 'technocrats' (however this term is interpreted) constitute a newly emergent 
dominant class (ibid, pg. 263). 
Giddens is not alone in his reservation. In Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, 
a significant exploration of technocratic themes, Fischer states he is not offering a 
"rigorous theory of technocracy or technocratIc power" (1990:14), for this needs more 
attention. Rather, he offers an illumination on some technocratic themes, especially 
concerning the ways technocracy sustains "increasingly undemocratic forms of decision 
making". The following discussion does not assume the ascension of a technical class 
poised to replace the political power elite. Decision making power may largely lie in 
the hands of politicians, although technocrats can facilitate or limit the 'competence' 
of policies (Giddens, 1980:263).14 The concern here is the nature of policy advice 
given to decision makers. Of course, it must be assumed that there is some real 
influence exercised by the ability of the technical experts to define a problem and 
propose policy advice; otherwise, there would not be much point in analyzing policy 
analysis. Arguing that technocracy stems from a particular epistemological focus 
14 The extent to which decision makers accept problems as defined, and solutions proposed by a technocracy, 
that is, the degree of influence exerted, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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constitutes a different task from specifying the degree of influence it can exert on 
decision makers. The first point is the purpose of this section. 
Technocracy developed as the sheer volume of knowledge increased, particularly 
in this century. A corresponding intellectual division of labour also occurred, leading 
to the creation of 'expert cultures', groups of people who share a conunon expertise 
that sets them apart from the 'lay person'. These are knowledge based cultures, a fact 
that permeates the "very form and content of advanced industrial society itself' (Fischer, 
1990:13). This permeation affects public policy which is itself "becoming increasingly 
subject to expert cultures" (Dryzek, 1990a:112). Specialization is a key attribute of these 
expert cultures, and this tends to produce an epistemological authority that is not 
easily challenged. In highly specialized and technical areas, the relevant knowledge 
may be held by only a small group of people. This can have the affect of the public, 
the non-expert conununity, deferring to the (perceived) greater knowledge of the 
experts. It can also result in an expectation by the experts that the public ought to 
defer to their greater knowledge (McMillin and Nielsen, 1991:553). This in itself is not 
wrong, nor could one argue that it is unique to twentieth century advanced industrial 
society. Priests and elders, kings and rulers have all had the role of defining what is 
true. However, the nature of specialized expert knowledge comes at the cost of 
integrated, comprehensive knowledge, for the nature of specialist knowledge leads to 
a focus on manageable data, comprehensible systems, but is not able to cope with the 
oftentimes profoundly complex systems that make up ecolOgical and social life 
(Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987:146-147, Bartlett 1990, Biihrs and Bartlett, 1993:10). 
The professionalisation of expertise adds another dimension to technocracy. It 
can be argued that as policy experts carved out a niche for themselves in the 
intellectual labour market, they developed something in need of protection, namely 
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their status and livelihoods. Typical of professional groups in general, this led to the 
protection or enhancement of their share of the intellectual market through "the 
systemic enforcement of controlled 'closure' of occupational entry" (Giddens, 1980:186, see 
also Diesing, 1991:193). While policy analysts are not as professionalised as medicine 
or law by having strict entry criteria, professionalisation has been charged with 
serving its own interests (Fischer, 1990:357). This introduces incentives to protect one's 
'market share' of intellectual property and to resist challenges to its devaluation. 
These motives function regardless of the empirical 'facts of the matter at hand' and 
show how the culture of expertise adds a sociological dimension to the production of 
knowledge. This is important for my argument because both the intellectual reliance 
upon technical approaches to problem solving and the sociological defence of those 
approaches (and their output) create technocracy. 
What I described above is the institutionalization of technique through expertise 
and profeSSionalism. Technique, along with its supporting assumptions of positivism 
and objectivism, and its enactment through instrumental rationalities, forms the 
dominant landscape of contemporary policy analysis. While much has been achieved 
through these approaches, their inadequacies in the face of the complexity of 
environmental, economic and social problems is of growing concern (Dryzek, 1990a:3; 
Durning 1993:297). Yet I have not offered any Significant critique of these 
assumptions, and the question still begs as to what, exactly, is of concern about them. 
Surely technique, with its use of instrumental reason, has worked extremely well over 
the last 200 years, producing many benefits for humankind. Indeed, this is true. But 
as pointed out in the introduction, all is not well with the human community. 
Reliance on the achievements of the past, and their assumptions, will not resolve 
current problems. Therefore, I now turn to a detailed' critique of these assumptions 
in order to identify their weaknesses. 
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1:2 A CRITIQUE OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS 
A central claim of this thesis is that policy making theory, and by implication 
practice, is flawed to the extent that it relies uncritically upon the assumptions of 
objectivism, positivism, instrumental rationality and supports technocracy. Critiques 
of these assumptions are numerous (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Dryzek, 1990a; Ellul, 1964; 
Fischer, 1990; Feyerabend, 1987; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Harding, 1991; 
McCarthy, 1978; Rule, 1978). Having established these assumptions and practices as 
intimately related to contemporary policy analYSiS, the immediate task is to provide 
a sustained critique of them. This exposes their incoherence and/or limitations, 
resulting in a more informed assessment of their role in policy analysiS. This in turn 
provides space for alternative and more theoretically promising policy approaches. 
I begin with a critique of objectivism, because this essentially forms an epistemological 
foundation for positivism and instrumental rationality, and is therefore primary. 
Following this, I offer a critique of positivism. Instrumental rationality is then 
criticised, although not discarded in entirety, and is rehabilitated. Finally, technocracy, 
in particular the role of the policy analyst, will be critically examined. This opens the 
way for a reconstruction of the policy process in Chapter Two. 
1:2:1 Objectivism 
This is the belief that "in the final analysis there is a realm of basic, uninterpreted, 
hard facts that serve as the foundation for all empirical knowledge" (Bernstein, 1976:111). 
This concept is derived from the idea that we live in an epistemically stable world. 
By this, I mean the world is inhabited by entities and objects that exist regardless of 
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the mind of the observer (Feyerabend, 1987:5). The existence of these entities and 
objects is not contingent upon the human observer, for they exist independently of 
any 'knower'. Further, the nature of these objects and entities is not determined by 
the 'knower' and also exist independently of the human observer. For example, the 
fact that human beings cannot live very long without water to drink is not simply a 
volitional decision, but a biological given. This knowledge is true irrespective of the 
beliefs of individual humans. Objectivism thus holds that knowledge (belief that is 
true) is by nature (human) value(s)-free and is gained only by impartiality and 
dispassionate rejection of human bias (Harding, 1991:138). This way, "one [can] separate 
justified belief from mere opinion, or real knowledge from mere claims to knowledge" (ibid). 
The conclusion is that objectivism provides the only valid route to truth. 
There are serious problems with objectivism as I have formulated it here. The 
critical problem is its failure to take account of the social-situatedness of knowledge 
(Harding, 1991:118). This results in reducing the objectivity of knowledge, rather than 
achieving its explicit intention of increasing objectivity. While this may appear to be 
a bizarre claim, it is in fact a Significant criticism of objectivism.1s However, a clear 
theoretical delineation between the notions of objectivism and objectivity is necessary 
in order to justify this criticism and its subsequent claim for objectivity.16 This will 
be done in three successive stages. First, I develop the notion of the social-situatedness 
of knowledge, then elaborate standpoint epistemology, and, finally, reconstitute the 
notion of objectivity (as opposed to objectivism). This provides both a criticism of, and 
Iln answer to, objectivism. 
-
15 Harding (1991) has explored this theme at length in her book, Whose Knowledge? Whose Science? Thinking 
&Qm Women's Lives. 
16 See also section '2:1:2' where I develop the concept of communicative rationality. This concept further adds 
III the idea of objectivity, building on the ideas developed here. 
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1:2:1:1 The Social-Situatedness of Knowledge 
Objectivism holds to a notion that knowledge is somehow embedded within the 
objects to be known and (simply) needs to be extracted (McCarthy, 1978:57; Pusey, 
1987:25). Thus, the nature of the objects of knowledge shape knowledge.17 The 
scientist's task is to uncover the true nature of the objects of knowledge. This 
presupposes a dichotomous relationship between the object (or subject of 
investigation) and the observer. In its vulgar form, It assumes there is a one way flow 
of data in the formation of knowledge. Empirical data is experienced by the obserVer 
much as a blank slate receives the markings of a writer. The nature of the data is 
what constitutes knowledge. Objectivism, on this account, is fatally flawed; it fails to 
account for the presence of the knower and fails to take account of the social-
situatedness of knowledge. 
Objectivism assumes the observer comes to the entity without any preconceived 
notions or organizing categories. They view "the world of experience as possessing a 
coherent structure unimposed by the perceiver" (ShapirO, 1981:11). However, it is not 
possible to Simply soak up sensory input and end up with knowledge. We must 
necessarily organise this input into some sense of order (Pusey, 1987:22). This is done 
through language and means we must learn how to organise the mass of data to 
which we are exposed into a coherent form. In order to make sense of what we 
encounter, we must rely upon interpretation based upon what we already know. This 
17 By knowledge I mean true and justified belief, i.e., for something to be classified as knowledge it must be 
true that p., one must believe that p., and one must be in a position to know that p. (Speake, 1979:194). According 
to these conditions, it is unnecessary to say one has true knowledge because by definition knowledge is true. Also, 
One may have false belief, but one cannot have false knowledge. 
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is an important insight from the hermeneutic18 tradition; "No knowledge without 
foreknowledge. That is, we form an expectation about the unknown from what we "know"" 
(Diesing, 1991:108).19 Therefore, we come to a situation already predisposed to 
particular types of interpretation for "interpretation always mediates between scientists and 
the world" (Diesing, 1991:313). This undermines the objectivist idea that facts simply 
exist out there, and that the only valid form of knowledge consists in apprehending 
these facts. Rather, facts are a product of the interpretation of minds and of the 
arrangement of sensory input consistent with the person's language and culture. 
Objectivism also presupposes it is possible to discard one's prejudices and values 
and come to a situation as an impartial observer. In order to be objective, personal 
feelings, values, and desires must be purposely set aside, so as to minimise their 
distortive effects. However, an objective person, in the sense used above, is a person 
without a context. They have, in the words of Young (1990), a "view from nowhere" (pg. 
100). This elimination of personal bias and partiality can only take place "by abstracting 
from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view" (Young, 1990:97). 
However, this is really only an illusion created by the idea of objectivism, and it 
cannot actually take place for all knowledge is SOcially situated (Harding, 1991:119). 
The claim that knowledge is socially situated follows from the argument above. 
Not only are individuals unable to avoid epistemic reliance upon prior knowledge in 
their interpretation of data, the prior knowledge itself is socially constructed. Diesing 
(1991) provides an illuminating account of the construction of knowledge within the 
social sciences. His compelling argument is that knowledge produced by science is "a 
18 Hermeneutics is a discipline concerned with interpretation. Originally developed as a means of detennining 
the meaning of Christian Scripture, it has developed into a wider project concerned with understanding and 
interpretation. The intention is to recover the original intention of the writer or speaker (see Thompson, 1981). 
19 Chapter Two explores this in greater depth. 
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manufactured commodity" (pg. 201) resulting from a complex mix of social, cognitive 
and political factors. Scientific practice is all of these 'simultaneously' (pg. 190). This 
argument highlights the narrow focus of objectivist theory, for it relies upon an 
abstracted reason, an approach which does not consider the actual practice of science. 
It is non-contextual in methodology, and therefore fails to see wider influences which 
affect the types of knowledge generated. For example, influences considered by 
Diesing (1991) include political factors, such as science politics, cognitive and 
personality factors and institutional structures. These produce a research environment 
riddled with fallibility and subjectivity and limited by its context. Diesing is not 
arguing that useful knowledge cannot be produced, but simply that serious account 
needs to be taken of all the factors that shape knowledge. 
Perhaps ironically, Western science is thwarted by its own lOgic. In its attempt 
to use reason to generate knowledge which is free from the constraints of tradition, 
dogma and authority (partial or culturally bound beliefs), it sought to appeal to some 
universal or foundational principle. This principle is assumed to be free from 
impartiality and bias and enables rational criticism of social beliefs. Rational 
endeavour was to unearth partiality and replace it with objectivity. This very logic 
does indeed unearth partiality and bias, but in the very sanctuary of Western science 
itself! This partiality and bias (I confer no negative connotations here) is inescapable, 
for science always reflects its cultural context. Harding (1991) puts it this way: 
Western scientific thought, no less than the thought of other cultures, has 
distinctive cultural patterns. I always see through my community's eyes and begin 
thought with its assumptions. Or, in other words, my society can "observe" the 
World only through my eyes (and others'), and cem begin to think only with my 
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assumptions (and others'). In an important sense, my eyes are not my own .... (pg. 
100). 
For this reason, the claims of objectivism to an impartial knowledge are false, for the 
partiality of culture (one's viewpoint) is inescapable.20 
Knowledge is also socially situated in other ways. Harding's (1991) account of 
feminist standpoint epistemology goes beyond the boundaries of the social science 
community which formed the focus for Diesing and produces a more radical account 
of knowledge production. She argues it is not only culture in a general sense, but 
social location which shapes one's assumptions. Gender, race, and class are three 
commonly mentioned social locations which confer different experiences and views 
of the world on their members. Drawing on the work of Marx, Engels and Lukacs, she 
argues human activity not only shapes what we do (material life), but shapes what 
we know. Human material life "sets limits on human understanding" (1991:120). It 
follows that women's lives present them with a different experience from that of men. 
But it has been men's lives upon which the scientific project has been established. 
Therefore, to the extent that science ignores the experiences of women (and non-white, 
non middle class persons), it functions as an epistemologically partial enterprise, 
culpable of the very biases it sought to eliminate. To make sense of this claim, we 
need to examine standpoint epistemology, for it clearly justifies this claim and 
furthers criticism of objectivism. 
20 I do not imply here that one is bounded by a fixed and unchangeable partiality, what Gadamer (1975) refers 
to as a closed horizon. Rather, reflexivity enables a shift in perspective, and indeed, the possibility for radical 
:ange in one's assumptions. But the point nevertheless remains that one can never avoid some assumptions, and 
erefore one remains partial, although perhaps self-consciously so. 
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1:2:1:2 Standpoint Epistemology 
Standpoint epistemology has developed from feminist and Marxist theory and 
precisely because of this heritage it offers a powerful critique of objectivism.21 
Central to feminist critique of Western reason (including objectivism) is the claim that 
the dichotomous separation of reason from emotion produces an intrinsic partiality 
in the production of knowledge. Here, the influence of Cartesian dualism on Western 
concepts of knowledge is profound. This notion forces a dichotomy between reason 
and emotion, fact and value, objective and subjective.22 While the use of conceptual 
categories is necessary for understanding, they are artificial because they are 
impositions of mind on the world. These constructs, such as reason over emotion, are 
products of particular cultural conditions and have epistemological outcomes. In 
traditional epistemology, reason dominated emotion, and men's knowledge 
(traditionally based on reason) marginalized women's knowledge (deemed to be 
emotionally based). However, feminist standpoint epistemology argues that: 
knowledge creation incorporates the use offeeling and intuition - elements marginalized 
or invisibilized by the traditional Western epistemic construction. Thus, a separation 
between (reason and emotion) creates an artificial dichotomization of knowledge creation 
<Rixecker, 1994:124). 
This denial of emotion as an epistemic resource produces partiality in knowledge 
prodUction. However, recognition of such partiality begs a further question; what 
-
Th~ ~Y fo~s here is on feminist theory, and therefore I do not explore the Marxist roots of standpoint theory. 
Hardin IS no SIngle a~eed upon articulation of feminist standpoint epistemology (see Rixecker, 1994). However, 
I hay gh(991) prOVIdes an 'expanded conception of feminist standpoint epistemology' (Rixecker, 1994), and so 
e c osen to use her version. • 
2:1 ( "tbe~er here to objective in the same sense I use for objectivism; knowledge that is universal, and whose truth 
Itllctens.e for all rational individuals. Subjective is its polar opposite; knowledge that is merely local, private and, 
lon, not applicable to public knowledge. 
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other potential areas of knowledge are being marginalized? These marginalized areas 
constitute potential epistemic resources. Harding (1991) develops this theme in her 
standpOint epistemology. Since knowledge is SOCially situated, knowledge production 
which systematically ignores some social locations while appropriating certain others 
is epistemically weak. But in what ways is this the case? The notion of standpOint 
provides an answer. A standpoint is not the same as a perspective (Harding, 
1991:123). In Harding's example, a perspective relates to personal experiences of 
women. But women's experiences in themselves cannot be grounds for "knowledge 
claims about nature and social relations" (ibid), for experiences are SOCially constructed. 
Also, Harding points out that women (like men) can say all sorts of things that are 
'scientifically inadequate'. So experience per se is not grounds for knowledge claims 
about such things as the nature of social relations. However, seeing women's lives as 
an objective location23 from which to begin research is the essence of a standpoint. 
Standpoint moves beyond individual experience and provides a location from which 
to generate theory. It is from the standpoint of women's lives that research can begin. 
Because women's lives have traditionally been devalued, they have been overlooked 
as a starting point for knowledge generation. When researchers reverse the dominant 
order of interpretation and treat women's lives as 'normal' and men's lives as 'other', 
Whole new insights about social structur~ are potentially available.24 As Harding 
notes: 
_ 1
23 
An objective location is a standpoint, a shared social position which is identifiable, although initially often 
~n y to those whom share this location. These locations are not fixed or final, but are contextually useful for 
eVeloping knowledge. An objective location is not constituted by particular idiosyncratic experiences, but by 
COmmonalities in social location, and, more significantly, the theories which emerge from these locations. 
24 I . 
"e I t IS not just 'social structure' where new insights can occur. For example, Ynestra King (1989) argues that 
III~o ogy requires a feminist perspective. Without a. thorough feminist analysis of social domillQtion that reveals the 
l'Xaerconnected roots of misogyny and hatred of nature, ecology remains an abstraction: it is incomplete" (pg. 24). A second 
of tnple concerns evolutionary theories of early human adaptation. Morgan (1985) provides two competing sets 
"III ~il~ati?n, one from a standpoint of male research, and the other from a female standpoint. The results are 
lUninating as they are entertaining. 
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if we start from the "dailiness" (oj) women's lives, we will come to some 
understandings of both women's and men's lives very different from the accounts 
favoured in conventional social theory" (1991:129). 
Standpoint epistemology is not limited to women's lives, but any group that 
stands in a marginalized position within society. There are two results from all this. 
I~irst, it opens up improved possibilities for the generation of adequate or more 
informed knowledge - what Harding calls a 'culture's best beliefs'. Second, it forms 
a powerful argument against an objectivism that hUlds impartiality as necessary for 
objective knowledge. As we have seen, not only is impartiality not possible, it actually 
produces less objective knowledge. However, if objectivism is untenable, how can I 
claim a more 'objective' knowledge? To answer this, I need to examine the notion of 
'strong objectivity'. 
1:2:1:3 Strong Objectivity 
If we reject objectivism, it may seem to follow that some form of relativism is 
the only alternative}5 for once we reject an indubitable foundation for knowledge, 
how do we adjudicate between competing truth claims? According to Bernstein (1983) 
relativism has: 
no substantive overarching framework or single metalanguage by which we can 
rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative 
paradigms (pg. 8). 
~----------------~lSee HOllis and Lukes (1982) for extended discussion on various types of relativism. They identify five types; 
IhIa th' c~nceptual, perceptual, relativism of truth and relativism of reason. I do not distinguish between these in 
eslS. 
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~~ut is this indeed the only possible conclusion? Standpoint epistemology claims it is 
not. Harding (1993) provides a useful approach by highlighting two problematic 
positions in conventional Western thinking. The first is 'transcendental or ahistorical 
t(mndationalism' (pg. 141) which rejects alternative views, thereby remaining 
(unconsciously) enmeshed in parochialism. By parochialism, I mean one's familiar and 
taken for granted context. The second is 'experiential foundationalism' (ibid) where 
the self becomes the sole criterion for legitimating knowledge. I will roughly construe 
these positions as objectivism and relativism respectively, at least for heuristic 
purposes. Harding then proposes the following moves. First: 
The challenge is to extract the illuminating kernel from its false and mystifying shell 
in each of these positions. On the one hand we should be able to decide the validity of 
a knowledge claim apart from who speaks it; this is the desirable legacy from the 
conventional vieuJ (1993:141). 
If truth claims are decided merely by who makes them, power becomes the deciding 
criterion. This is hardly sufficient basis for an epistemology. For one thing, we live in 
a world with real biological and physical limits, and are not free to construe the world 
simply as we would like (e.g., Caldwell, 1990:127-150). On the other hand, Harding 
argues that it does matter who says what. For example: 
when people speak from the opposite sides of power relations, the perspective from the 
lives of the less powerful can provide a more objective view than the perspective from 
the lives of the more powerful (Harding 1993:141). 
She argues it is absurd to suggest that the views of African American slaves about 
slavery were more partial and disinterested than their white owners. Indeed, the view 
from the lives (standpoint) of slaves provides a uniquely objective insight into slavery, 
an ObjeCtivity not available to slave owners. 
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This reconstruction of the problem enables us to see the truth buried in the 
traditional epistemic construction, as well as the insight of relativism that context 
matters. The tension this produces emerges from the either/or construction of the 
Iproblem'. But the choice need not ,be between objectivity or relativism, for this 
dialectic forces us back into traditional Cartesian assumptions of dichotomy between 
reason and emotion, men and women, fact and value. As argued above, these forms 
of dichotomy are the source of the current epistemological inadequacy I criticise. 
Further, knowledge is never static, fixed or unchanging, as I argue at length in 
Chapter Two. This reduces the (epistemological) need26 to conceptualise knowledge 
as the product of impartial or supra-contextual principles or methodologies. Once we 
allow for a more reflexive epistemology, we will not be so concerned about 
universalising knowledge. As Diesing (1991) insightfully notes: 
The truth that we produce is a temporary, changing truth for our time, not an 
absolute truth .... There is no instant truth or falsity. Instead, knowledge is produced 
by a community or tradition ... (pg. 325). 
Knowledge as the product of community or tradition enables the production of more 
empirically accurate and truthful knowledge, provided there is no systematic 
exclusion of non-dominant groups nor devaluation of their knowledge. The 
standpoint of minority groups provides a huge epistemic resource which has, to this 
pOint, been largely ignored. This is not to say every alternative standpoint will always 
produce significant advancements of knowledge. But they do provide a significantly 
increased possibility for improved objectivity, for they expand the epistemic base from 
---------------------26 ltaiti It may not deal so easily with the psychological need (or habit) for the idea that 'our truth' is the only 
ll\ate way to produce scientific knowledge. 
which  research is carried  out.27   Thus,   feminist  standpoint  epistemology  actually 
radicalizes   the   Enlightenment  project  by producing an objectivity greater than the 
androcentric  Enlightenment  was able to produce.28   Objectivism, then,  provides an  
inadequate foundation for policy analysis, and is rejected  as a theoretical framework. 
I now turn to a critique of positivism. 
 
1:2:2 Positivism 
 
Recalling the discussion of positivism in section 1:1:2:1, the term is used  as a 
general  legacy  rather than specific sense.   It refers to a refusal to treat as knowledge  
anything   that  cannot  be   empirically demonstrated.   This  empirical orientation  is 
manifest  in  a  need to reduce data to  quantifiable terms.   It follows from this that a  
positivist methodology is  the only  way to  produce  ‘real’ knowledge. 
 The preceding critique of objectivism ought to be sufficient to destabilise any 
notion of knowledge being simply accessible to the ‘correct’ methodologies. There is 
no such thing  as a pre-conceptual ‘fact’;  all facts are socially situated.   Even simple 
data  that  are easily quantifiable assume a social location and are built  on  particular 
assumptions.  Deciding what, exactly, will count as appropriate data, is an act of pre- 
judgment  where exclusionary and inclusionary decisions are made.29   Positivism  is 
  
27 DeWalt (1994) provides  some interesting  examples of  combining indigenous knowledge systems  with  
scientific knowledge systems.   DeWalt  argues  combining  knowledge  systems  does no  automatically  guarantee 
improved or more useful knowledge,  but  he  calls  for  more  effective  and  creative  interactions  between these 
systems so as to enhance this possibility. 
 
28 I do not  infer that feminism  shares  all the goals  of  the  Enlightenment,   but simply  that, in this respect, 
standpoint epistemology goes further, and thus continues, the Enlightenment search for objective knowledge. 
 
29 There are two points here.   First,   the fact  that  human beings,   for example,   need air to breathe cannot 
rationally be denied.   What potentially could be denied is the theory   which explains why we need air.   Perhaps a 
better  explanation could  be generated by approaching the question from a different angle. Therefore,  what I deny 
is  the idea  that humans can  have  access to  unmediated reality –  the  world as it ‘really is’.   This is fiction,  not 
because  there is no  ‘real world’ out there,   but because it is always  mediated  through  particular social locations. 
For this reason, reflexivity is essential in all epistemological endeavours for it will help produce ‘better’ knowledge, 
 
flawed because it nurtures a dogmatic quality which resists any knowledge claim not 
empirically grounded. The critical point here is not that data quantification cannot be  
useful in scientific endeavour. Rather, the unwarranted exclusion of other forms and  
methodologies   of   knowledge  production  results  in  serious  limitations  (such  as  
reduced objectivity)  of   positivist  methods.     For this reason, positivism,   but not  
empirical quantification per se, is rejected as a valid process of knowledge generation.  
The positivism I reject is exclusionary in its basic assumption that knowledge equals  
positive empirical data. It is the general legacy and orientation I reject, but this ought  
not be construed as a rejection  of empirical  methodologies  in  general.30Nevertheless, 
some further comments are necessary to understand the relation of empirical research 
to a discursive epistemology. 
 Empirical knowledge is confronted with an unresolved question of logic. Such 
Knowledge  is supposedly derived from one’s  personal experience of an object.  The 
problem is  that  although  we may be  certain  about our  experience,    we cannot be 
certain about what another person experiences, for those experiences are fundamentally  
private. Diesing (1991) poses this problem by assuming we see a black crow in front 
of us (pgs. 11-12). But how, he asks, are we to be sure our friend sees the same thing, 
or  that  she  is  telling  the  truth?   We  cannot  ‘test’  her  sense  experience for it is  
inaccessible to us.   We  are  left  relying  on  some form  of  intermediary,    namely  
communication.  There is no way logic can resolve this problem, so Diesing concludes  
“Science is founded on nearly meaningless statements” (1991:12). 
 
 
That is, knowledge which assists human wellbeing. On this notion of assistance to human wellbeing, see Rorty(1982)  
30 I  do not address   the various theories of scientific knowledge production in  this thesis,   for it lies somewhat  
tangential to  my primary purpose of  articulating  communicative  rationality.  Diesing  (1982; 1991)  provides 
interesting accounts of these theories in relation to policy science and social science respectively. 
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This problem of logic can be by-passed pragmatically through the use of 
discourse, even if one has to resort to rhetoric; "Stupid! That's a crow!" (ibid). What we 
share is language, not sense data. Empirical statements are based in shared language, 
and disputes over interpretations of data are also rooted in language. This does not 
mean we cannot appeal to our sense experiences in a disagreement, but any resolution 
will come through the mediation of language. Moreover, it is primarily shared 
language which produces theory, not shared sense experience or observation. Diesing 
(1991), in reference to phYSicists, puts it well: 
(P)hysicists do not have a tree of definitions m which every theoretical term 
eventually is defined in terms of elementary observables. Instead, they have a network 
of concepts connected at a few points to observation (pg. 13). 
While the interrelation between language and observation is more complex than 
presented here, it ought to be clear that a naive reliance on empirical observation does 
not in itself improve the prospects for knowledge. What is clearer is the importance 
of discourse in the formation of empirical knowledge. 
Dryzek (1990a) takes this theme even further with his examination of the opinion 
survey in social research. Ostensibly, opinion surveys are quintessentially 'scientific' 
for they provide empirical and quantifiable knowledge of social processes. But in the 
survey's attempt to quantify opinions, Dryzek claims they "produce only a 
fundamentally flawed account of politically relevant human dispositions" as well as 
"rein[orc(ing) a prevailing political order of instrumental domination and control ... " (pg. 
153). Thus, he argues opinion surveys 'mismeasure' human life. 
Part of the difficulty in understanding this criticism is the 'invisibility' of the 
roots of the problem. All interpretations draw on prior concepts and understandings, 
that is, theory. This applies no less to the reading of a scientific instrument than to 
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literary interpretation, and suggests what Kuhn (1970) has well noted: science is 
culturally conditioned. Scientific instruments are cultural artifacts and therefore are 
properly the products of discourse. The particular discourse is usually hidden from 
view simply because scientists, through common usage of their instruments, take for 
granted the discourse that supports these instruments. Thus, what appears to be as 
value-free an activity as one could imagine, e.g., the reading of a scientific instrument, 
is in fact constituted by values. It is a subtle value orientation of the opinion survey 
which leads Dryzek to conclude it "contributes to the dominant political order" 
(1990a:172), thereby resisting alternative and potentially epistemically relevant 
discourse. 
In conclusion, positivist reduction of knowledge to quantifiable empirical data 
is rejected on epistemological grounds for being too narrow and dogmatic 
(unreflexive). Empirical research itself is not rejected, but needs reflexive examination 
to identify hidden values and assumptions, thereby making discursive space for 
alternative and previously obscured or repressed knowledge.31 
1:2:3 Instrumental Rationality 
Instrumental rationality is a branch, of human reason concerned with finding the 
most efficient means to reach predetermined goals (Eckersley, 1992:98; Dryzek, 
1990a:4). Its strength lies in its technical concern to reach or achieve a particular end 
(it doesn't really matter what the end is) with the least possible expenditure of 
resources. This technical interest addresses what Habermas (1971a) sees as one of 
---------------------~~rrison (1995) also argues empirical quantification or technical discourse is hindered by the difficulty in 
bow un ting f~r the uncertainty which is part of all complex technical processes. He uses fuzzy logic to demonstrate 
~ertaInty, as well as non-technical discourse can be incorporated into the empirical analysis, thus producing 
and reflexive science. 
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three cognitive interests central in our epistemological relation to the world (Bernstein, 
1976:191-200; McCarthy, 1978:55; Pusey, 1987:24).32 Human beings understand reality 
through "general cognitive strategies" (McCarthy, 1978:55) that direct inquiry. These 
strategies are rooted in socio-cultural forms· of life. The technical interest is 
fundamental, for it links humans to the material basis of life, the need to understand 
nature in order to wrest a living from it. As McCarthy explains: 
The history of this confrontation with nature has, from an epistemological point ofview, 
the form of a "learning process". Habermas's thesis is that the "general orientation" 
guiding the sciences of nature is rooted in an "anthropologically deep-seated interest" 
in predicting and controlling events in the natural environment, which he calls the 
technical interest (1978:55, emphasis in original). 
Instrumental rationality, as the embodiment of this technical interest, is therefore a 
necessary component of human survival, for without it we would be unable to 
achieve the goal of material survival, except perhaps by pure chance. The critique of 
instrumental rationality lies not in its technical function per se, but with its 
'universalization' (McCarthy, 1978:22). Its materially necessary function has been 
transferred to other realms of decision making so that it has become the primary 
decision rationality (Fischer, 1990:217). I identify three criticisms of this extension of 
instrumental rationality. First, an insensitivity towards ends; second, an inadequate 
analytic methodology; and finally, its imposition into the 'life-world'. 
32 Michael Pusey (1987) provides an accessible account of Haberrnas suited for those without the theoretical 
background to enable them to wade through McCarthy (1978). The three cognitive interests are: (1) technical 
co.ntrol, (2) practical interest, which seeks understanding of language and communication and enables us to cope 
With everyday life, and (3) emancipatory interest, a critical concern to understand and reveal power masquerading 
as truth (Pusey, 1987:24-26). 
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1:2:3:1 Insensitivity Towards Ends 
Instrumental rationality is governed by technical rules and decision procedures 
(McCarthy, 1978:23). Its technical motive is fundamentally impersonal, requiring 
rigorous application to procedure. In this sense, the technician is removed from the 
process except as processor. But a rational process needs a telos, an end by which to 
measure the success of the process. Technical rules and decision procedures relate to 
ends in two, seemingly contradictory, ways. 
First, the relation of procedures and rules to ends consists of an objective 
construction of ends themselves. In this sense, rules and procedures act in similar 
fashion to pre-judgements in human understanding; they partially constitute the 
production of knowledge. Instrumental rationality assumes particular value judgments 
in its methods. It structures the world in various ways, and through these concepts, 
instrumental rationality interprets ends in particular and parochial ways producing 
situated outcomes. As such, instrumental rationality conceals an impulse to 
reconstruct ends by not acknowledging its social location. There is no rational reason 
why this acknowledgment could not take place, and it would allow for a discursive 
evaluation of any reconstructive bias.33 Without such evaluation, instrumental 
rationality remains epistemically flawed. 
The second point is that rules and procedures, while reconstructive of ends, are 
simultaneously indifferent to the nature of the ends. Instrumental rationality will 
search out the most technically efficient (for that is deemed the most rational) means 
to achieve any given ends. To the extent that its rules and procedures are empirically 
aCcurate and correctly applied, it will produce some result, either an achievement of 
-
33 I deal with the concept of discursive evaluation in section '2:1:2'. 
  
 
ends or an assessment that they are not technically achievable (at least without further 
modification to either ends or procedures). For instrumental rationality, the ethical 
status or value of ends lies outside its analytic scope (Shapiro, 1981:7). But ends are 
essentially value statements, preferred courses of action and outcomes.   Often, these 
end values lie obscured beneath a wealth of technical data and expert opinion, 
remaining effectively removed from critical public debate. More importantly is the fact 
that values  which  make up chosen ends represent particular values.   Almost 
inevitably, they are the values of the powerful and elite.    The problem is not that 
certain values as opposed to others are being served,    but that the discourse of 
scientific impartiality serves to mask this fact (Rule, 1978:18). Given that instrumental 
rationality is indifferent to ends, it needs to be subordinate to an ethic which can 
determine the social desirability of the particular goals.34  
 
 
1:2:3:2 Inadequate Analytic Methodology  
 
  Central to instrumental rationality's usefulness is its strategy of 'decomposing' 
problems into their fundamental components (Dunn, 1981:21). This is part of the 
'analycentric' perspective predominant in policy analysis (Bührs and Bartlett, 1993:16; 
Dryzek, 1990a:61). Dryzek (1990a) puts it this way:  
Instrumental rationality goes hand in hand with an analytic sensibility, the idea that  
complex phenomena are best understood through intelligent disaggregation into their  
component parts (pg. 6, emphasis in original).  
By breaking down the problem or situation under analysis into more basic units, the 
analyst  is  able  to  locate  opportunities for solution building.   Many problems appear  
 
 
 
34 This point is elaborated more fully in section '2:1:2'.  
 to be so full of complexity that it is not cognitively possible to apprehend the 
particular locations of system failure without this disaggregation. And as Dryzek 
notes, this solution can work relatively well for moderately complex problems (ibid, 
pg. 62).  
Instrumental rationality's analytic disaggregation method is necessary for 
coherent understanding, but is potentially limited by the assumptions it employs. 
Instrumental rationality focuses on a limited range of phenomena (de Haven-Smith, 
1988:121), and only those that can be objectively apprehended, measured and 
observed. Again, one significant flaw is that there are things which the approach does 
not  apprehend,  and which are therefore dismissed  as  irrelevant.  It  therefore acts  as  
a  definer  of  reality  by  focusing  upon an albeit useful but limited range of concepts  
such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA). For example, Fischer (1987:116) notes that CBA  
has often been helpful in technical  decision  making,  such as  military  procurements,  
but has proved highly problematic in the social and political realm. Bryne (1987) also 
argues   persuasively   that   although  the  state  desires   a   technocratic  system   of 
governance, and, views CBA as desirable to this end, CBA is nevertheless normatively 
based  (see   also   Bobrow   and   Dryzek,   1987).    To   the   extent    which    this   is 
unacknowledged, it is subject to the same criticisms as objectivism and positivism and 
does not require further elaboration. 
  
1:2:3:3 Imposition into the Life-World 
 
 
The life-world is essentially the symbolic world of culture and social interaction 
(Dryzek, 1990a:5) "where culture, social relations and individual personalities are maintained 
and  constructed”  (ibid,  pg. 12).  This life-world,  a  Habermasian term,  can  function  with  
alternative rationalities, but instrumental reason tends to dominate these other spheres of 
life (McCarthy, 1978:22). These other spheres (the life-world) are related to two of the 
cognitive interests identified by Habermas. They are practical interests, which 
seeks understanding of language and communication enabling us to cope with everyday 
life, and the emancipatory interest, a critical concern to understand and reveal power 
masquerading as truth (ibid, pgs. 55-56). The imposition of instrumental reason into 
The life-world is of critical concern here. But, what is the problem with this? 
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Horkheimer and Adorno provide a critical perspective with their Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1972), arguing the Enlightenment contained two opposite and contradictory 
impulses. The first and most obvious is the provision of an enormous amount of control 
over the natural and social world through the use of technology and science. However, there 
is another side. The same power of bureaucratic rationality and technical control that 
enables such emancipation from physical wants and needs also leads, ironically, to control 
over those very same people. "Men (and woman) pay for the increase in their power with 
alienation from that over which they exercise their power" (ibid, pg. 9 ). In the spirit of 
Weber's 'iron cage', technology, propelled by instrumental rationality, exerts a powerful 
rationalization over modern life. Science is both authoritative about the way things' really 
are', and controlling in that people became subject to its laws and techniques. Thus, there 
exists a tendency for people to become dominated by technical reason after they had 
ostensibly been emancipated by technical reason 
This domination takes the form of technical control. Virtually every area of human life is 
subject to some form of instrumentality (McCarthy, 1978:21), resulting in a subjugation of 
the intuitive, sensual and spontaneous. For example Berman 
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(1990) presents some expressions of this found in abstract philosophy, professional 
disciplines and ordinary citizen's daily life. In discussing them, he argues they share 
a common theme, that of the domination of all aspects of life by some form of 
technique. They, in fact, "project a Lebenswelt, a total vision of reality that circumscribes 
an entire world" (ibid, pg. 17). Because of the epistemic partiality inherent in 
instrumental rationality, the world view it produces is necessarily partial, and 
therefore is unable to adequately encompass the many and varied dimensions of 
human experience. Enlightened thought and instrumental action are necessary for 
social freedom, but they contain the seeds of a totalising domination of the life-world. 
Therefore, "If enlightenment does not accommodate reflection on this recidivist element, then 
it seals its own fate" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972:xiii). Instrumental rationality will 
tend to exclude other discourses unless its methodological limitations are clearly 
recognised and it is subordinated to communicative rationality. One area where 
instrumental rationality is epistemologically dominant is in public policy. This can 
best be examined through the concept of technocracy. 
1:2:4 Technocracy 
The impact of instrumental rationality is highly visible in policy making. It 
produces what is described as a 'Culture of Technical Control' (Yankelovich, 1991:7). 
This involves, among other things, the assumption that "policy decisions depend 
essentially on a high degree of specialized knowledge and skills, '" (and) that only experts 
possess this knowledge" (ibid, pg. 9). Likewise, Dryzek poses the question of 'a policy 
science of tyranny?' (1990a:114; also see Durning, 1993). By tyranny, he refers to "any 
elite-controlled policy process that overrules or shapes the desires and aspirations of ordinary 
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people" (ibid). Policy based upon instrumental rational techniques is open to the charge 
of being antidemocratic (ibid, pg. 115) for it considers irrelevant the views and wishes 
of the non-expert population. For instance, microeconomics, upon which a significant 
amount of policy analysis is done, operates with a model of society in which policy 
can be developed without ever having to seriously communicate with the non-expert 
population. An abstract system for deducing the maximum net social benefit need not 
ever refer to real people. Thus, the policy analyst may never meet or experience the 
people who are directly affected by his or her policy advice.35 If those most directly 
affected are unable to have any Significant access to the decision process, then the 
question must be raised about the level of domination by technocracy. The concern 
here is any form of territorial isolation in which decision techniques or disciplinary 
knowledge dominate a public decision process to the exclusion of other forms of 
analysis, alternative views and opposing public values. 
Technocracy seeks technical solutions for what are often fundamentally social 
problems. Fischer provides an example with the Reagan Administration's ambitions 
for 'Star Wars', a technical response to what is essentially an inability for the US and 
the former Soviet Union to communicate on a sufficiently human level in order to 
negotiate a mutual security pact (1990:23). This may have been as difficult a task as 
building a 'Star Wars' defence system, given the years of misunderstanding and 
mistrust, but it illustrates the institutional reliance upon technical systems of control 
that appear incapable of seriously considering alternative visions or possibilities. 
Technical solutions, while appropriate for a range of policy concerns, are 
inadequate when dealing with many social and environmental issues. The culture of 
35 This is also the case in reference to children who cannot yet represent their own interests, future generations, 
as well as the earth itself. They are all affected by policy decisions, yet have no means of being heard unless their 
interests are raised. 
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technocracy furthers this inadequacy by generating an unwarranted expectation of 
what technical and scientific processes can achieve. This expectation is reinforced by 
the high profile afforded technical experts in Western culture, resulting in the 
marginalization of other, potentially advantageous, knowledge resources. 
This chapter examined some of the critical assumptions of contemporary policy 
analysiS. Recurring themes, such as commitment to a particularly narrow concept of 
knowledge, and a tendency to exclude or reject other candidates of knowledge 
production, were highlighted. These assumptions were subjected to an extended 
critique which demonstrated they mistakenly conceptualise the process of knowledge 
production, and therefore generate epistemically inadequate methodologies for policy 
analysis. Standpoint epistemology was also discussed, partly as a critique of these 
assumptions, and partly to indicate an appropriate direction for a reconstruction of 
the policy process. I now turn to this reconstruction. 
64 
CHAPTER TWO 
A Reconstruction of the Policy Process 
Chapter One presented a discussion and critique of some critical assumptions 
of contemporary public poliCy analysis. These assumptions, for the most part, are 
inadequate, not only epistemologically, but also practically. The concept of knowledge 
central to these assumptions is fundamentally limited and therefore they are not able 
to provide sufficient analytical rigor with which to adequately deal with some of the 
serious social and environmental problems facing the world. I proposed feminist 
standpOint epistemology as a powerful addition to knowledge generation theory. 
Standpoint theory enables the generation of more objective knowledge, thus 
increasing the prospects for sustainable solutions and responses to public issues. 1 
In this chapter I more fully explore the philosophical (as opposed to the 
sociological) nature of knowledge production and apply this knowledge to public 
policy processes. I offer a reconstruction of policy process, grounded in epistemology, 
and therefore begin with the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer 
(1975). This provides a foundation for conceptualising knowledge as situated within 
a process of understanding, a process which is thoroughly interactive and dynamic. 
This in itself challenges the objectivist assumptions discussed in Chapter One. 
Through its emphasis on discourse, the communicative rationality theory of Habermas 
(McCarthy, 1978) provides a theoretical and practical link between Gadamer's 
1 I am not arguing here that better analytical knowledge is a sufficient cause for better policy, for analytical 
knowledge is only one aspect of the policy process. Rather, my point is simply better knowledge, i.e. knowledge 
generated from critical perspectives, actively engaging alternate standpoints, is necessary in the policy process if 
successful outcomes are to be anything more than good luck. 
 hermeneutics and public policy process. These ideas are then examined through the 
concept of the 'ideal speech situation',    and practical criteria for assessing the extent 
of communicative rationality in policy processes are developed. Finally, the idea of 
discursive design is discussed. This chapter, then, provides a theoretical and practical 
response to the limitations of policy analysis discussed in the previous chapter, an 
approach which is applied to a case study in Chapters Three and Four. All of these 
developments emerge out of a particular epistemological theme. It is to this theme I 
now turn.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
2:1 EPISTEMOLOGY  
 
Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and of how we  come  to  
understanding. Much of traditional Enlightenment epistemology is concerned with the  
search for Truth, that is, knowledge which is indubitable (Harvey, 1989:27; Solomon,  
1988; Weinsheimer, 1985:4).   However,   with the development  of the  sociology of  
knowledge,   among other influences,   this search for a  singular  universal  truth has  
come  under severe criticism.   The  sociology  of  knowledge  views knowledge  as a  
product of language and,   therefore,   as a social construction (Berger and Ludemann,  
1967).  
 
   Sociologists, such as Bauman (1990) and Smart (1990), support this theme by 
arguing a profound shift is taking place in epistemological orientation. These:  
 
Epistemological developments do not merely represent a temporary interruption of longer 
term developmental patterns but indicate the emergence of distinctly different forms 
(Smart, 1990:411). 
 
Understanding these 'distinctly different forms' of epistemological orientation is 
therefore essential in this reconstruction of the policy process. Philosophical and 
sociological discourses have traditionally been sustained by what Bauman calls 
'legislative reason',  where truth is a product of legislative acts of philosophy 
(1990:413). The challenge to this 'legislative' approach is an 'interpretative reason’.2 
This interpretive reason shifts the focus of epistemology. As Bauman puts it:  
 
 
 
 
 
2 Bauman suggests the terms 'legislative' and  'interpretive' are  better descriptions of    "two   distinct   and   alternative   
modes of philosophical and sociological practice recently classified as 'modern' and 'post-modern'" (Bauman, 1990:413))  
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From the search for the foundations of cognitive certainty, the outspoken domain of 
philosophy grounded by legislative reason, epistemological concerns move to the 
communicative problems of communally founded cognitive systems ... (1990:411). 
Problems of communication now become a critical focus in seeking knowledge. The 
search for the immutable is recognised as a quixotic task, so attention is diverted to 
more practical endeavours. Bauman puts it this way: " the search for foundations is 
redirected from transcendental subjectivity to the immanent, this-worldly context of daily life 
practice" (1990:228). Truth, then, is not simply just out there to be discovered, but is 
intimately connected with human values. And if knowledge is, in part, constituted by 
human values, genuine understanding can only occur through the medium of 
communication. This is because values lie outside the scope of empirical observation 
. and can only be revealed in communicative acts. However, these communicative acts 
ought not to be conceived as only explicit and intersubjective, ostensibly liberating 
'scientific' knowledge from social constraints. Rather, all knowledge is the product of 
the process of understanding. This is implicit in the writings of Gadamer (1975) who ( 
argued that genuine understanding can only take place through communication. Thus, 
our task is to adequately conceptualise the process of understanding. For this, I will 
outline Gadamer's theory of understanding. 
2:1:1 Gadamerian Epistemology 
One of the perennial problems that has occupied Western philosophy is the 
Cartesian notion of the object / subject distinction. The subject is discrete and 
bounded, ontologically separate from the object which is also discrete and bounded. 
This separation is not just linguistic but ontolOgical, rooted in the very being of the 
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subject and object. As was noted in Chapter One, holding to this dualistic model leads 
to a way of seeing answers to certain questions in an either/or mode. In relation to 
knowledge, either there is a firm and secure basis for it, or we are left drifting upon 
the seas of relativism. I have already rejected this as an unnecessarily rigid dichotomy, 
but a deeper understanding of this problem is essential to justify more fully a 
discursive turn in policy analysiS. 
Gadamer rejects this dichotomous conceptualization of subject and object, for it 
assumes an ontological stability which does not eXISt. In order to justify this claim, 
Gadamer returns to the Enlightenment to begin his reconstruction of understanding. 
For Enlightenment thinkers, acting in a context of a culture steeped in prejudice, 
tradition and authority, human freedom could be produced only through rigorous 
application of reason, in order to eliminate every belief that could not be rationally 
justified. However, Gadamer believes the Enlightenment overplayed its hand in its 
rejection of prejudice, tradition and authority. 
To Gadamer a prejudice is "a judgement that is given before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined" (Gadamer, 1975:240). It is a provisional 
judgement. It follows from this that a certain prejudice may not in fact be in error or 
be untrue. Gadamer therefore poses a critical question. "Where is the ground of the 
legitimacy of prejudices?" (1985:26). In other words, what ought count as knowledge? 
He asks this because he recognises we are inescapably historical beings. We can never 
rid ourselves of a context, a set of understandings or pre-judgements. This does not 
mean we cannot modify or relinquish certain beliefs given sufficient reason to do so, 
but it does mean we can never come to an interpretive situation neutrally, a point 
made earlier, but no less true for its retelling. 
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How then can understanding of anything outside the framework of our inherited 
prejudices and traditions take place? The first part of Gadamer's answer introduces 
the very important notion of 'play'. This is a vital concept, for it is the means by 
which he seeks to blur the distinction between the subject and object. Play is 
introduced because he seeks an alternative to the Cartesian model. In play, the players 
enter a particular structure, the rules of a game. The game does not exist without the 
players, but neither do the players themselves constitute the game. The game only 
'happens' when the players enter into the structure or form of the game. This playing 
of the game is not dependent upon the psychological states of the player's minds. In 
a sense, they 'give up' or 'suspend' their subjectivity in order to enter the game. This 
does not mean, and neither does Gadamer seek to imply, that they become non-
subjects, but rather that their subjectivity does not determine in an all powerful sense 
the ontology of the game. Rather, their entering into the game allows the game to 
absorb them as subjects (Warnke, 1987:30). As Gadamer puts it, "The attraction of a 
game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the game tends to master the 
players" (1975:95). In a similar manner, the structure of the game, itself apparently 
objective, is only brought to completion through the participation of the players. This 
occurs in a to-and-fro movement between the players and the structure of the game. 
The game cannot exist outside of this reflexive interaction of the various aspects of 
play and suggests that neither the subject or object ought to be seen as static. Through 
the talk of play, Gadamer causes a blurring of what was previously considered the 
discrete boundaries of the subject and the object. The subject and object no longer 
exist in some determinate fixed sense, but are open to shaping and reshaping through 
the to-and-fro movement of play. 
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Gadamer's primary focus of the nature of play revolves around the 
interpretation of works of art. While art is not the focus of this thesis, it is necessary 
to pursue Gadamer's ideas so as to most fully justify the reconstructive approach to 
policy for which I argue. It is in discussion of art that Gadamer's hermeneutic comes 
most clearly into focus. "The work of art is not an object that stands over against the subject 
for itself' (Gadamer, 1975:92). In saying, this he seeks to argue that the meaning of a 
work of art does not lie in some objective sense within the art or object itself, a 
meaning which the subject simply receives or is able to access through the correct 
method. Nor does he argue that the truth of a work of art is the prerogative of the 
subject. In this sense he argues against both an objectivism and a subjective 
relativism.3 Rather, the subject engages with the work of art in a similar fashion that 
the player engages in a game. As the game comes into being only through the to-and-
fro movement between the subject and the structure of the game, so does the meaning 
of a work of art emerge through the encounter of the viewer and the work itself. Its 
meaning (or truth) only becomes evident as a result of this encounter. 
In understanding, the (inter)play which occurs between the object and the 
subject is crucial. The subject (policy analyst) comes to a situation where 
understanding is needed (policy problem) and enters into dialectical play between the 
situation and themselves. The situation can only be understood from within the 
subject's framework of prejudice, but the subject is also constrained by the structure 
of the situation. Thus this to-and-fro movement occurs between the situation and the 
subject in which understanding comes into being. The critical point is this: complete 
understanding cannot exist within the situation itself as it can only be known within 
3 Subjective relativism holds that the truth of a knowledge claim is simply the prerogative of the subject. Its 
relativism is based in the subjective decision or desire of the individual, unlike cultural relativism, where shared 
values determine what is true. 
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this dialectical process. This is the hermeneutic process of understanding, the 
hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle, then, makes explicit that which is generally 
invisible in the daily practice of policy analysis, the structuring of knowledge through 
discourse. It is discourse which creates and sustains particular interpretations of the 
'problem situation'. 
The place of discourse is seen in Gadamer's restoration of the concept of 
prejudice.4 As Bernstein notes, all knowing involves some prejudices (1983:128). It is 
the explicit recognition of these prejudices that enables us to test them to see whether 
they are 'blind' or 'enabling' (ibid). In understanding a situation, our picture of the. 
whole helps us to make sense of a part, and then that part grants us some more 
insight into the whole. In other words, beginning with some prejudices, we test them 
against the whole, moving backward and forward dialectically until a more accurate 
understanding emerges. For example, in assessing an environmental concern 
(problem), the hermeneutic circle insists we temporarily suspend some of our 
prejudices (pre-judgements), thereby opening up greater potential to see and 
understand from a different standpoint. It is only through the interplay between our 
pre-judgments (what Gadamer calls fore-conceptions) and the 'things themselves' 
(text, discourse, material objects) that the possibility for true understanding emerges. 
In order to ensure this occurs "all correct interpretations must be on guard against 
arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought" (Gadamer, 
1975:236). True understanding occurs as initial ''fore-conceptions ... are replaced by more 
suitable ones" (Ibid). Gadamer thus describes not only the nature of understanding 
through the play between the subject and object, but even more importantly, he blurs 
4 Gadamer uses the concept of prejudice in a similar way to Harding's notion of standpoint. Although I 
develop standpoint epistemology and Gadamerian hermeneutics in different places, they are interwoven into the 
overall theory of this thesis. I make this point in recognition of Harding'S contribution to this theory. 
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the very boundaries between the two, for understanding only emerges as the subject 
gives up something of its own being (its blind prejudices), and the truth of an object 
is only realised in this interactive process. In other words, the object's meaning is not 
a fixed essence pre-existing within itself, only needing to be discovered, but rather it 
exists (or is completed) only within this fluid to-and-fro movement. 
The epistemology elaborated by Gadamer has a number of implications for 
policy making. Firstly, it reinforces the criticisms made regarding the limitations of 
objectivism, positivism and instrumental rationality. Truth is not the product of 
technique but of interaction, and it necessarily comprises a significant human element 
(prejudices). This undermines confidence in the knowledge output of much traditional 
policy making methods. Secondly, truth is never complete, but dynamic. Because 
closure on an issue is never fully possible, practical necessity notwithstanding, 
reflexivity needs to become an integrated . part of policy institutions and policy 
systems. Built-in feedback loops are essential in any policy environment. A third 
implication is perhaps the most telling. If we think we have apprehended the 'truth' 
of a situation without being aware of (a) our prejudices and (b) without consciously 
seeking the dynamiC interaction which tests the suitability of those same prejudices, 
then we have an understanding that is simply the product of tradition and prejudice, 
even if that tradition is a 'scientific' one.5 
What is needed, then, is a way of making policy which embraces the critical 
sense of Gadamer's theory. We need to form policy making processes around the 
interactive 'play' which leads to a greater emergence of the truth. For this, I will turn 
5 The fact that any 'truth' is a product of our traditions and prejudices is not in itself a problem, for we can 
never have a 'view from no-where', as Young has put it. And as Bernstein says, "There is something right about 
understanding the importance at the mathematization at the physical world, the search for invariant laws, the centrality crf 
the hypothetical-deductive form at explanation in the sciences .. ' But as we have seen, all this needs to be qualified by the 
hermeneutical dimension of the sciences" (1983:168). 
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to another contemporary German scholar, Jiirgen Habermas, and his theory of 
communicative rationality. 
2:1:2 Habermas and Communicative Rationality 
According to Habermas, two forms of human activity organize social institutions 
(McCarthy, 1978:22). In Chapter One, I discussed one form of this activity, purposive 
rational action. The other is communicative action, described as social action 
orientated towards reaching intersubjective understanding, which uses discussion to 
coordinate action, and is an instrument of community socialization (Dryzek, 1990a:14). 
Bernstein (1983) argues communicative action results in a "mutuality of reciprocal 
understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another" (pg. 186). 
Communicative rationality emerges from communicative action with the implicit goal 
of intersubjective understanding rather than action.6 Communicative action, therefore, 
is rational to the extent which it produces intersubjective understanding. 
Here is encountered a very social process where the quality of interaction 
determines the quality of the outcome. This process of understanding cannot be 
reduced to Simply an outcome of the individual mind, to the logical cognitive 
processing central to instrumental rationality. Rather, it belongs to a community of 
interacting subjects.7 This brings us again to a central theme of this thesis: that only 
through intersubjective understanding, through communal communication processes, 
6 Action orientated towards achievement of stated goals (success) characterises instrumental action and strategic 
action, the two other forms of rationality delineated by Habermas (Bernstein, 1983:185). Habermas describes 
instrumental action as 'non-social', and strategic action as 'social'. According to Bernstein, Habermas has not been 
very clear about the differences between these two rationalities (ibid, pg. 254). However, what is of most import 
here is the explicit distinction between 'communicative' and 'instrumental/strategic' action. 
7 I use the term community in this context as synonymous with stakeholders, that is, those who can claim to 
have an 'interest' in the relevant issue. I make no attempt to define or delimit 'interest', for that is a thesis in itself. 
See Mulgan (1984) for a useful discussion of interest and democratic eligibility. 
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will policy makers gain access to knowledge beyond the scope of instrumental 
methodologies. 
Communicative rationality offers possibilities for public policy beyond just a 
provision of broader knowledge. This occurs at the level of discourse, understood by 
Habermas as only that communication in which the force of the better argument is 
the only motive exercised (Habermas 1976:108), as opposed to, say, the motive to 
conceal truth or to exercise power not available to others (see below for discussion of 
Habermas's validity claims; they formalise these ideas). Human action remains 
epistemologically unproblematic while there exists a shared discourse over basic 
values and assumptions. However: 
We resort to discourse ... when there is a disruption of everyday understandings that 
require actions in common directions, a disruption serious enough to require that 
common understandings be restored. Habermas's argument is not, then, that democratic 
institutions should conduct all their affairs through discourse but rather that, they should 
be structured so that discourse can emerge when ruptures of shared understanding 
require some kind ofresolution (Warren, 1993:212). 
Communicative rationality, therefore, has a particular function in social coordination. 
This function has two levels: first, it functions to produce shared understanding for 
social action (although it does not produce the social action itself); second, it provides 
for rational resolution of disputes over normative judgement and social values. 
Communicative rationality cannot, as Dryzek (1990a:14) notes, totally replace 
instrumental rationality, for it produces understanding, not action. Communicative 
rationality is a communal product, whereas instrumental rationality can, quite 
properly, be the outcome of individual cogitation. Instrumental rationality is not 
rejected, but rather is subordinate to communicative rationality because it is unable 
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to produce socially approved norms and values without recourse to communicative 
rationality. 
How, then, does communicative rationality take place? And what are the 
conditions for its production? We begin with the notion of communicative competence 
which refers to the ability of a person to use speech acts in order to produce an 
interpersonal relationship between the listener and themselves (Kemp, 1985:184). 
Habermas identifies four specific speech acts, each having a corresponding validity 
claim. These validity claims are fundamental to, and necessarily presupposed in all 
communication (Bernstein, 1983:182; Thompson, 1981:90; McCarthy, 1978:287). They 
take the form of claims which are assumed to be true of all speech acts. I describe 
them here and elaborate them with greater practical focus below. 
2:1:2:1 Validity Claims 
The first, a communicative speech act, contains an underlying claim that the 
speech act is comprehensible. It may in fact not be, but in order for the speech act to 
qualify as an act of speech, this claim must, according to Habermas, be present. 
Because of the underlying assumption that any speech act is in principle 
comprehensible (this is the validity claim), it must be possible, in principle at least, 
to realise this 'promise' of comprehensibility. This is done with a communicative 
speech act through communication with the other party, where questioning can take 
place until both parties share a mutual understanding of the utterance (Kemp, 
1985:185). 
Second, a representative speech act relates to the validity claim of truthfulness 
or sincerity of the speaker. In practice, a speaker may not truthfully represent their 
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position or view. However, reassurance of the validity of the truth claim can be 
gained through the assurances from, or consistency in, the behaviour of the speaker. 
Third, the regulative class of speech acts carries with it a validity claim of 
appropriateness. This means it is necessary that the speech act be made by a speaker 
in the appropriate context. For example, a speech act that communicates the censure 
of law must be made by someone with appropriate authority, e.g., a court judge. This 
can be ascertained by an examination of the norms of the context. 
Lastly, the constative8 speech act relates to the underlying validity claim to the 
truth value of the utterance. In principle, speech acts assume truth is being 
communicated. Without this assumption, they would lose their communicative power, 
for one would not know whether or not to trust them. This Validity claim implies the 
possibility of ascertaining the truth status of a speech act. This is done either through 
the certainty of the hearer (common sense or knowledge), or through appeal to 
theoretical discourse. Either way, there exists along with the utterance the claim that 
its truth validity can be realised. If communication is to occur, these validity claims 
are necessarily brought into play. Habermas's theory of validity claims provides a 
means by which the theoretical promises of Gadamer can be put to practical use. 
Gadamer is concerned with production of accurate understanding. Therefore, I use " 
the communicative theory of Habermas to develop a practical means of ensuring 
accurate understanding is produced in policy deliberations. The question is, 'How, 
exactly, can this process of understanding be realised in practice?' To answer this, I 
turn to the next stage of the theory of communication, that of the 'ideal speech 
situation'. 
8 This refers to an utterance with which one makes a true or false statement (Speake, 1979:74), 
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2:1:2:2 The Ideal Speech Situation 
The ideal speech situation is a theoretical construct based upon the absence of 
any barriers which would hinder free and open communication between participants 
in dialogue. Dialogue should realise the four validity claims; it should be free from 
domination due to power inequality, strategic manipulation or misrepresentation of 
the situation by participants, should obtain the sincerity of the participants and have 
the means to ascertain the truth status of any utterance. The ideal speech situation is 
simply the "full realisation of the precepts of communicative rationality" (Dryzek, 1990a:36). 
Of course, it does not exist in the real world, but rather is presented as a 
counterfactual ideal against which communicative interaction in the real world can 
be evaluated. The basis for evaluation is the degree to which there are a lack of 
constraints on the communicative process. In the words of Habermas: 
the structure of communication itself produces no constraints if and only if, for all 
possible participants, there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to choose and apply 
speech acts (in Thompson, 1981:92, author's translation). 
The concept of the ideal speech situation provides a critical baseline from which to 
determine constraints in communicative acts. As is demonstrated in the case study, 
the ideal speech situation enables the development of understanding by bringing into 
focus any constraints and hindrances present in communication. 
The strength of Habermas's argument lies not just in a carefully articulated 
theory. If that were the case, it would be possible to develop an alternative theory 
which was rooted in a less equality centred normative structure. While this can no 
doubt occur, Habermas's claim regarding the ideal speech situation, which must by 
now be seen as favouring a normative theory of social equality and justice rooted in 
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critical theory (Kemp, 1985:189), is more than just a construct. He argues that it is 
"neither an empirical phenomena nor a mere construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition 
reciprocally made in discourse" (Habermas, 1973, cited in Kemp 1985:188). Habermas 
argues speech acts can only produce discursive understanding because they implicitly 
assume either the existence, or potential existence of the four validity claims. If speech 
is to discursively communicate, that is, produce shared understanding of norms and 
values, then communication must be comprehensible, the speaker sincere, the speech 
act contextually appropriate and the content true. Without these assumptions, speech 
would degenerate into mere rhetoric or some other form of irrationality. In this sense, 
Habermas seeks to redeem rationality without having it dominated by instrumental 
reason. Therefore, the ideal speech situation has a particularly useful role to play in 
my reconstruction of the public policy process. Now we need to complete the picture 
by elaborating the idea of systematically distorted communication. 
2:1:2:3 Systematically Distorted Communication 
The ideal speech situation sets up a 'perfect communication scenario'. In doing 
so, it enables the location of communication breakdowns, violations of the validity 
claims. These violations produce systematic communicative distortions that, once 
recognised, enable the strategic development of strategies of empowerment for 
disadvantaged communicants. The elimination of systematically distorted 
communication is thus necessary in order to produce communicative rationality 
(Thompson, 1981:94). 
McCarthy notes, "It might be helpful to think of ... validity claims as four different 
dimensions in which communicative interaction can break down or suffer disturbances" 
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(1978:288). When different validity claims are violated, communicative distortions are 
produced which disable the participants from being communicatively competent. In 
other words, they reduce the possibility of producing intersubjective understanding. 
In my critique of instrumental reason, I argued it illegitimately dominates policy 
analysis to the extent that other discursive arguments were excluded. Where this 
exclusion is institutional, as in the case of policy traditions dominated by particular 
analytical models, e.g., cost-benefit analysis, such communicative distortions are 
considered systematic. In explaining this, Thompson (1981) refers to situations where 
systematically distorted communications are: 
stabilised by means of deceptions which conceal the mechanisms of repression. These 
deceptions exclude the implicitly raised validity claims from discursive thematisation, 
and thereby transform the reciprocal imputation of accountability into a fiction (pg. 94). 
These deceptions involve norms and values which are not the product of 
communicative rationality, but of a dominant discourse.9 Communicative distortions 
are produced by specific mechanisms in policy processes. The power of these 
systematically distortive mechanisms lies in the fact of their concealment with what 
are, oftentimes, publicly legitimated policy processes. This can perhaps best be 
illustrated through the following example from Kemp (1985). In 1976, British Nuclear 
Fuels Limited applied to the local authorities in Cumbria, England, to build a nuclear 
waste processing plant at Windscale: Because of the national and international 
9 The set of assumptions I examined in chapter two are an example of a dominant discourse. This dominance 
is characterised by a general acceptance by practitioners, limited reflexivity and an unchallenged central role in 
policy analysis) which, precisely because of its dominance, exudes the appearance of truth, while simultaneously 
excluding alternative discourses. The apparent capability of the discourse to justify itself turns out to be fictional. 
While alternative discourses are excluded, the dominant discourse remains unchallenged, and any problems or 
contradictions stay hidden. Any challenge to the dominant discourse involves raising questions about the validity 
claims; questioning when it is not understood, reassurance of sincerity, .verification of its appropriateness and 
truth. When these questions are not, or cannot be freely raised, systemic communicative distortion exists. These 
distortions are repressive in that they exclude not just alternative discourse but other standpoints. Thus, 
marginalized knowledge remains devalued, potentially powerful epistemic resources under-utilized. 
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significance of the proposal, the secretary of state for the environment called for a 
public inquiry, and this was conducted in 1977 in one hundred days of hearing. Using 
the four speech act categories of Habermas, and their associated validity claims, Kemp 
analyzed the proceedings to discover if there were any systematic communicative 
distortions in what was, ostensibly, an open and fair hearing. 
With regards to the communicative speech act, he poses this question. "To what 
extent were the participants at the inquiry able to initiate and perpetuate discourse, that is, 
to raise issues and provide appropriate answers? To wnat extent were they able to make 
themselves understood?" (pg. 191). Kemp's analysis reveals that objectors, who were not 
provided any state funds, had neither the time nor the resources to sufficiently raise 
and develop their arguments. Objectors were unable to afford the costs of employing 
specialist legal council to present their cases, and therefore had to compete in a formal 
and legal system with which they were, in many cases, unfamiliar and inexperienced. 
Therefore, say's Kemp, it can be cogently argued that there is a systematic violation 
of the validity claim to comprehensibility. 
The second area relates to the representative speech act where, in the ideal 
speech situation, participants speak with sincerity and truthfulness. They must be able 
to fully represent their feelings, attitudes and opinions. What distorts this speech act, 
and corrupts its ability to realise its corresponding validity claim, are motivations that 
involve manipulation and deliberate misleading of the hearers, or of the speaker 
Simply being misguided or confused. The constraints that exist on the ability of 
speakers to achieve the validity claim of truthfulness can be both internal and 
external. The Wind scale inquiry encountered internal constraints in the arguments of 
the pro-nuclear lobby for the reason that the massive institutional commitment of the 
nuclear industry, along with the 'momentum of high technology', caused a failure "to 
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present a wholly truthful account of affairs within the industry" (pg. 193). With regards to 
external constraints, it was noted that some groups had difficulty in obtaining 
witnesses. Government agency witnesses refused the opportunity to participate, and 
experts in private firms are reluctant to participate because of the possibility of losing 
current or potential contracts in the industry. Both these forms of constraint constitute 
a violation of the validity principle of truthfulness. There is little assurance that the 
whole truth is able to be heard. 
The third category of speech acts are the regulatives. Here the issue is the 
appropriateness of the speaker in making the speech act. As Forester (1985) put it, "We 
don't expect building developers to give biblical interpretations in front of the Planning 
Tribunal or clergy to propose planned unit developments before their congregations" (pg. 204). 
What is important in realising the validity claim of appropriateness is the ability to 
clarify which norms are in operation, and then the ability to command and oppose, 
or permit and forbid arguments and challenge one-sided normative situations. The 
Wind scale case raises the issue of one-sided norms where certain types of information 
were able to be excluded from the process because of the Official Secrets Act. This 
provides a constraint on the ability of the hearers to oppose or forbid certain types 
of arguments, simply for the fact that the normative structure of the debate precluded 
some information and discriminated against the development opponents (pg. 195). 
Finally, constative speech acts in the ideal speech situation demand that all the 
participants have an equal opportunity to put forward arguments and challenge 
others, so that all perspectives are taken into account, and that none are exempt from 
criticism or consideration. The validity claim associated with this is the claim to truth. 
What can be questioned is the extent to which participants are able to defend their 
truth claims and question the validity of others. The Windscale inquiry, in Kemp's 
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analysis, was not free from 'misrepresentation and distortion'. For instance, not all the 
arguments presented to the inquiry were fully open to debate or challenge, some for 
reasons that they were government policy, and therefore not open to debate in that 
forum, and others for the reason of confidentiality or security. In the inspector's 
report to Parliament, several arguments were either omitted or misrepresented, 
thereby effectively transgressing the validity claim of truth (pg. 96-97). 
The point of recounting this analysis is to demonstrate the practical as well as 
theoretical relevance of the ideal speech situation. It provides a theoretical tool with 
which to practically evaluate any speech situation and ascertain the congruence 
between the ideal and the actual, as well as identifying areas of structurally distorted 
communication. One of the principle arguments of this thesis is that policy making 
needs to draw from a broad spectrum of frameworks and knowledge orientations, 
rather than limiting itself to a narrowly defined canon of scientific or economic truth. 
The exclusionary nature and unreflexive application of these approaches 
disenfranchises any other potentially useful knowledge orientation and thereby deals 
in an analytically inadequate way with the problem situation at hand. The ideal 
speech situation therefore provides a useful counterfactual in analyzing the extent to 
which alternative standpoints are excluded from a policy process. 
So far, I have drawn a theoretical thread from Gadamer to Habermas. The 
hermeneutic developed by Gadamer provides a philosophical foundation for 
conceptualising knowledge as a product the process of understanding. The ideal 
speech situation develops this hermeneutic by providing a theory of communicative 
distortion. This produces a practical means of identifying hindrances to the 'play' 
(interactive communication) so central to Gadamer's hermeneutic. By identifying these 
hindrances in a policy process, the assumed legitimacy or validity of the dominant 
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discourse can be challenged, thereby opening up the possibility for emancipatory 
policy options and greater objectivity in analysiS. Having established the theoretical 
framework, we now need some practical means of identifying communicative 
distortions. For this task I use the concept of a discursive design. It is to this task 
which I now turn. 
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2:2 DISCURSIVE DESIGN 
Contemporary policy making is deficient to the extent it denies or restricts 
alternative discourses. A resolution involves improving opportunities for involvement 
by marginalized discourses in policy deliberations. It also involves some critical means 
of identifying breakdowns in such communication. The task now is to put these ideas 
into practice, and this necessitates designing discursive processes which can facilitate 
these aims. This section discusses the idea of discursive design and then explores 
some limitations of design. Reflexivity is explored as a possible antidote to some of 
these limitations and the need for a discursive design to deal with power is critically 
examined. The ideal speech situation is reintroduced and subjected to some modifying 
criticism. Having discussed some requirements for a discursive design, I introduce 
four perspectives of participatory policy analysis. These are critically examined and 
two are rejected for being inconsistent with communicative rationality, while the 
remaining two are proposed as possible candidates for discursive design. Finally, I 
develop four criteria that are used in a practical evaluation of the Christchurch Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Management Strategy (SHWMS). These criteria form a critical 
component of this thesis in setting forth some essential requirements of the ideal 
speech situation. This provides a coherent connection between the abstractions of 
hermeneutic and communicative theory, and a real world policy situation. 
2:2:1 The Idea of Design 
Dryzek proposes the idea of ' discursive designs' as "the institutional manifestation 
of discursive democracy, offering an alternative to the more familiar liberal institutions of the 
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open society" (1990a:22). This embraces wider issues than those I am concerned with, 
namely discursive democracy.lO The focus here concerns the design of discursive 
friendly environments and procedures which enable communicative rationality to 
emerge. A design is not equivalent with planning. Both seek outcomes, but the subtle 
difference concerns the level of management of the process. Planning actively 
manages processes whereas design initiates criteria which "govern the operations of the 
process so that the desired result will occur more or less automatically without further ... 
intervention" (Ophuls and Boyan, 1992:288). Ongoing external intervention into the 
process (planning) is not compatible with the ideal speech situation for it introduces 
non-discursive factors. Rather, the initiation of criteria is what I mean by 'design', for 
it does not imply external intervention into the process once it is underway. Whether 
this initial intervention, the design itself, necessarily produces communicative 
distortion is dealt with below. 
The concept of design implies a purposive-rational component, a commitment 
to achievement of the chosen aim. The aim of a discursive design is clear: the 
production of ideal conditions for communication. Therefore, a discursively friendly 
environment is one which can, in part, be designed (I deal with some limitations to 
this below). This does not automatically produce communicative rationality, but 
merely generates the most communicatively enhancing conditions. This enables the 
10 The issues regarding democracy and discursive processes are the foci of a number of authors (e.g., Barber, 
1984; Dahl, 1994; Dryzek, 1990a, 1990b; Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993; Fischer, 1990; Guttmann, 1993; Ingram, 1993), 
and deal with some critical issues which cannot be adequately covered here. For example, how compatible is 
communicative rationality with current liberal political institutions, particularly in relation to political 
representation? What institutional changes are needed in order to foster greater discursive deliberation? What role 
does political power play in shaping dialogic outcomes? What are the general prospects for discursive democracy? 
Dryzek (1990b) suggests discursive designs seek "immunity from the state - and so from capital and market" (pg. 106), 
raising far reaching questions in relation to the 'public square' concept (see also, Roger, 1985), the role of new 
social movements and alternative economic/political orders. Answers to these questions require further research 
and thought and as such lie outside the scope of this thesis. They remain, however, significant issues in relation 
to the themes developed in this thesis. In saying this, I recognise policy processes inhabit a larger political world 
than that which I sketch here, while holding to the value of a specific focus on discursive policy analysis. 
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emergence of communicative rationality to be more than good luck and able to be 
nurtured through appropriate design of policy processes. This is illustrated in the case 
study where I argue a discursive design exists. Certainly the SHWMS process was 
carefully designed to enable the participation of interested parties. The degree to 
which this design fulfilled the ideal speech requirements is analyzed in Chapter Five. 
A discursive design, then, "is a social institution around which the expectations of a number 
of actors converge" (Dryzek, 1990a:43), an institution which can be purposively 
structured to enhance communicative rationality. There are, however, some limitations 
with discursive designs and some potential criticisms which need to be dealt with. 
2:2:1:1 Limitations of Design 
The idea of 'design' appears incongruent with the highly abstract nature of the 
'ideal speech situation'. It was not Habermas's intention to outline a blueprint for 
action; therefore the ideal speech situation does not imply any specific value, 
institution or practice (Dryzek, 1990a:37). How, then, can the ideal speech situation 
fail to be anything other than an abstraction, one with no explicit practical value? It 
would need, at minimum, to provide some guidance to action or some means of 
evaluating a situation if it were to be of practical value. But it must not prescribe a 
particular value or practice. That is ~e task of open and free discourse. The question 
is how one can 'design' a process that does not predetermine the outcome, or 
unnecessarily bias the results. 
Clearly, public policy processes are purposive human activities. They are not 
random occurrences but are fundamentally organised actions. Of course, they may be 
riddled with contradiction and ineffectiveness, but they are nevertheless organised. 
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Discursive activity consistent with the ideal speech situation needs to be designed 
because the elimination of communicative distortion will not occur by chance. 
Unequal power of actors will see to that. We cannot avoid designing political 
institutions or practices, but we can seek to avoid or mitigate the criticism raised 
above. How can we do this? 
The criticism regarding the abstract nature, and supposed non-practicality of the 
ideal speech situation, does not necessarily hold. While Habermas's theory is indeed 
abstract, it is nevertheless unavoidably anticipated in any speech act. It cannot be 
considered merely an invention of the philosopher and thereby dismissed. As Dryzek 
realises, it is not possible to justify speech acts apart from the ideal speech validity 
claims (1990a:37). Indeed, Alford (1985) argues that Habermas actually intends the 
ideal speech situation to be realizable 'in principle'. If it were not, "there would be no 
reason to take it seriously" (ibid, pg. 100). The ideal speech situation needs to 
understood as more than an abstraction. However, it is not to be construed as a 
specification for a discursive situation. It does not prescribe certain values or norms, 
but only the conditions for the production of such values and norms. It still may be 
argued the ideal speech situation appears to embody particular values, e.g., the value 
of equality (however defined), thereby prescribing ipso facto particular values. This 
argument misrepresents the ideal speech situation which is concerned not so much 
with a moral value, but rather the .actual ontology of communicative acts. This 
ontology, situated in the underlying validity claims, may be frequently, if not 
regularly violated, and this diminishes the coherence of the communicative act and 
reduces the potential emergence of communicative rationality. But if communicative 
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rationality is allowed to emerge, then any value that is produced is justified. l1 I 
argue the ideal speech situation, or its real world approximation, is a means of 
producing a value-laden outcome. However, it does not bias the process in favour of 
certain values vis-a.-vis other values. For this reason, it can be argued that the ideal 
speech situation is not value laden in the same way communication dominated by a 
dictator, for example, is value laden. There remains, nevertheless, a hidden value in 
the ideal speech situation. This is dealt with in section 2:2:2. 
Designing a discursively friendly environment where communicative rationality 
can flourish involves another difficulty. In seeking to specify the requirements for a 
discursive design, there exists a very real possibility of producing communicative 
distortion, thereby negating the potential of communicative rationality. 
Communicative rationality demands discourse be unconstrained except for the 
strength of the better argument (I criticise and modify this concept in section 2:2:2). 
It is process orientated and reflexively open to alternative or adjusted processes. Thus, 
to pre-specify the clear requirements for a design implies constraints on the process 
before it begins. This essentially contradicts the internal motive of communicative 
rationality which seeks to avoid such constraints since they may produce 
communicative distortion. Further, the idea of design carries with it some notion of 
instrumental rationality which communicative rationality seeks, through its discursive 
11 This leaves us on the horns of a (logically unresolvable?) dilemma. Communicative rationality can potentially 
legitimate any set of values, including the devaluation or rejection of communicative rationality itself, provided 
this decision is produced by communicative rationality. Thus, the potential exists for the self-destruction of 
discursive 'freedom'. One way of overcoming this is some legal entrenchment of the principle of discursive 
freedom (free speech). This, however, violates the ideal speech situation. Another possibility (although not logically 
guaranteed) is implied by Habermas's theory of participation; increasing participation limits the conditions under 
which authority can be exercised (deHaven-Smith, 1988:98) and citizens may increasingly resist totalitarian 
tendencies. However, totalitarianism of some form cannot be rejected as a possible future. While this dilemma 
remains a yet unresolved theoretical issue, perhaps other discourses, such as liberation theology (see for example, 
Boff and Boff, 1987) social ecology (see, for example, Clark, 1990) and ecofeminism (see for example, Plant, 1989) 
can prove to be liberatory tools. In his discussion on postrnodemism, Smart (1993:82), discusses the role of critical 
social theory in providing the possibility, maybe the inevitability, of having to learn to live without a guaranteed 
future. Human freedom, generically speaking, constitutes one possible future, but one not open to rational 
guarantee. 
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processes, to transcend. If design is seen as rigidly prescriptive, it may produce 
illegitimate constraints on the communicative process. Also, communicative rationality 
is inherently context sensitive, and for this reason discursive theorists tend to be 
reluctant to stipulate the specifications for any actual discursive design (Dryzek 
1990a:40). However, policy analysts cannot avoid the task of designing policy 
processes. The use of reflexivity will help mitigate these theoretical difficulties in 
design. 
2:2:1:2 Reflexivity and Design 
The idea of reflexivity is expressed throughout the pages of this thesis. Although 
briefly examined in the introduction to this thesis , I explicitly deal with it here in 
relation to design. First, I explain what is meant by the term, and then place it in 
context to some of the social science literature. I explore some key concerns of 
reflexivity and finally relate it directly to the design of discursive processes. 
Reflexivity is not the same as reflection. In reflection, one stares, as it were, into 
a mirror and is presented with a reflection of oneself. The reflection appears static, 
enabling contemplation of the image to occur. However, this is a difficult view to 
justify, given my previous discussion of the blurring of the boundaries of subject and 
object in the hermeneutic circle. Seeking a clear and accurate reflection of an object 
entails engagement with that object by the observer, an engagement which changes 
both subject and object (these terms are constituted by the fluid discursive 
engagement illuminated by Gadamer). The construction of knowledge functions on 
the notion of reflexivity, a concept which moves beyond reflection thus escaping the 
Gadamerian criticism of a static subject and object. Reflexivity involves a turning back 
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of one's experience upon itself (Mead, 1962), enabling an ongoing reconstruction of 
both the experience and self. Steier (1991) distinguishes seemingly opposite directions 
of reflexive acts. The first is the idea of reflex as a knee-jerk reaction, done without 
thinking, while the second involves contemplation and conscious thinking processes 
in reflexivity (pg. 163). However, both carry the notion of circularity, the first 
occurring within a physiological 'small circuit' which bypasses conscious thought in 
the brain, while the second involves a 'long circuit' reflexivity requiring 
contemplation. The 'small circuit' is needed to allow us to proceed with 
understanding (analogous to Gadamer's idea of the necessity for pre-judgements), 
while the 'long circuit' allows questioning of the assumptions which make 'short 
circuit' reflexivity possible. ~oth types of reflexivity involve adjustments to both 
understanding and the understanding self; both are fluid and adjustable. 
Steier suggests another form of circuitry, to continue the cybernetic analogy. 
Through reflexive questioning, there is the possibility of a new world emerging, one 
which does not conform to the usual assumptions we employ. Steier calls this a 'short 
circuit', where a world: 
whose 'properties' previously 'non-existent' now become salient. Our assumed, or tacit, 
world is 'blown up' .... Short-circuits and paradoxes, rather than being avoided, should 
be sought after, as a way of in-sight into the blindness that our knowing activities create 
(1991:164). 
It is clear from this that much of the theory already discussed in this thesis implies 
an inherent reflexivity, where settled understandings are disrupted in order to provide 
potentially richer and more adequate (or strongly objective (Harding, 1993» ways of 
understanding the world in which we live. 
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This orientation is characterised by Smart (1993) in his reappraisal of the role of 
sociology as a discipline. He argues sociology sought to justify its existence through 
a variety of legitimating narratives, initially directed towards theoretical consensus. 
This hope, however, collapsed with the growth of incommensurable forms of theory. 
There are a number of responses to this situation, but Smart (1993:70-71) places them 
in two broad categories. The first is a reassertion of the pOSSibility, and need, for a 
"foundationalist, naturalistically inclined, universalising modern sociology" (ibid). This, 
however, has yet to occur and the chances of this happening do not look 
promising.12 The second response rejects the universalising desire of the first and 
argues sociology is a "pluralistic, multi-level, reflexive discourse about social life articulated 
in terms of a number of different, and in important respects, discrete traditions" (ibid, pg. 
71). One of the ways this manifests itself is within hermeneutic, or reflexive styles, of 
sociological analysis. While not the only forms of sociology in circulation, they 
emphasise the "tenuous, negotiable, meaningful, interpretive, and sociolinguistic character 
of social life ... " (ibid, pg. 74). This goes some way to resolving the historical tension 
within sociology between the promise of providing a grand theoretical explanatory 
schema, and the perceived failure to produce consistent, problem solving theory. 
Smart (1990) observes it is not that there is no stable world to know, but the very act 
of knowing it reconstitutes both that world and the knower. Giddens (1990) continues 
this theme by arguing reflexivity inherent in modem life does not allow stabilization 
to occur between the expert (policy analyst) and the lay person (pg. 45). Social theory, 
then, cannot avoid reflexivity. 
12 Bourdieu (1988), for example, berates Erving Goffman's calls for a 'working consensus' among the social 
sciences as "this fiction of unanimity" and argues persuasively against the possibility of such consensus. 
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Given the above, social research needs to embody a reflexive methodology as 
well as a reflexive attitude. A methodology may be practised as merely an external 
tedmique, that is, by a disinterested application of procedure or process, but 
reflexivity demands more than this. Beck (1994) suggests reflexivity implies 'self-
confrontation' (pg. 5), capturing the observation of Steier that personaZ-ity (1991:4) has 
traditionally been banned from research. Therefore, one's self is an integral part of the 
research process. While this is not saying anything particularly new, it needs, I argue, 
to become part of our (my) attitude to research. Tlus implies an ethical dimension to 
reflexivity where I need to acknowledge my situatedness, my assumptions and 
agenda (for this research has an agenda - to assume otherwise is to believe I have a 
'view from no-where' (Young, 1990». This self-confrontation is simultaneously a 
confrontation with the research. Both these forms of confrontation demand certain 
things. They demand questions be asked about the researcher: why they chose this 
subject and not that; this method and not that; how they construct the problematic; 
how they define the subject and so on. The same questions (and others) are made of 
the research subject itself. But why these questions? Simply because to assume settled 
understandings is to avoid the reflexive probing which can open up new possibilities 
for knowledge, perhaps more appropriate ways of constituting the subject and one's 
self in relation to that subject. 
There is a reflexive paradox here. Reflexivity may be infinitely regressive, that 
is, to reflexively critique a particular construction of a research project (or anything 
at all) is to generate another construction which can itself be reflexively reconstructed. 
In its Simplest form, to say 'there is no immutable truth' (an assumption of this thesis) 
is only coherent if that sentence is itself true. If there is no truth, then that statement 
is not true, which means there is immutable truth. This involves the issue of self-
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reference, that is, does the statement refer to itself, or is it exempt by belonging to a 
higher order or metalevel of truth. If so, how is this metalevel justified? By appeal to 
a meta-metalevel? There is no end to such regression, so this is seen as a paradox of 
reflexivity. This reflexive paradox is noted for two reasons. First, it appears not able 
to be eliminated, despite various attempts of philosophers to do so (e.g., Lawson, 
1985). In this sense, it functions as a continual critique, "a weapon to be used against the 
great enterprise of [universal] knowledge" (ibid, pg. 15). But it also has a positive side by 
forming a motive for constant surveillance of knowledge claims which profess to be 
fully objective or complete. In other words, an acceptance that reflexivity is eradicable 
and, as Lawson (1985) suggests, not requiring a solution, allows us to accept there is 
no universally correct knowledge and forces us to face the discomfort inherent in this. 
The question arising now is how one settles on a particular discourse. Obviously, 
the "self-denying chaos generated by the paradoxes of reflexivity ... (are) unsustainable" 
(Lawson, 1985:125, emphasis in original), which is to say human beings, and their 
communities, need some agreed discourse(s) in order to maintain social cohesion. This 
agreement can be called 'closure'. Am I now to conclude there can be no 'closure' in 
this endless reflexive dilemma? Obviously not, for even this thesis is a form of closure 
or a drawing the line, stating a position. Yet, reflexivity, occurring within this text or 
within the engagement of this text by the reader opens up possibilities for other 
angles, interpretations and perspectives. The point is this: closure is a necessary 
discursive requirement for an ordered functioning of human community, although 
any particular pattern of closure will be temporary. Ideally, closure will be the 
outcome of communicatively rational deliberation. It may also be the outcome of 
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discursive domination by a powerful group or section of society. Whatever the case, 
reflexive attitude and methodology initiates significant challenges to any closure.13 
The application of reflexivity to discursive design is crucial in avoiding the 
constraints discussed in the previous section. Design involves specifying at least some 
defining characteristics of a process. A reflexive attitude ensures policy analysts 
remain alert to reflexive adjustments needed in a design. Likewise, a reflexive 
methodology, such as pre-design consultation with other parties, will ensure the 
design is as contextually appropriate as possible. Reflexivity needs also to function 
during any discursive process to enable ongoing readjustment to new information. 
Closure must occur at some point, but such closure is secured from producing 
communicative distortion by being developed in a communicatively rational manner. 
Reflexivity cannot guarantee discursive design freedom from communicative 
distortion. However, reflexively alert analysts and reflexive processes with feedback 
mechanisms will assist this aim. Reflexivity enables discursive designs to be analyzed 
for potential sites of communicative distortion. Common to all communicative 
distortion is the issue of power. Power demands reflexive engagement by policy 
analysts because power pervades all human activity, including discursive processes. 
For this reason, an analysiS of power is developed in relation to discursive design. 
13 Giddens (1990), among others (see Beck, et al, 1994), argues reflexivity is inherent in modem social forms. 
"With the advent of modernity, reflexivity takes on a different character. It is introduced into the very basis of system 
reproduction ... " (1990:38). Modernity is systemically reflexive. I distinguish this from the particular style of 'long-
circuit', or self-conscious reflexivity I am discussing here. While not denying Giddens' observations, I am interested 
in critical application of reflexivity as an emancipatory method. 
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2:2: 1:3 Power and Design 
Power may be conceptualised in a number of ways, but I will develop a 
particular notion which has direct implications for discursive designs. I begin, though, 
with a very general notion developed by Skolimowski (1992) of power as a property 
of life. This evolutionary perspective sees the purpose of power to produce syntropy 
(the opposite of entropy) through acts of will which are life-enhancing (ibid, pg. 153). 
While this view can invoke normative notions (power as life-enhancing), Skolimowski 
is not alone in his views. Millar (1993) writes of Foucault: 
(H)e understood power not as a fixed quantity of physical farce, but rather as a stream 
of energy flowing through every living organism and every human society, its formless 
flux harnessed in various patterns of behaviour, habits of introspection, and systems of 
knowledge, in addition to different types of political, social and military organization 
(pg. 15). 
It is the effects of power 'harnessed in various patterns of behaviour' which I address. 
While effects of organizational power are not insignificant, they require more 
substantial analysis than I can attempt here. Power, then, is diffuse. Rather than try 
to exactly define it, Foucault concentrates on the effects of power within social life 
(Foucault, 1980:92). Power can be construed as a life-force, but it cannot be conceived 
in a vacuum (Skolimowski, 1992:161). Rather, it is appropriated in a variety of ways, 
language being perhaps the most influential. I have discussed at length the role of. 
language in the generation of knowledge, but the role of power in language which 
produces knowledge must not be ignored. Discourse is one vehicle of power and can 
be understood as a means by which power is effected; discourse produces knowledge, 
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therefore knowledge is an effect of power. Power becomes a central force in the 
construction of knowledge. 
Conceptualising knowledge as neutral vis-a-vis power is mistaken. Further, it 
identifies an important effect of power at a level which is normally invisible. While 
some analyses of power may deal with limiting the intrusion of political or public 
institutions on individuals (liberalism), or focus on the relations of production 
(Marxism), the view developed here identifies power operating at the micro-level. 
This view is: 
concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points 
where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions 
(Foucault, 1980:96). 
Foucault is not saying discourse is everything (in Lemert and Gillan, 1982:62). But 
where it is manifested in dominant discourse, he believes it is best resisted by the 
marginalised community at the local level. Refusing to accept being constructed or 
defined by others and reasserting the right to define oneself or one's community is 
at the heart of Foucault's strategy to resist dominating power. One can never avoid 
power, but one can recognise when an assertion of power through discourse does 
violence to oneself or one's community. 
Discursive designs need to take account of power inherent in discourse by being 
reflexive enough to ensure all discourses (relevant to the situation) are given equal 
representation. This again reinforces the necessity for reflexivity. The policy making 
processes attended to in this thesis involve public institutions and generally adhere 
to the discourses of the dominant sectors of society. To identify alternative discourses 
(I leave aside the political difficulties of this) requires analysts to maintain a reflexive 
attitude as well as instituting reflexive procedures into any discursive process they 
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design. It requires institutional opportunities for marginalised discourses to challenge 
the legitimacy of the dominant discourse. Yet, what needs to be recognised is that the 
prior assumption of legitimacy of any dominant discourse generates an unequal 
playing field in relation to the 'force of the better argument'. The fact that a dominant 
discourse has greater power (that is why it is dominant) requires an active 
empowerment of less powerful discourses in order to meet the ideal speech 
requirements. This is not an argument that all discourses are equally good or 
acceptable, e.g., the discourse of racism versus the discourse of human rights. Rather, 
discursive designs must account for power inequality by providing equal opportunity 
for marginalised discourses to enter and participate in the discursive deliberations. 
This discussion in no way exhausts the issue or effects of power, but does 
provide clear recognition of a particularly influential form of power in discursive 
processes. Some limitations of design along with some possible ameliorations have 
been discussed, and the notion of design in general has been explored. I now return 
to the ideal speech situation. 
2:2:2 Ideal Speech Situation Revisited: A Critique 
Some central characteristics of discursive design are established through the 
above discussion of limitations of design, reflexivity and power. I now revisit the 
notion of the ideal speech situation and deal with one Significant weakness in its 
current formulation. This weakness consists of the charge of ethnocentrism in the 
means of adjudication between differences during discursive deliberation. To recap, 
communicative rationality requires, among other things: 
98 
that participants, themes and contributions are not restricted except [those which lie 
outside the validity claims being tested] ... ; that no force except that of the better 
argument be exercised (Habermas, 1976:107-108). 
Participants engage in communicative acts whereby they freely state their views, 
question others, challenge views they do not agree with and modify their own views 
in the light of the criticism of others. What finally adjudicates between good and bad 
arguments is Simply the 'force of the better argument'. Participants, through such 
deliberations, recognise the better argument and cume to collective agreement (see, 
Majone, 1989:21-41). 
While largely agreeing with this, Young (1995, 1990) points out a significant flaw 
in the way the 'force of the better argument' is constituted.14 The type of argument 
referred to involves a persistent rationalism which "retains the vestiges of a dichotomy 
between reason and affectivity" (Young, 1990:118). It also involves a notion of discursive 
argumentation which deemphasises "the metaphoricaL rhetorical, playful, embodied aspects 
of speech" (ibid), aspects important in effective communication. In other words, 
Habermas retains a commitment to a particular concept of deliberation which relies 
upon rational dialogue derived from models of scientific debate, modern Parliaments 
and courts (Young 1995:137). It assumes when political and economic differences are 
set aside through the ideal speech situation, communicative distortions are eliminated. 
However, this concept of argumentation proves exclUSionary and ends up favouring 
particular modes of communication because deliberation itself cannot be culturally 
neutral and universal (ibid, pg. 137). In pursuing this point, Young identifies two 
14 There are in fact two facets to her criticism. I restrict the discussion here to one most directly relevant to this 
thesis. The second discusses the potential of the force of the better argument to eradicate difference by assuming 
unity as a prior condition of deliberation (1995:140). It seeks to restore a disrupted consensus by appealing to the 
notion of generalizable interests, but by doing so puts aside the particular interests which, as I argued earlier, not 
only constitute a valuable epistemic resource, but furthers the repression of the less powerful. See especially, 
Young, (1990). 
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aspects of 'social power', apart from economic and political differences, which prevent 
people from equal participation. The first is an internalized right to speak or not to 
speak, and the other a devaluation of some particular speaking styles. 
The internalized right to speak generally favours males, simply for the reason 
that speech which is assertive and combative is valued above more 'female' modes 
of communication, generally expressed in asking questions and seeking understanding 
(Young, 1995:139). Speech which is tentative, faltering, unassertive or inquiring is less 
likely to be effective in formal speech environments which value argument, 
assertiveness and articulateness. The argument here is not that one group are superior 
communicators per se, but that the communication situation favours a particular style, 
thereby excluding or devaluing other styles. Thus, these situations are charged with 
being ethnocentric (or sexist, or class biased). The norms which shape discursive 
deliberation also favour dispassionate, disembodied speech and identify objectivity 
with calm and logical argument. Thus: 
The entrance of the body into speech - in wide gestures, nervous moments or physical 
expressions of emotion - are signs of weakness that cancel out one's assertions or reveal 
one's lack of objectivity and control (Young, 1995:139). 
This tends to favour certain groups. White middle class men tend to practice speech 
which is more controlled and emotionless than women and some minority groups, 
and this provides an advantage in demonstrating the strength of the better argument. 
Speaking styles are also important elements in communication. Young proposes 
three which are generally devalued in discursive deliberations: greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling (I elaborate them below). The import of these elements for communication 
resides in their situatedness, in the fact that they embody the particularity of the 
communicants (ibid, pg. 144). Traditional critical argument seeks to remove 
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particulars or parochialism from debate, replacing them with generalised principle. 
This strips alternative discourses of their very essence, for their alternativeness resides 
in their particularity. Young (1995) argues that allowing the expression of alternative 
communication modes increases understanding in three ways. First, it teaches us that 
our own perspectives are partial and local, exposing the myth of universality. Second, 
we come to recognise that others can have a legitimate claim to justice based on their 
unique needs (particularity), and they therefore have a right to challenge my claims 
and arguments. Finally, there is an overall increase in the quality of social knowledge, 
reflecting Gadamer's hermeneutical theory. This means: 
Participants gain a wider picture of the social processes in which their own partial 
experience is embedded and this greater social objectivity increases their wisdom for 
arriving at just solutions to collective problems (Young, 1995:144). 
Turning to the three communicative elements proposed by Young, acts of 
greeting enable parties to recognise other's particularity. Greetings contain no 
assertions or claims, but facilitate acknowledgement, trust and familiarity. IS To strip 
discourse of its symbolic or non-linguistic aspects is to reduce the development of 
human caring. For example, handshakes or the hongi (a traditional Maori act of 
greeting) allow personal acknowledgement between individuals to occur, thereby 
enhancing trust and care. Such trust and care is essential in enabling participants to 
retain commitment to what at times may be a confrontational, angry and threatening 
encounter. 
Rhetoric can involve the use of emotion and figurative language, and in doing 
so, it enables a greater connection with the listener. As Young (1995) notes, it is not 
enough to provide good arguments; one must be heard. This suggests a difference 
15 For a theoretical analysis of trust, see Niklas Luhmann (1988). 
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between hearing and listening. Listening involves reflexive understanding of the 
situatedness of the speaker (see Forester, 1989:Chapter 7). Therefore, rhetoric 
"announces the situatedness of communication .... and constructs the speaker's position in 
relation to those of the audience" (ibid, pg. 146). By doing this, rhetoric enhances 
understanding between parties in a way which rational discourse cannot, for it 
legitimises emotion and passion. Further, rhetoric, through the use of humour, images 
and figures of speech (ibid) avoids boredom, thus maintaining the listener's attention 
essential for understanding. 
Finally, storytelling forms an important component of effective communication. 
Participants enter into discursive processes in order to resolve some collective 
problem and may bring with them quite different views of the world. Intersubjective 
understanding requires an accurate understanding of the particularities of the others, 
their views and values. This implies the need for means to foster such understanding. 
The goal is not a synthesising of the particulars into one cohesive view, but to allow 
participants to understand the context and justification for the values and view of 
others. Storytelling, anything from the recounting of myth to telling one's experience, 
is one such means of achieving improved understanding. Young describes three ways 
in which this occurs. First, the narrative may reveal particular experiences which the 
listeners in other social locations are not able to experience. For example, a person 
born and raised in the city cannot experience being born and raised in the jungle. 
Storytelling can enhance understanding, although not experience, of why the jungle 
dweller holds to the values they do and vice versa. Storytelling can also help explain 
to outsiders the meaning of practices, symbols and places. Values are often embodied 
in these and cannot be justified in the same way as rational discourse. Therefore, 
storytelling provides a way of understanding the context of values as the storytellers 
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relate 'where they are coming from' (Young, 1995:148). Finally, storytelling can reveal 
"a total social knowledge from the point of view of that social position" (ibid). This means 
listeners are able to see how they themselves are viewed by the 'other', thereby 
adding to the overall knowledge of a situation. These different perspectives, now 
more clearly understood by all parties, enable a greater collective wisdom to emerge 
in problem solving. 
Storytelling can be used in a yet more direct way. Chief Judge Durie (1995) 
recounts a particular incident which occurred some years ago in the Maori Land 
Court of New Zealand. -A Maori elder appeared before the court over an ownership 
claim on the Whanganui river bed. He Simply sang a song of the river. This was 
noted, but the court concluded he had nothing to say about the ownership claim. 
However, as Durie points out, the song was a claim to ownership, but the court was 
unable to recognise such cultural practices (1995:36). In the Maori elder's terms, he 
was engaging in discursive deliberation, but not in terms of Western rational 
dialogue. 
All this is not to devalue critical argument, but to augment what is often a 
culturally partial affair. Greetings, rhetoric and storytelling provide additional 
elements in discursive deliberation, helping to provide increased equality in the ideal 
speech situation. These criticisms suggest a modification of the concept of the 
'strength of the better argument' by inSisting situated knowledge (strong objectivity) 
is needed to indeed produce the 'better argument'. Therefore, any subsequent mention 
of the ideal speech situation, systematic communicative distortions and so on, include 
the modifications discussed here. Specifically, a discursive deliberation is only 
considered free from communicative distortion (this being an 'ideal') if the normative 
structure of the discourse legitimises affectivity, the place of bodies in discourse, 
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greetings, rhetoric, and narrative, as well as reasoned argument free of economic or 
political constraints. Reflexivity insists these may not be the only aspects of discursive 
argumentation to consider, but they are a good beginning. 
What I have explored in this chapter are some characteristic of discursive design. 
However, discursive design has not had significant application in practice. In noting 
this, Dryzek (1990a) looks towards what he refers to as incipient discursive designs. 
He suggests that "intimations of discursive designs can be found in some contemporary 
attempts to resolve confiictual social problems" (ibid, pg. 43). Specifically, mediation and 
regulatory negotiation are advanced as mechanisms for achieving consensus within 
environments where unresolved problems and degrees of conflict exist (Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck, 1990). There are also a number of expressions of public participation in 
policy making, and although most of these fail in terms of my criteria above, they do 
indicate opportunities for a more communicatively rational approach (eg, Munro-
Clark, 1992). Since the concern of this thesis is public policy making, I will examine 
an approach more directly relevant than the two mentioned above by Dryzek. It 
concerns what Dan Durning calls 'participatory policy analysis'. 
2:2:3 Design and Participatory Policy Analysis (PP A) 
Durning (1993) presented four perspectives of Participatory Policy Analysis 
(PP A). While differing in their analysis of who ought to participate in policy analysiS, 
how, and for what purpose, they each share a rejection of positivism, embrace some 
variation of phenomenology, and use a hermeneutic approach to inquiry (pg. 300). 
Durning's analyses are developed in response to two perceived failures of traditional 
policy analysis. The first failure is that it is antidemocratic. With references to the 
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'policy sciences of tyranny', Durning calls upon the analyses of Fischer and Dryzek 
to argue that "(t)he importance of public preferences is diminished when the advice of policy 
analysts - and other experts - is accepted as authoritative" (pg. 298). He moderates this 
somewhat with the suggestion that "most analysts would probably assert that they are 
sensitive to ... the public". Nevertheless, this general analysis is consistent with the 
arguments developed in this thesis. His second perceived failure is also a theme of 
this thesis. He argues the positivist foundation of traditional policy analysis produces 
misleading advice and hinders analysts from doing tneir jobs well. From this, Durning 
explores four perspectives of participatory policy analysis which might go some way 
to remedying these defects. These are PPA for a participatory democracy, the 
provision of analytic inputs through PP A, interpretive PP A and stakeholder policy 
analysis. A key focus of each is the role of the analyst. 
2:2:3:1 PP A for a Participatory Democracy 
The first is PPA for a participatory democracy. Here the intention is to 
redistribute power along the lines of a discursive democracy.16 Analysts would assist 
citizens in a policy development process not managed by elites. It is the citizens who, 
by entering into critical dialogue, develop policies, and in so doing become self-
governing. This approach would radically upset existing power structures, and in 
doing so could become a vehicle for empowerment, liberation and social 
transformation (pg. 301). Given the "main purpose of PPA" is the "empowerment of 
citizens" (pg. 306), it may reduce the power inequalities that can enter a discursive 
process through the activity of powerful or dominant interest groups. Therefore, a 
16 See Dryzek (1990a) for a useful exploration of the concept of discursive democracy. 
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participatory democracy would appear to be a good candidate for the ideal speech 
situation, for it would enable open and public debate, unstifled by the potentially 
technocratic focus of the state. But it is unlikely, according to Durning, that such a 
radical restructuring of political institutions will occur, at least in the foreseeable 
future. The three perspectives which follow may be more realistic for they "require no 
radical redistribution of power, nor a citizenry eager and able to engage in discourse leading 
to policy decisions" (pg. 301). 
2:2:3:2 Providing Analytic Inputs through PP A 
A second perspective on participatory policy analysis involves the provision of 
analytic inputs through PP A. Central to this notion is an attempt to broaden the range 
of information or opinion used in producing a policy recommendation through the 
use of various types of public fora. It is focused upon stakeholders and seeks to 
gather information rather than educate the affected groups or individuals. This move 
is not consistent with the Gadamerian hermeneutic expounded previously, where 
understanding occurs from discursive interaction. The information gathered from this 
perspective is not truly interactive and does not facilitate a learning process. It ' 
constitutes a one way system with information flowing from the stakeholders to the 
analysts. This information, then, is rather static, and cannot be developed into a richer 
picture, which, if it could, would provide significantly more appropriate and 
empirically accurate understanding. Gathering information so that the policy can be 
more completely informed (pg. 301) is commendable, but it assumes a state of 
disinterested objectivity on the part of the analyst and does not deal with the 
particular paradigms, values and biases of the analyst that will inevitably influence 
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the outcome. This is where the value of communicative rationality is so clear, in that 
it allows free expression of one's particularities, including those of the analyst, and 
subjects them to the hermeneutic circle that produces a richer outcome, one that does 
not seek to eliminate, but rationally incorporates those particulars. 
Another criticism of this form of PP A is that providing analytic inputs is not the 
same as participating in policy making (pg. 302). When compared with the ideal 
speech requirements, it falls far short of facilitating communicative rationality. 
Participants might be able to share their views, but they are not entitled to shape the 
decisions. That right belongs to the policy analysts. The policy agenda is set by the 
analysts (or the politicians), and the model does not provide for a collaborative 
analytic role for stakeholders, but simply an information transmission role. Thus there 
is only participation in a very limited, and from the perspective of the ideal speech 
situation, inadequate sense. 
2:2:3:3 Interpretive PP A 
Interpretive PP A is a third perspective. Central to this approach is the intensive 
involvement of key stakeholders in the analytic process. It recognises analysts are not 
part of an 'anointed priesthood' (pg. 302) and therefore separate from the analysiS, but 
are instead part of the analysis. They are dependent upon the insights given by 
differing interpretations of the other participants. Stakeholders work with analysts in 
a collaborative way to produce agreement about values, goals, and interpretation of 
data. Durning notes that: 
(i)nterpretive analysis depends on participatory methods because the analyst, though an 
expert, knows that his or her understanding of reality may not be shared by other 
107 
important participants, and as a result, the analyst's advice may be rejected or may be 
wrong if it does not fit the context as understood by key participants (pg. 302). 
Here we have an analytic approach which fits more closely the ideal speech situation, 
as well as embracing a Gadamerian hermeneutic. It allows for ongoing feedback by 
the analyst to the stakeholders to ensure a common understanding is secured. This 
approach may not be needed, nor appropriate, for policy issues that have low political 
conflict, are not too complex, and are amenable to technical solutions (ibid). Cases 
which already have normative agreement among stakeholders and involve simple 
technical solutions may not benefit from further interpretive. analysIs. In suggesting 
this, Durning recognises no one correct approach to policy development, but that each 
problem situation has its own particularities which need to be taken into account. 
Therefore, an intensive discursive approach is not always necessary or appropriate in 
policy analysis. Having said that, any significant or complex policy concern will 
necessitate an interpretive analysis for it will inevitably involve differing values and 
perceptions of both the problem and solution. 
2:2:3:4 Stakeholder Policy Analysis 
The final perspective Durning offers is stakeholder policy analysis. Similar to 
interpretive policy analysiS, it differs with respect to who is responsible for the 
analytic outputs. With interpretive policy analYSis, the analyst remains the central 
analytical figure and is responsible for the output. With stakeholder policy analysis: 
the analysis is created by stakeholders who transform the information and opinion inputs 
into advice. Thus, (they) not only provide analytic inputs and information, they perform 
the analysis (pg. 303). 
108 
Governmental advisory commissions are an example of this type of analysis where 
experts from both government agencies and service users produce policy advice. This 
form of analysis could approach the conditions of the ideal speech situation if equality 
among the participants existed, but care would need to be taken to ensure all 
stakeholders could participate or be represented. 
Summarising the four PP A perspectives, the participatory democratic approach 
is radical, but requires a level of political change considered improbable for the 
foreseeable future, at least in relation to public policy analysiS. The three remaining 
perspectives provide possible approaches which could be used (and in some cases are 
being used) within current political structures. However, the provision of analytic 
inputs (the second perspective) fails to use the Gadamerian hermeneutic and falls 
short of the ideal speech conditions. We are then left with two possible approaches, 
both which allow intensive and quality stakeholder participation. The critical 
difference is the extent to which responsibility for the analysis affects the possibility 
for undistorted communication. Public agency analysts will, by virtue of their 
position, have a key role to play here, especially with the interpretive approach, for 
they are more central in the facilitation of the process. Assuming there are no 
procedural restrictions or rules which dictate the role of the analyst (in reference to 
the output responsibility), the analyst would need to carefully assess their role in 
facilitating communicative rationality. This involves a reconceptualization of the 
analyst's role, particularly if they have been trained in or accustomed to the second 
perspective where they simply seek information and input. This entails a shift not 
from expert to non-expert, but from a position of analytic dominance to analytic 
facilitation. Their role "would lie in the creation and sustenance of conditions and 
institutions for free democratic discourse" (Dryzek 1990a:126). 
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A problem could arise if control or responsibility for the analytic outputs 
disrupted the operation of the ideal speech conditions. This could happen, for 
example, where the analyst was under political pressure which was separate from, 
and not discursively interacting with, the analytic situation (see, Forester, 1982). This 
type of political pressure could undermine the analysis because it is not open to 
reflexive modification and therefore would not have to respond to the 
communicatively rational arguments. However, these political arguments would not 
be guilty of communicative distortion if they were discursively active in the ideal 
speech situation. They would cease to be corruptive, and would be an important 
contributor to the policy debate. This is an argument for involving decision makers 
and politicians in the ideal speech situation. If they are considered stakeholders, then 
it would violate the ideal speech situation for them not to be involved. But they 
would need to see themselves as equal participants in a discursive process, and not 
in their more usual role of adversarial politics. 
2:2:4 Four Ideal Speech Criteria 
Having developed the idea of discursive design and its relationship with 
participatory policy analYSiS, it is now necessary to connect them more substantially 
with the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation identifies the problem of 
communicative distortion, but in order to identify particular distortions in 
communicative processes, some identifying criteria are needed. I identify four criteria, 
derived from the ideal speech situation, which I argue can help shape a discursive 
design by identifying both existing and potential locations for communicative 
distortion. They enable analysts to ask questiOns about specific categories of 
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communicative distortions and therefore can be considered heuristic devices with 
which to probe policy processes. The theoretical link between these criteria, what I call 
ideal speech criteria, and the ideal speech situation involves a practical assurance that 
the ideal speech situation is approximated to the greatest possible extent. To briefly 
recap, the ideal speech situation is based upon the absence of any barriers which 
would hinder free and open communication between participants in dialogue. 
Communication should be free from domination due to power inequality, strategic 
manipulation or misrepresentation of the situation ·uy participants, should obtain the 
sincerity of the participants and have the means to ascertain the truth status of any 
utterance. To be assured this occurs, persons must have access to the communicative 
process, there must be significant communicative equality among the participants, the 
process needs to be reflexive and participants need to have equal access to 
information. These are not the only possible criteria, but I outline them here in 
reference to the SHWMS process and will examine them in more depth in the 
methodology section. 
2:2:4:1 The Accessibility Criterion 
This relates to the openness of the process and the opportunity or provision for 
stakeholders17 to participate in the process. For instance, do all the stakeholders have 
free and equal access to setting the agenda? How will the decision of who to include 
be made? Does the process rely upon rules which systematically exclude certain 
17 I do not define a stakeholder here. However, by not defining it I may be open to the charge that I cannot 
determine if all stakeholders are included in the SHWMS case. In other words, some stakeholders may remain 
unidentified, producing communicative distortion. However, without rigorous criteria which can define a 
stakeholder (and I am not aware of any which are non-controversial) this remains a dilemma. To some extent, 
policy process reflexivity, which can be assessed, will mitigate this difficulty by exposing interests (stakeholders) 
which are unrepresented. There is no guarantee all stakeholders will be identified, for there is no universal 
definition of a stakeholder. 
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groups? Do the meeting times and locations facilitate attendance and inclusion? These 
questions are central to communicative rationality because inability to gain access to 
discursive deliberations or exclusion of legitimate participants (however they are 
defined) introduces communicative distortions. The discourse is unnecessarily partial. 
2:2:4:2 The Equality Criterion 
This concerns the capacity of participants to participate with freedom and 
equality. For example, a formal or legal structure, such as an appeal tribunal, will 
advantage those participants with experience in this arena, but could intimidate those 
less familiar with that environment. Therefore, any design needs to consider carefully 
not just formal equality, but the need for subjective or experiential equality, where 
participants feel equally able to contribute. Inequality due to sOcially constructed 
differences are the concern here, for it is not possible to deal with innate differences 
of intellect, communicative ability and so forth. 
There is a deeper issue here with regards to equality. It concerns the question 
of whether there is an inherent ethnocentrism in the concepts of equality and freedom. 
I use these in a Western liberal sense (see Held, 1987:39-40) with their definitions 
grounded in concepts of individualism. There are two critical questions here: Are the 
Western definitions of these concepts (however defined) universally valid? and, am 
I unconsciously imposing my ethnocentric values on other cultures who may not 
share these values? This raises two issues. The first concerns an ethical claim of 
universality for these values. I deny the possibility of this, if by universality we mean 
some transcendental value outside of a particular context. This has been dealt with 
at length in Chapter One of this thesis. The second issue concerns whether the ideal 
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speech criteria constitute an ethical claim in the first place. To answer this, we need 
to be clear on the context. These criteria are being applied (in this case) within a 
multicultural environment. Given this context, we can ask what conditions are 
necessary for the peaceful resolution of conflict due to cultural difference? Moreover, 
what conditions are necessary for the preservation of cultural difference in a society 
which has to share common resources? I argue these criteria, rather than supporting 
particular values, provide adequate conditions to enhance the possibility for diverse 
cultures to maintain their traditions and values, while ensuring no culture will 
unfairly dominate discursive processes to the disadvantage of others. In other words, 
the ideal speech criteria form a functionally necessary role in a diverse world (see 
footnote No. 11, in this section for further discussion). 
There is another factor in the equality criterion, that of control. This concerns the 
explicit roles the participants take in determining the process and interaction of the 
discourse. The focus here is on the proactive control of the interactions. How is the 
process managed? Is this process or person(s) acceptable to the participants? This is 
a critical aspect of any discursive process for this role involves Significant authority 
and is invested with Significant responsibility. 
2:2:4:3 The Reflexivity Criterion 
The third criterion, reflexivity, is an important part of the discursive process, for 
it enables the on-going reconstruction of the process. Any communicatively rational 
process needs a structure within which to operate, and this requires mutually agreed 
upon rules. But these rules should not be inflexible because discourse can raise issues 
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not previously considered or known. If this occurs, rules may need to be adjusted. In 
practice, this can be very difficult to achieve, given time and resource constraints. 
However, as I will argue later, discursive design is more of a creative than technical 
process. It relies upon goodwill and the ability to cultivate positive relations as much 
as it does on good structure. It is inherently political. This is, in part, its strength, for 
although technical competence in design will enhance the effectiveness of the process, 
it ought to be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of 
communicative rationality. 
2:2:4:4 The Information Criterion 
The availability of information is my final criterion. This concerns access to both 
written and oral information. Unequal access to relevant information has been seen 
as a major distortion of communicative competence in public decision making (Kemp, 
1985) and for this reason careful analysis of access to information is important. Critical 
questions to consider in any discursive design are how to ensure sufficient 
information is available, that it is accessible by and comprehensible to all participants. 
Of particular concern is information strategically important to one party, but is 
unavailable to other parties. Commercially sensitive information may fall in this 
category, but its non-disclosure will produce communicative distortion. The same 
difficulty may apply to intellectual property rights, e.g., indigenous knowledge. Two 
issues are apparent in these cases. First, there is the potential violation of the ideal 
speech criteria due to concealment of certain knowledge. Second, there may be 
justification for this concealment at times. For example, Maori may be unwilling to 
disclose the exact location of sacred sites due to a cultural prohibition. This poses a 
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difficulty for the ideal speech conc~pt; full disclosure may violate certain values, while 
non-disclosure may produce communicative distortion. In response, I propose that a 
distortion only exists when unequal access to information is agreed, through a 
discursive deliberation, to disadvantage at least one party to the discourse. It may 
well be that concealment of the location of a sacred site does not constitute a 
disadvantage to other parties. Further, communicative rationality can also be used to 
produce intersubjective understanding about a cultural need to conceal certain 
information. If agreement can be reached about such concealment, then this does not 
constitute communicative distortion. 
These criteria will affect the design of a discursive process. They provide a 
framework which, though not exhaustive, can guide the shape of any discursive 
design. In doing so, they address concerns regarding the communicative distortion 
potential of 'design' by enabling communicative rationality to emerge in policy 
processes. 
In summary, what I presented here are some possibilities for the design of 
discursive processes. The critical issue is that whatever the actual design used it must 
be the closest approximation of the ideal speech situation. But the question that has 
yet to be addressed concerns the real world applicability of these theories. How does 
this work in practice? Can the ideal speech situation actually produce communicative 
rationality in a real world situation? What can the criteria developed above tell us 
about a particular policy development? In order to address these questions, I will use 
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a case study example of the Christchurch City Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Management Strategy. It is to this that I now tum. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Christchurch City Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Strategy: 
A Case Study 
Discursive design theory offers promise in dealing with the limitations of 
contemporary public policy making. However, theory untested in real life policy 
situations can be subject to the same limitations I argued constrained contemporary 
policy analysis. One limitation is a limited reflexive capacity, whereby if a theory is 
not exposed to critique by the real world, it is likely to be limited in its real world 
adequacy. For example, one of the tests of good theory is how well it enables us to 
understand, evaluate and act on situations in the real world. Without such 
application, further reflexive refinement of theory cannot take place, except perhaps 
on a further abstract level. And while increasing abstraction can be helpful in 
theoretical refinement, the practical question of its usefulness still remains (Bulmer 
1984:4, Denzin 1989:1). The concept of discursive design, and in particular the ideal 
speech criteria I developed in the previous chapter, need to be applied in real world 
cases in order to evaluate how well they function in a specific context. Through the 
use of reflexive critique, a more thorough assessment can be made of the theory's 
practical usefulness. Further, and certainly not less important, it provides 
opportunities for the reconstruction of theory itself, thus engaging the hermeneutic 
circle (see section '2:1:1') and aVOiding a static or fixed view of theory. 
Until recently, most of the attention given in the literature to the application of 
discursive practices in policy making has been theoretical (Dryzek, 1990a:40; Fischer, 
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1993:172; Hayward, 1994:1; Healey, 1992). Although attention has been paid to 
alternative decision techniques, such as conflict resolution, mediation, and public 
participation (Crowfoot and Wondollect, 1990; Kathlene and Martin, 1991; McMullin 
and Nielsen, 1991; Munro-Clarke, 1992; Talbot, 1983), any application of the ideal 
speech situation to real world policy analysis appears incipient. There is need for the 
theory to be applied in the real world. For this reason, I apply the ideal speech criteria 
to an actual policy process, the Christchurch City Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Management Strategy (SHWMS). I provide an overview of the SHWMS process, 
define the research questions, develop a methodological framework for analysis, and, 
in the next chapter, perform the analysis. 
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3:1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY PROCESS 
Solid and hazardous waste management in Christchurch has until recently been 
carried out on a relatively ad hoc basis. Although some innovative ideas have been 
implemented, e.g., the transfer station system of waste removal, no long term strategy 
existed (Dolan, Trans). 1 Although the city was required to have a management 
strategy in place, no statutory requirement for a long term strategy existed. According 
to Laurence Dolan, the city's solid waste planner, this constituted a problem generally 
recognised by the Council. Because there was no long term strategy, there was: (1) 
'unfinished business'; (2) 'uncertainty about where waste management practices were 
going'; and (3) insufficient information from the community (Trans:Dolan). Dolan 
began the initial part of a process designed to produce the city's first long-term waste 
management strategy. 
3:1:1 The Discussion Document 
The process to produce a long term strategy resulted in the Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) releasing a publication in August 1992, titled 'Where 10 Now? 
Christchurch Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Public Discussion Document'. 
The discussion document was designed to inform Christchurch residents about the 
Council's desire to develop a long term strategy that would "provide for the coordinated 
1 Statements and claims I make in relation to the task group are sourced from the thesis interview transcripts. 
Dolan and Pavelka are referenced as ([rans:Dolan; Trans:Pavelka). For reasons of privacy, I have assigned a 
number to each other participant, e.g., ([rans:l; Trans:2) and so forth. Where a number of participants make the 
same point, I reference them as, e.g., (Trans:l, 3, 12, 13). I retain the reference list identifying the transcript with 
the participant. This way, participants' privacy is retained, while ensuring future research of the transcripts is 
POssible. 
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development of future waste management policies, servIces and facilities ... " (pg. 5). 
Specifically, it would establish: 
-The primary goals and objectives for waste management. 
-The policies necessary to meet the goals and objectives. 
-The ways in which the policies will be implemented through the provision of incentives, 
services and facilities in the future (ibid). 
Two thousand discussion documents were printed, and about 1700 were distributed 
or picked up from the Council (Taylor Baines, et al., 1992). The document called for 
written submissions, and 72 were received. 
3:1:2 The Task Group 
The document also promised to set up task groups to provide more intensive 
public involvement in formulating the strategy. Thirty three individuals or groups 
indicated a desire to be involved. Gaye Pavelka, Manager of the 'Centre For Resolving 
Environmental Disputes', was contracted to provide independent facilitation of the 
task group (there was only one group set up). Those who indicated a desire to be 
involved were invited to a meeting where the ideas were discussed, resulting in 14 
people officially appointed to the task group, in addition to Dolan and Pavelka (CCC, 
1994:6-7). 
The SHWMS task group met on 12 occasions over a period of 4 months during 
1993. The meetings were facilitated by Pavelka, and everyone had formal equality 
with no one accorded any more procedural authority than another. Dolan was 
responsible for the supply of information as needed or requested by the group and 
for writing up decisions for re-presentation to the group at the following meeting. 
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Decisions were reached by consensus, and only rarely was a vote taken. The final 
document was informally presented to a group of City Councillors at a special lunch, 
and then in July 1993 was formally presented to the Council at meetings of the 
Operations and Environmental Committees. The document was accepted with only 
two minor changes (relating to the priority of two of the reconunendations), and re-
presented for public submissions. Sixteen were received, and after discussion by the 
task group, the final changes were made. The SHWMS was adopted by the CCC on 
March 15, 1994. 
Although the idea and use of task groups is not new, it was a particularly novel 
approach for the CCc. The usual consultation procedure was to publish a draft policy 
document, or, in the last few years, an issues and options paper, call for submissions, 
hold a public hearing, and then publish the final policy document. Although there 
was a degree of flexibility in this traditional process, it was up to the planners, policy 
analysts or council officers, along with the politicians, to decide on the final policy. 
The public was expected to present its views, and these would be deliberated by the 
Council. It was very much an expert driven policy process, similar to Durning's 
participatory policy analysis through providing analytic inputs (1993; also see this 
thesis, section 2:2:3 Design and Participatory Policy Analysis). In contrast, the SHWMS 
process involved a significantly more .intensive process of consultation, but it also 
moved beyond consultation into a form of collaborative policy analysis. Task group 
members represented a number of interests and sectors (see Appendix One), and, 
although initially uncertain of their role, came to understand it as a process of 
consensus building and corporate strategic planning in which they were partners with 
the Council staff. The CCC still had statutory responsibility and authority to accept 
the strategy, and in this sense the task group was not a decision making body. Yet, 
121 
in a significant sense, they were creating the policy and therefore enacting the 
interpretive model of Durning (1993). 
The use of 'independent' facilitation was also a notable feature of this process. 
As far as I am aware, this was the first time an independent facilitator was used by 
the Council in the development of policy. Pavelka did not represent any particular 
interest and her facilitation was considered by most of the group as a neutral role 
(Trans:Dolan; Trans:l - 5, 9 - 12, 15). 
What I have presented is a brief introduction to the SHWMS. A more detailed 
analysis will be presented in Chapter Four. What needs to be clearly stated now is the 
purpose of the research, including the specific research questions, for which I seek 
answers in the analysis. These questions determine the methodological approach used 
in the analysis. 
3:1:3 Purpose of the Case Study 
The focus of this case study is on the 'process' used in the production of the 
SHWMS, not the substantive issues of the strategy itself. The first purpose is to 
evaluate the discursive aspects of the SHWMS process. It seeks to assess the extent 
to which the process complies with the theoretical requirements of the ideal speech 
criteria. The second purpose of the case study is to assess the practical usefulness of 
the 'ideal speech criteria' in identifying communicative distortions in the SHWMS 
process. This enables reflexive evaluation of the theory as a 'guide' or 'set of criteria' 
in the development or assessment of discursive policy processes. The theory will also 
be assessed for its use as a means of criticism in cases where policy processes exhibit 
no discursive component. The third purpose is to assess the usefulness of discursive 
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processes in general. Obviously, it is difficult to draw generalizations from one case 
study which directly apply to other cases. Case studies can be generalized, but they 
are generalizable to theory, not other case studies (Yin, 1984:21). In other words, the 
value of a case study is in how it supports or does not support theory. Yin calls this 
'analytic generalization', where "a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case study" (Yin, 1984:38). My third purpose 
of assessing the usefulness of discursive design in general is achieved not by case 
study comparis<:>n but by theory refinement resillting from case study analysis. 
Although the case study deals with a particular context, one unlikely to be replicated 
in detail, its usefulness in other contexts relates to the quality of the theory. Due to 
the limited number of case studies of discursive policy processes currently available, 
studies such as this are valuable for their contribution to the growth in understanding 
discursive design theory. For these reasons, it is important to identify what external 
factors contributed to the success or otherwise of the SHWMS process. 
The Research Questions 
These three purposes begin with the SHWMS process, reflexively reengage the 
theory and draw generalizable conclusions about discursive policy processes. The 
three purposes are formalized below as specific research questions: 
(1) To what extent does the SHWMS process fulfil the theoretical requirements 
of the 'ideal speech criteria'? 
(2) How useful are the 'ideal speech criteria' in identifying communicative 
distortions of the SHWMS process? 
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(3) What can be learnt from the SHWMS process that improves our 
understanding of discursive policy processes? 
These questions are sequential. An answer to the third question can only be given 
when conclusions for the previous two questions are developed. An answer to the 
second is an outcome of the process of analyzing the first. Therefore, the analysis 
begins with question one and proceeds to the final two. In order to answer these 
questions, a methodology is needed. 
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3:2 METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
The importance of methodology and method, and the critical difference between 
them, can perhaps be seen in the following way. I discussed a theory which purports 
to overcome a considered problem - that of communicative distortion in policy 
analysis. I also developed some 'practical problems' or 'questions' which await an 
answer. In order to provide an answer, some data (provided by the case study) and 
a means of analyzing this data are needed. The 'general principles' that guide the 
collection and analysis of the data can be referred to as methodology. In Bulmer's 
words: 
General methodology denotes the systematic and logical study of the general principles 
guiding sociological investigation, concerned in the broadest sense with questions of how 
the sociologist [or policy analyst] establishes social knowledge .... (Bulmer, 1984:4, 
(brackets added)). 
Methodology, then, provides the theoretical justification for adopting what can be 
called method or research activity (Bulmer, 1984:5; Denzin, 1989:4). Method differs 
from methodology in that it determines tithe specific or manipulative fact-finding 
operations which are used to yield data about the social world" (Bulmer, 1984:5). Thus, the 
task here is to describe both the methodology and methods used in the research and 
in the ensuing analysis. 
Although analYSis formally takes place after data gathering, the theoretical 
framework used in analysis largely determines what data are required. The process 
I developed was initially inspired by theory, begging questions that seemed to capture 
my 'sociological imagination' (to borrow from C Wright Mills, 1959). Theory shaped 
the form of analysis I undertook. The research questions, choice of methodology and 
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methods were developed, not in a clear systematic sense, but very much in a reflexive 
process of discovery. I make this point to undermine any strict sense of order that 
may be conveyed in the discussion below. Order and clear structure are necessary to 
communicate the methodology and methods to the reader, but any such order is 
invariably imposed retrospectively. This, however, is the nature of a reflexive 
approach, where understanding emerges out of a series of encounters with people and 
ideas. Therefore, it is appropriate that my methodology, methods and analysis reflect 
this. I begin with a description of the methodology and methods used in the analysis 
because these had a more substantial affect on the type of data needed than the case 
study had on the analysis. 
3:2:1 Methodology and Methods of Analysis 
The three research questions I posed above call for two categories of information 
~ 
to be analyzed. These are a 'structural analysis' and a 'phenomenolOgical analysis'. 
Both are defined below and involve general principles which determine the sort of 
knowledge to be produced. While they can be considered analytically separate, they 
are both essential to the research questions. 
3:2:1:1 Structural Analysis 
By structural analysis, I mean an analysis of the 'structure' surrounding the 
SHWMS process. More specifically, I refer to the physical, procedural, social and 
political environments in which the SHWMS took place. It is the empirical reality, 
Durkheim's 'social facts' (1895), that I examine here. Social facts can be thought of as 
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"social phenomena that [are] external to the individual yet [constrain] his or her actions" 
(Abercrombie, et al., 1988:226).2 Structural constraints exist beyond the volitions of 
individuals, and are important in structuring the actions and choices of individuals. 
An analysis of structure will provide important clues about communicative constraints 
in the SHWMS process. 
Two key elements of structure are important for this analysis, process and 
context. This enables a more focused analysis of the structure through identification 
of structural processes and structural context. These two foci, defined below, also 
address some of the concerns of the research questions. Analysis of the process 
addresses some of the concerns of the first two research questions, while analysis of 
the context addresses the final research question. First, I define the concept of 
structural process. 
3:2:1:1:1 Process 
Process, as used here, is concerned with communicative procedures, strategies, 
rules and interactions that took place during the production of the SHWMS. It consists 
of the stream of events, interactions, strategies, emotions, rules and decisions that 
occurred during the task group's existence. It also involves the period just prior to the 
group being set up. The policy cycle theory is useful here. Although there are a 
variety of interpretations of the cycle, they are all derived from Lasswell's (1956) 
original formulation of seven stages. However, a 'standard heuristic' version, widely 
2 There is no claim here that 'social facts' are objective in the sense used by objectivism. These phenomena are 
not contingent upon the individual, but they can be construed or interpreted in a number of different ways 
depending upon one's standpoint. I offer what I believe to be a compelling interpretation, but further reflexive 
analysis may expand or challenge my interpretation. This possibility is central to my theory and does not posit 
a theoretical difficulty. 
·1 
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used, involves four broad stages (Biihrs and Bartlett, 1993:19). The policy cycle begins 
with agenda setting, moves to policy formulation, then to implementation and finally 
evaluation. The SHWMS process consisted of the first two stages, so my analysis will 
centre around them. Obviously, implementation of the policy, and any subsequent 
evaluation, is beyond the analytic reach of this thesis because it has yet to be 
implemented in any substantive sense. First, I discuss agenda setting. 
Agenda setting is the first stage of the policy cycle and has a powerful role in 
problem definition. Kingdon (1984) offers a useful definition of agenda setting: 
The agenda, as I conceive of it, is the list of subjects and problems to which government 
officials, and people outside government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention at any given time (pg. 3). 
This definition, however, is inadequate in dealing with agenda setting. The 'list of 
subjects and problems' is dependent upon prior definition of what constitutes a 
problem. Problems can be defined in different ways, and this can affect the types of 
policy solutions generated. The construction of solutions, if they are instrumentally 
rational, are logically dependant upon a prior problem definition. For example, debate 
has been vigorous in New Zealand over the concept of sustainability as defined in the 
Resource Management Act (1991) (for example, see Memon, 1991). If the problem is 
defined in terms of how to limit environmental impact, any subsequent outcome will 
be different than if The problem is defined as how to protect development 
opportunities (for example, see Fisher, 1991). Communicative rationality is not so 
much concerned with the substantive definitions of problems, but with how the 
problem was defined. Key questions for the SHWMS case study include: who was 
responsible for defining the problem? Did the process involve open discursive 
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opportunities for all stakeholders? These are important analytical questions for this 
case study. 
Problem definition is only one aspect of agenda setting. The way a problem is 
defined will shape potential solutions. Kingdon (1984) again provides a useful concept 
when he distinguishes between agendas and alternatives. An official agenda involves 
some problem definition as well as some preferred solutions. Alternatives involve 
other possible solutions not on the official agenda. Kingdon (1984) observes: 
"Out of the set of all conceivable alternatives, OJ]'1cials actually consider some more 
seriously than others. So the process of specifying alternatives narrows the set of 
conceivable alternatives that is seriously considered" (pg. 4). 
While this is obviously necessary, given the resource and intellectual difficulties in 
investigating every alternative, it helps determine the shape of the ensuing policy 
debate. The capability of an analytic system to cope with diverse and sometimes 
radical alternatives will have an impact upon the discursive opportunity of 
stakeholders. Kingdon argues agendas are more likely to be set by politicians, while 
specialists produce alternatives. These specialists come from diverse orientations and 
interests, "but they all share one thing: their specialization and acquaintance with the issues 
in that particular policy area" (ibid, 1984:209). From this, I argue politicians or experts 
in the policy field, such as waste management, have an advantage in their ability to 
get issues, whether they be problems or solutions to existing problems, onto the 
political agenda. Therefore, the discursive evaluation of the SHWMS process will need 
to carefully examine the agenda setting component in order to determine the level of 
diScursive opportunity for stakeholders. The pre-existence of an agenda is not in itself 
problematic. What may be problematic in relation to my theory is the level of 
reflexivity in the production of the agenda. Little or no reflexivity produces an agenda 
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characterised by partiality, potentially producing communicative distortion. Therefore, 
it is the level of reflexivity allowed to occur during the policy process that determines 
to what extent the ideal speech criteria are met. 
Agenda setting sets discursive boundaries to a policy process. One of the ways 
it does this is through stakeholder selection. Although stakeholder selection would 
appear to fall outside Kingdon's definition of agenda setting, it is a necessary issue 
to analyze. A definition of a 'stakeholder' will encompass, or eliminate, particular 
viewpoints or discourses. These viewpoints or discourses may involve important 
components of the problem situation which would otherwise be overlooked or 
marginalised. Therefore, reflexivity is essential when identifying stakeholders. The 
issue at stake for the SHWMS is not so much the concept of eligibility in a democratic 
process (for a discussion see Mulgan, 1984), but the capacity of the process to be open 
to any potential stakeholder. Again, this is subject to analysis in Chapter Four. 
The second stage to consider is policy formulation. While the literature is rich 
with investigations of policy formulation and selection proc~sses (for a concise review, 
see BUhrs and Bartlett, 1994:22-25), my concern here is specifically with the SHWMS 
task group. While an agenda existed prior to the task group forming, policy 
formulation largely took place during the duration of the meetings. This process is 
subjected to the ideal speech criteria. The question is to what extent, and in what 
ways, the conditions for 'ideal speech' were met. Both the agenda setting and policy 
formulation processes will be analyzed using the ideal speech criteria3; these are 
elaborated below. 
3 Theoretical justification for the 'ideal speech criteria' is given in section '2:2 Discursive Design'. 
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The Accessibility criterion is concerned with the level of opportunity for 
participation in the discourse on waste management. The task group was a formal 
expression of the discourse and therefore a central question is: Who had access to the 
task group? The definition of a stakeholder is a critical determinant in this, and is 
carefully examined by the following questions: How were the stakeholders defined?; 
How was the agenda set and who set it? Equally important is the process by which 
the task group was chosen. There are some key questions to be addressed here. Did 
all stakeholders have an equal opportunity to participate in the process? Were any 
stakeholders left out of the process? How were the task group members chosen? 
Participation necessitates knowledge of the task group's existence and the resources 
necessary to take part, which raises further questions. What was the time commitment 
and did it hinder anyone's access to the group? Did the travel time and costs to 
attend meetings prove a hinderance? Were participants with child care responsibilities 
hindered from attending? Did the meeting location facilitate attendance and inclusion? 
Did the setting and culture discriminate against any stakeholders? 
The Equality criterion refers to equality of opportunity, not equality of ability. 
Obviously, participants in this process will have differing levels of communicative and 
intellectual competence. However, the concern here is about the capacity of 
participants to participate with freedom and equality in the discursive process. For 
instance, I needed to find out how the meetings were run. How was speaking time 
allocated? What forms of communication were permitted? How were meeting 
protocol and procedures established? Were all stakeholders able to communicate on 
an equal basis? Analysis of this involves both an understanding of meeting 
procedures, as well as the personal experiences of the participants. Were there 
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procedures for ensuring all members had an opportunity to speak when they wanted? 
Did they feel they were able to speak freely? 
An important component of the equality criterion is what I call the control 
factor. In order to ensure communicative equality, there may need to be some external 
control (monitor) of the group to ensure those with less social, intellectual or 
persuasive ability are not disadvantaged. Without recognition of these issues, 
communicative distortions are likely to emerge. Therefore, the following questions 
need to be addressed. What explicit control roles existed within the group? How did 
they come about? What guidelines existed for these roles? Who developed these 
guidelines? How were those with less persuasive ability recognised and assisted? 
Finally, decision making will have to be examined. Decision processes form a 
critical component in communicative rationality because the development of 
intersubjective understanding provides the conditions for mutually agreed decisions. 
It follows that the elimination of communicative distortions must occur not just in 
deliberation processes, but in any formal decision moment. By formal decision 
moment, I refer to a time when all parties to the discourse formally agree upon a 
particular policy, plan or action. This does not imply a policydecision only occurs at 
one clearly defined pOint in time, but it does recognise the significance of formal 
decision processes. These processes are examined here. What sort of decision making 
techniques were operating within the group? How were decisions made? What role 
did consensus building play in the group? Answers to these questions will enhance 
recognition of communicative distortions. 
The Reflexivity criterion is an important part of the discursive process because 
it enables the on-gOing consideration of beliefs and values as well as facts and data. 
This mitigates the problem of overlooking or ignoring new or additional arguments 
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and ensures more thorough attention is given to all relevant issues. Therefore, 1 will 
need to find out if the capacity and freedom for reflexivity was present and effective 
in the process. That is, was the process itself able to be questioned? If so, then how 
did this occur? To what extent did the process facilitate self-reflexivity of the 
participants? This is especially important in that communicative rationality necessarily 
involves adjustment and development of the beliefs of participants. 
The Information criterion concerns access to both written and oral information. 
Unequal access to relevant information has been seen as a major distortion of 
communica"tive competence in public decision making (Kemp 1985). For this reason, 
it is important to analyze this criterion. Was sufficient information available, accessible 
by all and comprehensible by all, regarding both setting of the agenda and the 
formulation of policy? Who provided it? What was provided and how was it 
provided? Was it technically complex? Was technically complex information 
understandable by all? If so, how did this occur? Was there sufficient time for 
participants to become conversant with the information? 
These criteria are critical in this analysis because they probe locations of 
potential communicative distortion. They provide a method for rigorous analysis (I 
do not claim an exhaustive analysis) of the process, i.e., the communicative 
procedures, strategies, rules and interactions that shaped the discursive outcomes of 
the SHWMS. Analyzing both agenda setting and policy formulation stages of the 
policy cycle in this way exposes the structure, or social facts, which constitute the 
process. Analysis does not finish here for any process occurs within a context. Thus, 
context forms the second part of the structural analysis. 
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3:2:1:1:2 Context 
Context is similar to the 'background' or 'scenario' in a stage production. The 
actors do not perform in a vacuum, with no sense of context, but locate their 
characters in time and space with a particular history. Only within this defined 
context can the audience make sense of the actors' actions. The SHWMS took place 
within a particular context, and this forms some of the variables which shaped the 
interactions which occurred between the actors. Unless these are accounted for, it may 
not be possible to provide adequate evaluation of the process. For example, what is 
the effect of political support (or lack of it) on the interactions and development of 
communicative rationality within the group? The structural context, as I define it here, 
will help provide an answer to the third research question. 
I have identified five elements essential to the structural context of the SHWMS 
process. These elements are to some degree interrelated, a!,-d analysis must seek to 
integrate them as much as possible. As mentioned earlier, they are separated only for 
analytic clarity. 
Before continuing, I need to stake a disclaimer. This section is not intended to 
be an exhaustive contextual analysis for the following reasons. As Diesing has 
observed, there is a tension which surrounds any case study. The researcher: 
wants to study a whole system, not just a fragment, and this requires a continually 
expanding boundary as he [sic] finds his subject matter participating in larger systems. 
He also wants a thorough, detailed study of all the important interrelations in his 
system .... He cannot satisfy both these requirements fully. No matter which way he 
turns, his work will lack something. .. (1972:277). 
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I am acutely aware of this tension regarding this contextual analysis. Indeed, I make 
no attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the context of the SHWMS. The principle 
research focus of this thesis is on the ideal speech requirements. Nevertheless, a 
discussion of the context is warranted, even though it cannot be examined in detail. 
To fail to examine the context passes up an opportunity to reflect critically on what 
mayor may not facilitate a discursive turn in policy making. And this is the essence 
of my third research question: What can be learnt from the SHWMS process that 
improves our understanding of discursive policy processes? 
The first element of context is the institutional context. In this case, it refers to 
the Christchurch City Council, although more specifically, the Waste Management 
Unit. I looked for ways in which the institutional structure shaped or impacted upon 
the SHWMS process. This requires some understanding of the scope of the Waste 
Management Unit and the roles of the personnel involved in the SHWMS process. To 
whom was the Unit responsible? For whom was the strategy prepared? What were 
the Unit's guidelines in relation to developing policy? These are the questions 
answered by my analysis in Chapter Four. 
The legal context is the second element discussed. With the increased focus on 
public participation in the Resource Management Act (1991), it is important to identify 
what role this legislation played in the development of the SHWMS. What were the 
statutory requirements on the council, particularly with regards to public 
participation? What procedures, if any, did the legislation mandate? Statutory 
requirements for participation and mandated procedures may introduce limitations 
or constraints on free discourse during the SHWMS. Therefore, answers to these 
questions will help determine if this was the case. 
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The third element of context concerns the roles of personnel in the process. 
Neither policies nor policy processes just happen, but are products of human action. 
The role of individuals as key variables in policy development is important here and 
is well established in the literature (Kingdon, 1984; Schneider and Teske, 1992). One 
key role is that of the 'policy entrepreneur' (Kingdon, 1984). This is someone who 
typically sees a 'window of opportunity' for the development of a particular policy 
or approach. They act as a catalyst for innovation. I determine whether someone 
performed such a role in the SHWMS process, and answer the questions: Who were 
they? What enabled them to function in the way they did? and, How significant was 
this role in establishing the approach used in the SHWMS process? 
The fourth element is the political context. Public servants may be generators 
of policy, but they do not, in most cases, make policy decisions. The role of politicians 
in authorising or forbidding particular policy initiatives is therefore important to 
identify. For instance, what was the role of the council politicians in this process? 
What was their initial attitude towards it? Did their attitudes change by the 
completion of the process? What do they consider to be the positive or negative 
benefits of the process? These are questions which my analysis answers. 
The final element is the nature of the subject. By this, I refer to the scope, 
complexity, risk factors, number of stakeholders and public sensitivity on the subject. 
Without carefully defining these features, it would be difficult to assess the reasons 
for the success or lack thereof in the process. For example, what elements of the 
subject facilitate, and what elements hinder, the application of a discursive approach? 
Was there public controversy surrounding solid waste management? Was there 
technical disagreement about the problems or solutions? Was there any Significant 
clash of values apparent during the process? 
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The process and context form the two aspects of the structural analysis, giving 
understanding of the physical, procedural, social and political environments in which 
the SHWMS took place and any potential locations for communicative distortion. The 
second analytical theme, the phenomenological analysis, addresses the participant's 
individual experiences of the SHWMS process. 
3:2:1:2 Phenomenological Analysis 
While structural analysis enables us to understand the context and process of the 
SHWMS, it does not give us insight into the way participants experienced the process. 
Phenomenological analysis can help us here. Phenomenology is the study of 
appearances, that is, how things appear or are experienced by conscious beings 
(Stewart and Mickunas, 1974:3). The aim is to produce an understanding from the 
subject's frame of reference (Singleton, et al., 1993:36). My premise is that subjects 
have their own interpretation of events and experiences, in the sense that they 
'personally' experience these phenomena. This is not to say that the range of possible 
interpretations is not delimited by one's culture or available discourses (Psathas, 
1973:8), but rather that there is a very real uniqueness about these experiences; they 
belong to that person, not another. This provides qualitatively different experiences 
that cannot be understood through an external structural analysis. These private 
experiences and interpretations form an important aspect of the world of possible 
\ knowledge. To neglect the personal experiences of subjects is to ignore much 
knowledge essential in a process such as the SHWMS. As Bulmer puts its: 
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It is ... essential to study social action from the actors' point of view to provide some 
account of the actors's subjective 'definition of the situation' (to use a phrase made 
famous by W.I. Thomas) (1984:211). 
Why is this essential? The logic of communicative rationality insists that all 
perceptions, values and feelings of participants are valid contributions to the 
discursive process, although this does not mean all perceptions, values or feelings 
have equal epistemic value. If intersubjective understanding is to occur, it needs to 
involve all relevant emotions, experiences and values of the communicants. Failure 
to allow for these dimensions of human knowledge can only result in distorted 
communication. Therefore, any analysis that seeks to assess the extent of 
communicative distortion needs to examine the personal experiential dimension of the 
participants. 
Phenomenology 
The roots and emergence of phenomenology as a distinct method of philosophy 
are complex, and a detailed examination of them would be of little benefit here.4 
However, it is worth touching on a couple of key concepts which will help the reader 
to understand the way I appropriate phenomenology. 
Central to phenomenology is the issue of consciousness. Unlike the Cartesian 
cogito (the thinking self), the phenomenological notion of consciousness does not 
\ separate the act of being conscious from what one is conscious of. Thus, "Consciousness 
is always directed towards an object" (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974:8). This is known as 
4 For further reading see Bernstein, (1976:115-169); Psathas, (1973); Spiegelberg, (1965, 1975); and Stewart and 
Mickunas, (1974). 
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'the intentionality of consciousness' (ibid; Thompson 1981:38) and means that 
questions over the existence of the real world are no longer relevant, for intentionality 
of consciousness means the r~al world (object of consciousness) must exist. Therefore, 
an exploration of phenomena (or appearances one is conscious of) is necessary for 
social understanding. 
Another important aspect of phenomenology is the bracketing or suspension of 
judgements when seeking to understand a particular phenomenon (Psathas, 1973:14). 
In fact, it has been referred to as a philosophy without presuppositions (Stewart and 
Mickunas, 1974:6), for it involves setting aside the day-to-day assumptions that inform 
our usual interpretations of things. By suspending our understanding in this way, we 
are then able to become aware of phenomena which we would not normally notice. 
For example, it might be argued that the last thing an inhabitant of the ocean depths 
would become aware of is water. This is the type of 'seeing' which phenomenology 
enables. Given that we all carry a stock of a-priori interpretations around with us, 
these blind us to many other aspects of phenomena of which we might otherwise be 
aware. Thus, a phenomenological method seeks to give equal attention to all aspects 
of the phenomena (ibid, pg. IS), seeking to uncover a 'universal essence's (Eidos) 
(Spiegelberg, 1965:676; Thompson, 1981:38). 
Both of these concepts involve complex and subtle reasoning. However, they are 
not immune to criticism (e.g., Bernstein 1976:167; Thompson 1981:38). I mention them 
because they are both central to phenomenological method, but also to point out that 
\ I am not appropriating the second aspect, only the first. The first is an assumption 
that provides a theoretical basis for using personal experience as a legitimate source 
5 I do not assume phenomenology is successful in uncovering a 'universal essence', nor imply such a project 
C?uld be successful. Given the earlier discussion on standpoint epistemology, such a possibility would appear 
highly unlikely. 
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of data. However, I do not come to the experiences of the participants with suspended 
judgement in the sense of having no analytic framework. This entire thesis is a 
process of constructing such an analytic framework. For consistency with 
phenomenological method, I ought to step back from my analytic agenda and use 
phenomenological method to 'intuit' (Spiegelberg, 1965:659) the general essences of 
the experiences. This fundamentally radical move is simply not necessary for my 
analysis, for I am seeking a 'particular' understanding oithe extent of communicative 
rationality, and not the general essences of this interaction. Nevertheless, the call to 
reflexivity implied in the. open attitude attending phenomenological analysis is well 
noted. This, then, serves as both an explanation and justification of my use of the term 
phenomenology. 
The use of Phenomenology in AnalYSis 
In my evaluation, I ascertain the extent to which the SHWMS conformed to the 
principles of the 'ideal speech situation'. This necessitates taking seriously the 
participants' personal (subjective) evaluations of the process. Did they feel they had 
equal opportunities to speak? What restraints, if any, did they experience? Were they 
able to understand the discourse of others? These are the sorts of questions which will 
add another analytic layer to the structural analysis discussed above. 
Specifically, phenomenological analysis deals with participants' experiences of 
the process. Why did they get involved? How did they find out about it? Have they 
been involved in similar or dissimilar processes before? What is their relationship to 
Solid and hazardous waste management? I find out what their experience of the 
process was like. For example, did they experience any personal benefits from the 
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process? Did they have any negative experiences? Would they be willing to do it 
again? What changes would they suggest? Did they feel they could communicate 
freely in the group? These questions enlarge my understanding of the context of the 
process and will assist in answering my third research question: "What can be learnt 
from the SHWMS process that improves our understanding of discursive policy 
processes?" 
To summarise this section, I have explained both my general methodology and 
the specific methods used in the analysis. The next step involves the collection of the 
data. It is to this I now turn. 
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3:3 DATA COLLECTION 
Two sources of data are relevant to this research. The first source is literature, 
and the second is the reflections of the task group members and relevant CCC staff. 
I describe both these sources in terms of what information I obtained, how I obtained 
it, and why I used that particular approach. 
3:3:1 Literature Search 
Central to the structural analysis is information on the agenda setting process 
and meeting procedures of the SHWMS process. Due to the fact this was a CCC 
project, and therefore accountable to Christchurch rate payers, detailed records of the 
process were kept. I list these as follows: 
Meeting Agendas: These contain the proposed agenda for each meeting, 
distributed to each member prior to the meeting. 
Meeting Minutes: These minutes provide details of who was present, along with 
apologies, an overview of what was achieved (on one occasion), a record of what was 
discussed, and any decisions made. 
Technical Information: This provides data for the 'information' criterion. It 
includes published articles and research information from the CCc. Additionally, it 
covers the statutory obligations of the Waste Management Unit. 
Correspondence: This includes letters, faxes and memoranda. There is only a 
Small number, most of which would be considered confidential. 
Task Group Members Lists: These include a mailing list, as well as names 
Suggested for the task group. 
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Meeting Aids: These consist of hand written deliberation notes, typed sheets 
used for issue identification and recommendations, and large sheets of paper used for 
group goal setting. 
Newspaper Articles: Two from The Press, Christchurch 
Submissions: A summary of each of the 17 submissions received by the CCC in 
response to the draft Solid and Hazardous Waste. Management Strategy. 
Other sources are published documents. They are presented in chronological 
order. 
Public Discussion Document: (CCC 1992), previously cited. 
Analysis of Submissions: (Taylor Baines, et al., 1992), previously cited. 
Rough Draft SHWMS: (CCC, 1993b) 
Draft SHWMS: (CCC, 1993a) 
Case Study: Christchurch's Solid Waste Management Strate~: A Case Study in 
Community Participation, a paper by Dolan and Pavelka (1993) presented at the 5th 
annual conference of the Waste Management Institute. 
Final SHWMS: (CCC, 1994) 
The above literature and documentation was made available to me by Caye 
Pavelka. They provide a wide range of substantive data relevant for all of the research 
questions. In particular, the literature and documentation provide data relevant to the 
contextual analysis, for they deal with much of the background to the task group. 
However, the data provided by the literature search are of limited use because the 
ideal speech criteria require a level of analysis which goes beyond just the 'official' 
records. For this reason, I chose the interview as my second and principle form of 
data collection. 
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3:3:2 Interviews 
3:3:2:1 Why use the Interview Technique? 
The principle reason for my use of an interview technique is that this research 
is driven by a type of theory which demands an interactive methodology, and 
therefore the use of a non-interactive form of data gathering is not appropriate. 
Obviously, participant observation of the SHWMS was impossible for chronological 
reasons (it took place in 1993, prior to me beginning this thesis). A mail out survey, 
one of the approaches originally considered, turned out to be methodologically 
incompatible with my theory. The discursive and interactive epistemology I developed 
earlier demanded a discursive and interactive approach be used to gather the data. 
As Benney and Hughes (1984) observe, sociology has become the 'science of the 
interview', for the "subject-matter of sociology is interaction" (pg. 216).6 The use of an 
impersonal survey method, for example, cannot adequately capture the impressions, 
feelings, attitudes or opinions central to the phenomenological analysis. However, a 
face-to-face interview is more able to achieve this. 
An interview is essentially a conversation between two people (Denzin, 1989:109; 
Benney and Hughes, 1984:222). Being face-to-face, the participants enter into a 
relationship which forms the basis from which knowledge is conveyed. This 
knowledge is constituted through at least three (interrelated) facets of this interaction. 
First, the ability of the interviewer to listen, communicate and reflexively interpret the 
communications of the other will shape the type of knowledge produced. Likewise, 
6 While this thesis cannot be neatly categorised as just sociology, it does draw strongly on sociological tradition, 
particularly regarding my phenomenological methodology. This assumption that I am' doing sociology' is therefore 
appropriate. 
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the trust the interviewer engenders in the respondent is important in shaping the type 
of knowledge given by the respondent (Denzin, 1989:109). Second, the personal 
situation of the participant, how comfortable they feel in the interview, how 
competent they are in communication, their degree of willingness to be involved, and 
their commitment to truthful revelation (Denzin, 1989:110; Moser and Kalton, 
1971:271), will all affect the knowledge shared. Third, the actual information required, 
the construction of the questions, their order and wording all affect the final outcome 
(de Vaus, 1985:46-50). The interviews I undertook generally minimised the potential 
problems emerging from these interactions, for the social distance between myself and 
most of the participants was minimal All but two participants had a professional 
connection with the issue, and one of the two was an experienced community board 
member. Two participants were women, both university trained. All were Pakeha 
(non-Maori of European decent). Some age differences existed but most were in their 
thirties and forties. Given my social location as a university trained Pakeha in my mid 
thirties, there was not a Significant difference between us, with the exception of 
gender vis-a.-vis the two women. Nevertheless, my presence as interviewer and 
analyst ought not be ignored. While I shared a similar social location to most of the 
task group, I had a researcher role in the interviews. This role was not, and could 
never be completely neutral, i.e., having no social location. Therefore, this role is 
examined in the analysis (Chapter Four). 
Having established the reasons for using the interview technique, I need to 
explain the type of interView used. There are three basic types of face-to-face 
interviews. They are the structured, semi-structured and non-structured interview. 
The differences centre around the extent of structure used. I used the semi-structured 
interview, its use being well established in the literature (Denzin, 1989; Singleton, et 
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al., 1993). The semi-structured interview falls in-between the structured interview and 
the non-structured interview. The former not only ensures the questions are exactly 
the same for every respondent, but that the same order is followed. The semi-
structured interview maintains a clear conception of the information to be gained, but 
allows flexibility in both the wording and order of the questions. In contrast, the non-
structured interview has no set schedule of questions, giving the interviewer great 
freedom to explore issues and test hypotheses (Denzin, 1989:106). Because I needed 
to find out how the participants experienced the SHWMS process, as well as what 
they actually did, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview enabled me to glean 
both substantive and experiential data, without sacrificing the discursive freedom of 
the participants. 
3:3:2:2 Problems with Interviews 
The literature recognises certain problems with interviews, principally cost and 
bias (Singleton, et al., 1993:262). In my case, cost was minimal, as there was only a 
small number to interview and limited travelling involved. However, bias is a more 
serious problem. Even the concept itself is problematic, for as discussed in Chapter 
Two, no one can be truly free of bias if we mean by bias the influence the interviewer 
has on the response of the respondent. I define bias as any technique or personal 
influence of the interviewer and/or the interview situation which causes the 
respondent to significantly reconstruct their opinions or experience, thereby not 
recounting accurately their own opinions or experience. It can occur, for example, if 
a respondent gives me a response they think I want, rather than being true to their 
actual memory or feelings. While the elimination of bias is impossible, given that 
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knowledge is itself a (never completed) product of interaction, the challenge is to limit 
its effect. What I wanted to know is the way they experienced the SHWMS. However, 
it is entirely possible that were I to discuss with them the ~eory of communicative 
rationality and the argument for open communication, they would reinterpret their 
experience in the light of this new knowledge. An experience which may previously 
have been acceptable now becomes unacceptable. This can be interpreted as the 
introduction of ideology (Dryzek, 1990a:166). Thus, we must carefully determine what 
we are seeking, stable truth of the 'actual' situation, defined as facts existing in 
defiance of contingency, or merely an ephemeral moment of understanding? The 
former is somewhat illusory, while the latter is of little help in analysis. The way 
forward is to assume knowledge is relatively stable (given that this is most people's 
experience of much of their lives), and carefully attempt to reduce the personal 
interference of the researcher. 
Given the relatively impersonal nature of the SHWMS, as opposed, say, to 
researching the sexual practices of the participants, as well as the general equality 
between myself and my respondents, it is unlikely that significant bias will be present. 
Caution, nevertheless, is important. If I ask a question in such a way that the 
respondent is made aware of an issue they may not have previously been aware of, 
bias may occur. For example, if I say, 'Did anyone abuse their authority in the 
group?', the respondent is alerted to the idea of abuse and may feel compelled to 
answer in those terms. If, however, I say, 'Tell me about what the group was like', 
and follow up with probing questions such as 'tell me some more about that', there 
is less chance of predetermining the answer. So while bias in the interview is a factor, 
it is possible to minimise its impact through the use of open-ended questions. 
Another important area of bias may affect the analysis. This concerns the 
etiology of systematic communicative distortion. The concern of this thesis is 
Structural causation external to the participants. I take my theoretical starting point 
for  this from  C.Wright Mills'  'private  problems and  public issues'  (1959) where he  
divides problems experienced by the individual into two classes. The first are 
problems caused by the private choices of those individuals, and the second are 
personal problems caused by factors beyond the control of that individual.7
 
The 
boundaries between the two are undefined, and it is likely that both sets of causes are 
at 'work simultaneously. The causes of systemic communicative distortion exist 
beyond the private control of individuals. These communicative distortions are the 
subject of this thesis. But because of the blurred boundaries between the private and 
public, how can I know whether any confession of an experienced inequality in the 
SHWMS discursive process was a systematic structural problem (public), or a 
personal problem such as an anxiety disorder about speaking in public or even the 
transference of strictly private distress onto the public process? Participants may 
genuinely experience a lack of discursive opportunity, even though structural 
communicative distortion may have been eliminated, e.g., the 'ideal' speech situation.  
The focus here is on communicative distortions which can, in principle, be 
eliminated from public policy processes by careful design. A key to recognition of 
these distortions lies in the 'public' nature of systemic distortion. Systemic distortions  
 
 
7The distinction between public and private is problematic,  not  least  for the  feminist  claim  that  the  personal  
is political (and therefore public). However, I use the concept in a particular way. I do not mean private troubles 
have no social causation. Rather, I use the concept in a didactic way to distinguish between communicative 
inequality which is systemic and can be dealt with through public processes and that which cannot be dealt with 
through public processes.  I freely admit,  for example,  that  communicative  distortion resulting  from  the inability  
of a young child to enter into discursive deliberation, while not socially caused in itself, can be accommodated 
through the use of others speaking on their behalf. This may not be so easily resolved if someone refuses to 
participate or feels too insecure to do so. If there were unlimited resources, public processes could, presumably, 
overcome most of these issues. In practice, closure must occur at some point where public or institutional 
responsibility ceases. I make no attempt to define where this point is.  
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will be apparent to many of the participants, and will generate a theme in the 
analysis. This is similar to Mills' concept where if a trouble is truly a 'public issue', 
it will not be confined to only a few. This may not resolve the difficulties in all 
potential discursive processes, but presents itself as a theme to be investigated. 
Therefore, it is carefully considered during the analysis. 
3:3:2:3 The Interview Process 
Given the small number of task group members (16), the interviewing process 
was not an exhausting task. I initially contacted each participant by letter and 
followed up with a phone call. I could not make contact with one participant, and he 
was not interviewed. In three other cases where there was a stand-in nominated 
(industry, environmentalists and one of the waste management companies), I only 
interviewed the principle representative, not the stand-in representative. The only 
other person not interviewed was someone not officially on the task group, but who 
was a constant observer in all but three meetings. I was unable to contact him. There 
were six other participants during the duration of the task group, most of these being 
CCC personnel providing expert advice for a single session. They were not formal 
members of the group and were not entitled to a decision making role. Therefore, 
their impact on the task group members is more relevant than their experience of the 
task group. For this reason, I did not interview them. 
All participants8 were interviewed face-to-face, with one exception, when a 
telephone interview took place. This person was about to leave for overseas and did 
not have the time available for a face-to-face interview. His responses were noted by 
8 Henceforth, participant refers to those actually interviewed. 
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hand and typed up immediately after the interview. My interview with Laurence 
Dolan had to take place when he was visiting the city, and thus was limited by his 
tight time schedule. I took notes by hand and typed them up that day. In all other 
cases, the interviews were tape recorded. 
The advantages in taping the interviews are numerous. First, it produced an 
exact record of each participant's responses, including such things as pauses, tone and 
other subtle communicative devices. Second, it enabled me to concentrate on what 
they were saying, rather than desperately trying to write everything down. This level 
of concentration ensured the person I was listening to them and not preoccupied with 
other things. Third, transcribing the tapes enabled me to pay close attention to things 
I may not have noticed the first time around. This gave me a greater awareness of 
what they were saying. 
However, there are criticisms of taping. These tend to involve at least two 
things: the time involved in transcribing and the possibility of reducing the 
interviewer's ability to be observant. First, the transcribing I did was not word for 
word, but involved critical comments and quotes that conveyed the essence of the 
interview. To transcribe the entire 16 tapes, approximately 14 hours of interviews, 
would have taken around 112 hours (at 8 hours transcribing per hour of interview, 
Singleton, et al., 1993:342). Given the fact that respondents answered specific 
questions, it was fairly easy to understand their answers, and therefore an exhaustive 
transcription did not prove any advantage. On the odd occasion when reading the 
transcriptions, I have gone back to the source (tape) when uncertain about what was 
being said. Overall, though, the transcriptions proved to be ideal data. The second 
criticism is that taping may cause the interviewer to be less observant, given their 
reliance on the tape to capture all relevant details (Denzin, 1989:85-86; Singleton, 
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1993:342).This was overcome by hand written notes I took during the interviews. I 
noted responses, underlined the next question to refer to, and at times noted new 
questions that seemed contextually relevant to that participant. This enabled some 
reflexivity in my interviewing. 
The above deSCription of the interview process explicitly states how the data 
gathering took place. The next issue to examine is the production of the interview 
questions. 
3:3:2:4 Interview Questions 
The questions used in the interviews were produced by systematically examining 
the methods of analysis (structural and phenomenological analyses). The analytic 
methods each raised certain types of questions and involved two stages: an initial list 
of questions, and second, an operationalised list of questions. The first list of questions 
(Questions to be considered when data gathering - see Appendix Two) addresses each 
aspect of the structural and phenomenological analysis. These questions were not 
operationalised, but were simply part of a process designed to reduce the research 
questions from their somewhat abstract state into a more concrete form (de Va us, 
1985:43). Once this was done, the questions were operationalised, that is, carefully 
worded in order to gather the appropriate type of information necessary to answer 
the research questions. However, the type of operationalisation that occurs with a 
quantitative analysis is different from the qualitative analysis I undertook here. With 
quantification, statistical analysis is essential, and therefore questions have to be 
framed in such a way as to produce an unambiguous answer that can be assigned a 
certain value (Singleton, 1993:103). I am not undertaking a statistical analYSiS, and 
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therefore am not assigning quantitative values to responses. Rather, the questions are 
designed to elicit communication of views and experiences, whatever they might be, 
without quantification. 
Operationalising the questions also involved sequencing, that is, putting the 
questions in an order that flowed easily from one topic to the other. This can be seen 
in Appendix Three. However, due to the differing personalities and interviewing 
situations, I rarely was able to follow this order. I found the opening chat with the 
participant set the scene for what we would initially discuss. This was a legitimate 
approach for it enabled me to follow the flow of communication from the participant, 
rather than me always directing it from the prepared schedule. I generally allowed 
an issue to be exhausted by the participant before proceeding to another question. 
Generally, the previous question, and subsequent answer, would indicate the most 
logical question to follow. So even in operationalising questions, reflexivity was 
essential, for the participants would often not give straightforward answers, but 
would develop them as they pondered the issue. Obviously, I was setting the agenda, 
but I was careful not to intrude with my opinion, nor to bias the answer by 
suggesting a possible answer. 
I described how I developed the interview questions, but there remains a 
Significant issue yet to be addressed. Questions are not simply knowledge producing 
devices; they implicate the researcher in an ethical relationship with the interviewee. 
For this reason, I now turn to an examination of the ethics involved in my research. 
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3:3:2:5 Ethics 
Ethics are not tangential to research, and must be carefully considered 
(Singleton, et al., 1993:474-495). A useful checklist (my term) is provided by Diener 
and Crandall (1978, cited in Singleton, et al., 1993). They identify four problem areas 
most often identified with research on human subjects: potential harm, lack of 
informed consent, deception and privacy invasion. 
Potential harm, which can involve both physical and psychological damage, 
discomfort or pain, is not a major problem for my research. Indeed, all participants 
appeared to enjoy the interview process. Informed consent involves the participants 
being fully informed of the nature of the research, and their voluntary decision to 
participate. All participants were invited to take part through an introductory letter 
and a follow up phone call. On both occasions, I was able to explain what I wanted 
to do, and that what information they shared would be confidential, available only 
to me and my supervisors. All appeared to be clear about this, and there was never 
any sign of reluctance, even on the part of those with very heavy work schedules. It 
was not possible to describe the theoretical basis of my research, largely due to the 
time constraints most of the participants were under. Nor did it appear that any were 
particularly interested. I was careful not to talk about discursive democracy or 
communicative rationality for fear of introducing avoidable bias, although at the end 
of some interviews we exchanged ideas on some of these issues. Deception, where 
participants are not informed of the true reasons for the research, or may not even 
realise they are being researched, is seen by some researchers as necessary in some 
contexts (Singleton, et al., 1993:481). I consider this morally problematic, as well as 
entirely unnecessary in the case of the SHWMS. 
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Privacy is perhaps more difficult to deal with. By an invasion of privacy, I mean 
the intrusion of the researcher, or their technologies, e.g., tape recorders and video 
cameras, into areas of the subject's life that the researcher would not normally have 
access to, without the subject being aware of this intrusion (ibid pg. 484). This was not 
the case in my research. The other aspect, though, concerns the protection of 
individual identities in the analysis. My approach here is as follows. First, I stated in 
the introductory letter that I would not reveal their identities unless I had express 
permission to do so (see Appendix Four). Although the identity of the task group 
members is a matter of public record, I was seeking experiences of a personal nature, 
and therefore felt I ought to be careful when revealing such information. I felt there 
was nothing to be gained in identifying actual personalities, so I have not identified 
quotes or experiences with particular people. The only exception to this is with 
Laurence Dolan, Gaye Pavelka, and the CCC staff and Councillor. This is due to the 
pivotal roles they played in the process, or because they possessed certain background 
information about the process. Therefore, when I quote them, it is primarily for 
verification of such facts. If they shared a Significant personal experience, I used my 
judgement as to whether their identity needed to be revealed. When in doubt, I did 
not identify personal comments. Since I did not tape Dolan, I sent him a copy of the 
transcript to ensure accuracy, and received permission to quote him. 
The final ethical issue concerns the status of my research data. They were given 
in confidentiality, and therefore cannot be viewed by anyone else without express 
permission. The interview tapes and transcripts remain in my possession. Therefore, 
if a researcher wished to further study the SHWMS or my research, they could get 
access to the tapes and transcripts by contacting me and then obtaining written 
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permission from the persons concerned. I am certain permission would be easily 
obtained. 
I began this chapter with an overview of the SHWMS process and the purpose 
of the case study was established as an exploration of the practical usefulness of the 
'ideal speech criteria' in assessing communicative distortion in the SHWMS process. 
This was developed into three research questions central to this thesis. Methodology 
and methods used in the analysis were then discussed and justified. Because the 
theoretical orientation of this thesis is reflexive, requiring clear acknowledgment of 
my involvement, I described much of the process in some detail, particularly data 
collection and interviewing .. 
This chapter forms a connection between the theory developed in Chapter Two 
and the analysis of the SHWMS process. In other words, methodology provides a 
bridge between the theory and practice of discursive design. Without this bridge, 
there is no way to apply the theory to practice. Such application is one of the aims of 
this thesis, produced from the recognition that discursive design theory has been 
much discussed but rarely applied in real world analysis. The methodology and 
following analysis are designed to alleviate this problem. Having clearly discussed 
what the analysis is designed to achieve, and why this particular approach is taken, 
it remains for the analysis to be performed. It is to this I now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Analysis of the Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Strategy 
Process 
This analysis of the Christchurch Solid and Hazardous Waste Management 
Strategy (SHWMS) process follows the methods described in the previous chapter. 
Two forms of analysis were developed, a structural analysis and a phenomenological 
.analysis. They are analytically distinct in that they address different issues, so were 
described separately. However, in the analysis of the SHWMS process they converge 
at different points. This means the structure outlined in the previous chapter differs 
marginally from the structure of the following analysis. To clarify this, I outline the 
structure of the analysis. The three research questions are answered by two forms of 
analysis. The structural analysis addresses the 'structure' of context and process, while 
the phenomenological analysis addresses the participant's 'experience' of the process. 
Thus, the analysis of the SHWMS consists of two parts: first, a structural analysis of 
the context; and second, a structural and phenomenological analysis of the process. I 
make this distinction to provide a structure for the analysis, but I do not imply there 
is no connection between context and process. Once the context has been examined, 
contextual implications are woven into the analysis of the process. This way, the 
analysis maintains some clear structure while allowing for reflexivity. 
I begin the analysiS by examining the context of the SHWMS process. This has 
five elements to it: institutional, legal, personnel, political, and the nature of the 
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subject. The next part of the analysis concerns the process. This involves agenda 
setting and policy formulation. The four 'ideal speech criteria' of accessibility, 
equality, reflexivity and information are used to analyze these two parts of the 
process. 
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!;1 CONTEXT 
I argue the context in which the SHWMS was produced is an important 
influence on the discursive ability of the participants. These contextual factors may 
constrain discourse in different ways and therefore I analyze them before turning to 
analyze the process. I both describe the particular elements of context and analyze 
ways in which they affect communicative rationality. 
4:1:1 Institutional Context 
Prior to local body amalgamation in 1989, the Christchurch City and District 
Councils managed solid waste through the Metropolitan Refuse Disposal Committee. 
After amalgamation, this function was taken over by the Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) Drainage Unit which also covered sewage and storm water. There was no solid 
waste unit at that time. However, concern grew that solid waste management tended 
to be ad hoc and that a coherent strategy was needed (Trans:Dolan; Trans:2; CCC, 
1992:5). Laurence Dolan was appointed Solid Waste Planner in 1991, but worked in 
the planning section of the Drainage and Waste Management Unit. In July 1993, an 
independent section was set up to deal with solid waste management. This unit is 
part of the Drainage and Waste Management Unit and is required to present policy 
recommendations to the Operations Committee of the CCc. 
Dolan was assigned the task of developing a coherent long term solid waste 
management strategy. He was responsible to Bob Watts (at that time the planning 
engineer) and developed the task group idea in conjunction with Watts. Dolan needed 
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no external authorization to develop the task group idea, except consultation with 
Watts and general reports from the Waste Management Unit to the Council. Dolan 
noted he had free reign throughout the process and considerable trust shown towards 
him by his manager (Trans:Dolan). Institutionally, there was a great deal of latitude 
for the development of this type of discursive process. The costs were met within the 
Unit's budget and were not considered great (Trans:2). Cr. Wright suggested that "if 
it cost $50,000, it was money well spent".} There apneared to be no major financial 
restraints, and this facilitated acceptance of the task group concept. 
Ray Harris, the cUrrent solid waste manager, believes there is an increased 
expectation that the Council consult with citizens. While there are statutory 
obligations for Councils to fulfil, "one has to use common sense .... It was really a case of 
starting from scratch" (Trans:Harris) to ensure the public had good input. Cr. Wright 
also noted the Council previously operated from the top down, but now are working 
from the bottom up; "We are trying to change the culture of the whole organization". I 
conclude, therefore, that there was a significant level of institutional flexibility in 
relation to developing the SHWMS. I argue this flexibility enabled the construction 
of a contextually appropriate and innovative format within which to produce the 
SHWMS. 
1 Please note two points about referencing. First, I use two techniques when using the interview manuscripts 
in the text: quotation marks are used to indicate a direct quote from a participant; and single quotation marks are 
USed when I paraphrase a participant's comment. The second point is that where I record a participant's name 
in the text, I do not ascribe a transcript number. This enables me, if necessary, to quote the participant in other 
places in the text without revealing their identity through the use of a transcript number. 
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4:1:2 Legal Context 
The CCC has a number of statutory obligations in the area of solid waste 
management. These are contained in the Health Act (1956), the Local Government Act 
(1974) and the Resource Management Act (1991) (CCC, 1993a). These obligations 
primarily relate to the proviSion of services and regulation of waste management 
practices. Policy is also set by the Government at a national level and implemented 
by the Ministry for the Environment. Apart from the obligation to seek public input 
through submissions, these pieces of legislation and policy do not mandate, or even 
suggest, that a discursive design like the SHWMS be used. There was, then, no 
obligation on the CCC to use a task group to produce the SHWMS. 
The CCC is obligated to have a waste management strategy in place. As I have 
discussed, there is no obligation for this to be a long term strategy. Nevertheless, there 
is some indication that this may be required in the near future. The CCC, as a 
territorial authority, is required under the Resource Management Act (1991) (RMA) 
to have regard to any proposed regional policy statement (s.74(2)(a». In 1991, the 
Canterbury Regional Council (CRC) published a discussion document on the 
management of solid and hazardous wastes (Ayrey and Sherriff, 1991). It 
recommended territorial authorities prepare a 20 year waste management plan. 
Although the CRC did not have a waste management plan at the time of the SHWMS, 
the CRC discussion document was an additional signal to the CCC of the need to 
address the issue of a long term strategy. However, this does not constitute a legal 
requirement for a discursive consultation strategy such as the SHWMS process. 
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Mandated public consultation on Council policies, plans and activities takes 
place through submissions in relation to the Annual Plan and submissions in relation 
to the District Plan. Other submission processes relate to resource consent applications 
under the RMA. These submission processes are statutory requirements, but apart 
from these there are no other direct statutory requirements for consultation. Political 
concerns, the need for effective management of public issues and growing public 
interest in participation is producing increased effort from local bodies in seeking 
greater public involvement in decision making (Trans: Harris). The legal context of 
the consultation process of the SHWMS was not, therefore, a primary influence in the 
development of the task group idea. 
An implication of the legal context is that a discursive design process does not 
have any legal standing. There is no requirement for political or decision making 
agencies to adhere to communicatively rational outcomes of discursive designs. I 
make this observation because it raises some interesting questions about how 
discursive designs can integrate with existing political structures. For example, would 
a legal requirement to make policy decisions via discursive designs produce or 
obstruct communicatively rational outcomes? While not answerable here, the legal 
context of the SHWMS highlights some important questions for discursive design. 
4:1:3 Personnel Context 
While the institutional framework provided some flexibility in dealing with the 
need for a long term waste management strategy, the roles of individuals made a 
critical difference. Most SHWMS process participants attribute much of the success 
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of the process to the personal skills and attitude of Dolan (Trans:3,4,9-12). He was 
described as an innovator (Trans:10) and an able communicator (Trans:11). One 
participant commented they thought "other departments in the Council are quite envious 
[of the SHWMS document] ... other departments wished they had the same process, that 
they'd had someone like a Laurence Dolan" (Trans:11). There was also a view that he took 
a risk with the task group and may have been 'leaned on a bit' by the Council 
(Trans: 12). Dolan was aware of the growing role of public participation in waste 
management planning (Dolan and Pavelka, 1993:5), although the idea for an 
independent facilitator was given by Pavelka. 
Pavelka was the other key contributor to the process. She was aware Dolan 
desired to set up a consultative process, and that he was not certain about how to go 
about it. After discussion, it was agreed that she facilitate a task group. She provided 
significant experience in group facilitation and highly developed people skills. 
Although some task group members had experience in formal meeting settings, no 
one had experience of the type of group process used in the SHWMS. Thus, she 
provided a unique contribution to the task group process, a contribution strongly 
endorsed by the task group members (Trans:Dolan; Trans:l - 5, 9 - 12, 15) as critical 
to the group's success. 
The importance of the role of personnel can be assessed through Kingdon's 
(1984) 'policy entrepreneur' theory. This theory is an attempt to determine why some 
policies get onto the political agenda and others do not. Kingdon argues policies need 
a convergence of three factors: a clearly understood problem, a solution and the 
emergence of a person who can take advantage of the situation. A successful policy 
initiative occurs when there is a convergence of these three factors, a 'window of 
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opportunity' in Kingdon's words. The SHWMS process can be interpreted this way. 
There was a problem, the recognition that a long term waste management strategy 
was needed, a solution, the concept of an independently facilitated task group, and 
an individual with the appropriate skills and vision in the right place at the right 
time. My point is this: the discursive design represented by the SHWMS task group 
emerged, in part, due to the particular individuals involved, namely Dolan and 
Pavelka. I am not arguing that without these individuals consultation would not have 
occurred, for consultation is a statutory obligation. Rather, it is likely any alternative 
consultation would have been less discursive. I make this claim for the following 
reasons. While there is growing awareness within the planning community of the 
need for greater public participation (Trans:Harris), the RMA does not require the 
type of discursive deliberation argued for in this thesis. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume, given the resource constraints public agencies are under, they will generally 
opt for the easiest form of consultation. This usually involves a submissions process, 
but does not extend to such face-to-face interaction as in the SHWMS process. Dolan 
commented that the SHWMS process was quite stressful and involved a great deal 
of work on his part. This, I suggest, provides an incentive to avoid such processes. 
The SHWMS was an initiative generated primarily from one individual and was not 
part of the normal practice of the CCc. I have no evidence which suggests such a 
process would have developed the way it did without Dolan. Pavelka's role in 
prOviding a framework for discursive deliberation was also critical. Without her 
facilitation, the task group would have used a 'chairperson'. Dolan and Pavelka (1993) 
suggest this would have encouraged greater 'representation' to the Council, resulting 
in less cooperation (and less discursive deliberation). I conclude that, in the absence 
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of defined procedures for such consultation, the roles of specific personnel form a 
significant part of the context of the SHWMS process. 
4:1:4 Political Context 
The political context I refer to is the relationship of CCC politicians to the 
SHWMS process, particularly the role and attitudes of the CCC politicians. The formal 
relationship between CCC policy staff and Councillors is that the former are to 
provide policy recommendations and information to the various council committees, 
who then decide on policy to present to the Council. The Council is responsible for 
fulfilling statutory requirements and the Solid Waste Management Unit acts as the 
agent of the Council to achieve this. The Council "sets the policies ... and we [the staff] 
do the mechanics of getting the work done" (Trans:Harris). In relation to the SHWMS, the 
operations committee, which is responsible for waste management, had very little 
input into the initiative. Because the SHWMS initiative did not involve large amounts 
of money, waste management staff were free to develop the process as they saw fit. 
The operations committee gave a lot of latitude to the staff (Trans:Wright) and were 
very supportive of the idea of a task group when it was first presented to them. Cr. 
Wright recalls they discussed the initiative, but it was "no big deal". They 'welcomed' 
the idea. There were a couple of councillors concerned about the legal status of such 
a strategy, but once it was explained to them they were "very very receptive" 
(Trans:Wright). The Mayor also sent a message to the group expressing her keen 
interest in their work (Trans:5). 
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The Council's interests were represented on the task group by Dolan and Cr. 
Wright, with occasional technical input from other staff. While there was support 
from the politicians in using the task group idea, the task group's mandate was to 
present a proposal to the operations committee. There was initial concern among a 
number of participants about how seriously the Council would take the proposals 
(Trans:3, 4, 12, 14). One participant commented they had not seen a politician until 
half-way through the process (Trans:3). Another fel~ the task group was seen as a bit 
superfluous, as a tag-on by the Council (Trans: 14). An idea was suggested that the 
task group reconvene at a later date to hold the Council accountable if the strategy 
was rejected (Trans: 13). While this has not happened, the suggestion indicates a 
concern that the Council might not take the task group seriously. Pavelka believes 
most participants saw a need to have Council politicians involved. It was a means of 
giving legitimacy to the process. Cr. Wright gave the group a categorical assurance 
that the strategy would go to the operations committee. By the end of the process, 
most were reassured the .Council would take the SHWMS seriously. 
The political context was described as initial but cautious support (Trans:14), 
followed by positive acceptance of the strategy. However, it needs to be noted that 
the Council had the final say. The relationship between the discursive deliberations 
of the SHWMS task group and the Council had to be one based on trust, for there 
was no formal requirement that the Council accept the strategy. While this issue did 
not restrict free discussion within the task group, it did have a bearing on the 
confidence of the participants that the Council would seriously listen to them. This, 
I suggest, presents an impediment to the ideal speech situation, for such 
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communication may be rendered futile due to the discursive power of others over the 
outcome. 
This criticism can be taken further. The fact there was political support for the 
task group idea and that the participants became confident the strategy would be 
taken seriously, does not mean the political context produced no communicative 
distortion. While Council politicians pledged support, this support did not fully 
recognise the communicatively rational potential of the task group. The task group 
was considered a good means of public consultation and a way of gathering 
information to be used in a policy process. However, the initial non-participation of 
councillors raised concern in the task group that the strategy document might not be 
taken seriously by the Council. This concern indicates the Council did not appreciate 
the nature of the process, i.e., the production of communicative rationality. This is not 
a criticism of the politicians, rather a comment about the political norms with which 
they operate. The political institution did not appear to recognise the deeper reasons 
for a discursive design. The political theory being used by the politicians did not 
accommodate the discursive theory I use here. While giving partial support to 
discursive deliberation, it failed to extend such support to communicatively rational 
decision making. Rather, it only enabled communicatively rational policy advice. 
Communicatively rational policy advice does not ensure communicatively rational 
policy, simply because policy advice can be rejected. Only communicatively rational 
decision mechanisms will ensure communicatively rational policy. 
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4:1:5 Nature of Subject 
The nature of the subject refers to the scope, complexity and level of public 
conflict regarding the waste management issue. I assume, for my purposes here, such 
concerns will manifest themselves within the task group process. The task group is 
deemed to represent community interests, so the diversity within the group ought 
reflect general public concerns. Therefore, I draw my analysis primarily from 
interview transcripts. I address three areas, the level of controversy of the subject, its 
scope and complexity. 
Solid and hazardous waste management in Christchurch has a relatively high 
public profile (Trans:Harris). Yet, there is no Significant public controversy associated 
with. the SHWMS document. 72 submissions on the Where To Now? (CCC, 1992) 
document were received, but only 16 submissions on the draft strategy (CCC, 1993a). 
Of the latter, the majority of submissions generally supported the strategy with 6 
giving overall approval and another 8 providing further suggestions for improvement. 
Two submissions expressed some serious concerns. There were no submissions 
expressing overall disapproval of the SHWMS. The SHWMS process was the subject 
of one editorial in The Press (1993) which said the process "resulted in a document 
which is a model of clarity and good sense". A number of participants indicated their 
initial concern that there would be a large amount of conflict within the task group 
(Trans: 2, 9, 11, 13). However, there was very little conflict reported. This lack of 
apparent conflict is due to four identifiable reasons. The first, the skill of the 
facilitator, will be dealt with later. The second reason is due to the scope of the 
strategy. 
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The scope of the SHWMS was primarily conceptual and long term. It did not 
deal with concrete or practical issues directly, but with conceptual policy 
(Trans:Dolan; Trans:14). There were no 'clear winners or losers' as a result of the 
strategy (Trans:14), and no direct or immediate financial implications. ''It wasn't the 
type of group where there were commercial interests involved to the extent where there were 
dollars and cents on the line" (Trans:l0). This was a critical aspect of the deliberation. 
The time frame of the strategy meant there would be no immediate costs incurred. 
There was, however, indication that some participants would support the document 
because it was a strategy, the implication being that implementation would require 
further debate (Trans:3, 10). Further, at least one participant indicated they preferred 
to go straight to the politicians when encountering negative impacts from Council 
policy (Trans:3). Having the ear of the politicians was viewed as a more effective 
strategy than task group negotiation when facing conflict or personal costs. While the 
strategy's scope did not encompass any particularly contentious issues, there was 
evidence that at least some participants had alternative strategies in mind if task 
group outcomes became unacceptable. 
A third reason for the relative absence of conflict is the lack of complexity which 
might produce fundamental value conflict. While there were some participants who 
occasionally had difficulty with technical aspects of the discussions (Trans:9), 
participants not there as technical experts but to provide policy and priorities 
(Trans: 14). The strategy was basically a 'common-sense document, practical and 
nothing radical about it' (Trans:lO). There were no wildly radical views being shared, 
all of it was 'good sound common-sense' (Trans:3). This provided a context relatively 
free from contentious technical disputes. Undergirding the deliberations was a general 
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philosophical consensus that waste generators should bear the costs of waste disposal 
(see CCC, 1994:10). This consensus was undoubtedly assisted by the fact that there 
was not much smokestack (waste producing) industry in the city (Trans:10). Most of 
the task group felt local industry was environmentally responsible, a point reinforced 
by industry representatives (Trans:1). Once again, this supports my view that the 
strategy did not involve direct costs to the participants. 
The final reason for the lack of conflict was that participants came to the task 
group without a history of conflict. It was a fresh issue, not highly contentious, with 
no historical antagonisms (Trans:Pavelka). One participant expected a: 
not exactly bitter, but a keenly fought [debate] ... with people arguing from entrenched 
views .... I think there was this general agreement [by the end] that the guys on the 
other sides weren't such bad bastards after all [laughter] (Trans:ll). 
While the particular combination of personalities contributed towards the goodwill 
experienced in the group, the subject of waste management was not highly 
controversial (in this case) (Trans:12), was limited in scope which reduced adverse 
impacts on participants and their constituencies, did not involve polarized technical 
debate, and lacked a history of antagonism. 
4:1:6 Summary of Analysis of Context 
The context in which the SHWMS was developed involvt:>d a variety of themes. 
There was a perceived need for a long term waste management strategy as well as the 
institutional flexibility in the development of a strategy. There was also a growing 
. 
commitment among Council staff to use more participatory consultation approaches. 
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This added to the institutional flexibility. The strategy was developed within the 
Waste Management Unit's budget. It proceeded without any political intervention and 
gained support of the Council politicians. The critical factor was the availability of the 
right personnel, people with the appropriate skills and knowledge to develop what 
was, in effect, a new consultation strategy for the CCc. The issues involved little 
controversy, due in large part to the facilitation of the process (covered later) and a 
general philosophical agreement among participants. There were no legal constraints 
on the development of the discursive approach, except that the task group could only 
make recommendations. The Council has the statutory obligation and right to accept 
or reject the SHWMS. 
With the exception of the restriction on the task group to make 
recommendations, the context produced no restrictions on the 'ideal speech criteria'. 
However, there is no guarantee the context, as analyzed here, will remain the same 
for future policy strategies. Discursive designs require a commitment to the 
development of intersubjective understanding by all parties. This requires political 
institutions, such as the CCC, to institutionalize these requirements through the use 
of formal procedures or rules for consultation. The SHWMS process, as a discursive 
deSign, resulted from a particular mix of contextual conditions, outlined above. They 
presented, in Kingdon's (1984) term, a 'window of opportunity'. Overall, the context 
allowed, rather than actively enabled, the task group to take place. The critical 
enabling factor was the role of Dolan and Pavelka. Moreover, in terms of my concern 
with communicative distortion, the context was aimed at improved public 
consultation rather than communicative rationality. 
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In the case of the SHWMS, the context made the development of a discursive 
design possible. But this does not constitute fulfilment of the 'ideal speech criteria'. 
Rather, this requires comprehensive analysis of the process itself. I now tum to this 
task. 
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4:2 PROCESS 
The SHWMS was produced by a process of discursive deliberation. I have 
divided this process into two parts, agenda setting and policy formulation. The 
following analysis uses the 'ideal speech criteria' to assess the extent of 
communicative distortion within the process (see section '3:2:1:1:1 Process'). I begin 
with agenda setting. 
4:2:1 Agenda Setting 
Two aspects of agenda setting need to be considered. First, problem definition 
and second, identification of stakeholders. I divide agenda setting into two time 
periods. First, the time prior up until the first meeting of all those interested in 
forming the task group (referred to as the -"stakeholders meeting'). Prior to this 
moment, stakeholders had no formal discursive opportunity to take part in agenda 
setting, except for writing submissions. The second time period refers to the 
stakeholders meeting when the task group was chosen. This constitutes the first 
formal involvement stakeholders had setting the agenda. These periods provided 
different discursive opportunities for stakeholders, enabling greater analytic focus on 
the agenda setting process. I begin by applying the accessibility criterion to problem 
definition and stakeholder identification in each of these periods. 
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4:2: 1: 1 Accessibility and Agenda Setting 
The accessibility criterion is concerned with opportunity for stakeholders in 
agenda setting. The CCC had an advantage because it had responsibility and 
authority to raise the issue of a long term waste management strategy. The specific 
question for this thesis is the level of opportunity for other stakeholders in agenda 
setting and the extent to which such involvement or lack of involvement constituted 
communicative distortion. The SHWMS was a CCC initiative, with Dolan producing 
the initial discussion document (CCC, 1992). This resulted in 75 submissions analyzed 
by an independent consultant (Taylor Baines and Associates, 1992). Dolan and Pavelka 
discussed the idea of a task group and decided to gauge public interest through a 
question in the discussion document (CCC:1992). Those individuals or groups who 
indicated an interest in the task group were then formally invited to the stakeholders 
meeting. Apart from informal and routine contact with individuals in the waste 
management industry (e.g., Trans:4), there was no opportunity for public input to that 
pOint. 
There were two important facets of the agenda setting process operating prior 
to the stakeholders meeting. One was Pavelka's agenda. She wanted to demonstrate 
to the participants the possibility for groups of different people to work together 
cooperatively, producing better quality answers than individuals working alone could. 
She sought an outcome where participants with different points of view could find 
conunon ground and come to agreement. The second facet was that the Council, 
through Dolan, drew the boundaries of the process. They defined the scope, time-
frames and specific outputs, though not the policies themselves. The scope was 
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restricted to solid and hazardous waste management, not any other area of waste 
management. According to one participant, they defined what the task group could 
and couldn't consider (Trans:4). It was more about presenting the process than 
negotiating the process (Trans:Pavelka). However, there is no evidence from the task 
group minutes that the scope, i.e., only solid and hazardous waste, presented a 
discursive limitation in the deliberations. The only criticism of the scope came from 
a submission suggesting the discussion document (CCC:1992) failed to integrate "wider 
environmental issues, particularly the use of fossil fuels and sustainability" (Taylor Baines 
and Associates, 1992:31). While the scope defined the general boundaries within 
which the strategy was to be produced, it did not specify the list of possible subjects 
for discussion within those boundaries. The minutes for the first meeting of the task 
group states there was no firm agreement on what subjects ought to be discussed 
(CCC:1993c). 
Does the non-discursive defining of the scope and time-frame constitute systemic 
communicative distortion? At one level yes. These definitions, scope, time-frame and 
outputs do shape the ensuing deliberation. Yet, it is hardly fair to expect there to be 
no defined process, as much as it would be incorrect to expect impartial knowledge 
(in the epistemological sense). To assume any policy process can begin at a neutral 
point, i.e., with assumptions which contain no parochial values, contradicts the 
epistemology developed in this thesis; that all knowledge is necessarily partial, 
although some knowledge is more partial than others2 The critical question, then, is 
not whether there is a starting point for deliberation, but the extent to which this 
starting point is itself the product of communicative rationality. The only opportunity 
2 See section '1:2:1:3' on 'strong objectivity' for a development of this theme. 
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for deliberation over the scope of the strategy was through written submissions to the 
discussion document (CCC:1992). Therefore, accessibility to agenda setting was 
limited at this point. 
This limitation is essentially one of structure, i.e., the structure of the agenda 
setting process precluded discursive deliberation. Thus, there was a violation of the 
symmetrical distribution of chances to engage in discursive deliberation (Habermas, 
in Thompson, 1981:92). However, the task group participants did not experience any 
sense of exclusion, or indicate it limited their ability to freely participate in discursive 
deliberation. The question can be restated: did the agenda setting process produce 
significant communicative distortion? This raises a theoretical issue in analyzing 
policy processes; if participants do not consider their discursive freedom compromised 
by a structural limitation like the one above, does this constitute discursive distortion? 
I address this point more fully in the conclusions (Chapter Five). For now, I suggest 
the answer is no, for two reasons. One, the intention of the facilitator was explicit, 
namely, to produce common agreement for action from different points of view. This 
is the motive of communicative rationality. My second reason is that every process 
must have a starting· point and some boundaries. While the starting point and 
boundaries were set by the Council, this cannot be considered communicative 
distortion until the reflexivity of the policy process is examined. The point is this. 
While it is important where initial boundaries of a discursive process are set, more 
Significant is the reflexivity of the ensuing process, for this provides opportunity to 
redress inappropriate boundaries. I leave aside the broader question raised earlier of 
the communicative limitations imposed by existing political and legal institutions 
discussed in section '4:2 Context'. 
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One stakeholder group not represented in the task group were the Tangata 
Whenua. They were invited to the stakeholders meeting, but their representative was 
unable to attend due to time commitments (Trans: 7). However, in the interview he 
raised some critical questions about the process, including who decided the task 
group should operate within a particular time-frame and who has the right to be 
represented. The issue of time is important because of the need to report back to 
constituencies. In this case, Maori had well established constituencies and would have 
required more time than the SHWMS process allowed. While information was passed 
to the representative by Pavelka, this situation represents a generic problem for 
Tangata Whenua. It also represents a generic problem for the Crown} for Tangata 
Whenua are not simply one stakeholder among many, but have a unique place as bi-
cultural partners under the Treaty of Waitangi (Wilson, 1995).4 The difficulty 
encountered by the SHWMS process concerned how consultation with Maori ought 
to take place. The SHWMS process was designed around CCC criteria and did not 
suit the particular needs of Tangata Whenua. This resulted in their exclusion from the 
discursive process, thus producing communicative distortion. While Maori did make 
a presentation to the operations committee, they did not enter discursive deliberation, 
resulting in the potential loss of improved knowledge of the waste management issue. 
In the bi-cultural context of public decision processes, this represents a Significant flaw 
of the SHWMS process. 
3 This also represents a problem for the wider community. The communicative theory used in this thesis asserts 
the best knowledge can only be gained by an inclusive approach to policy analysis. Therefore, the issue of the 
systemic exclusion of Tangata Whenua is not just a concern to Tangata Whenua themselves, but represents 
potential epistemic loss to the whole community. 
4 For example, the RMA states the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral 
lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga as a matter of national importance (s5.(e». It also charges those 
with functions and powers under the Act to take account of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi) (s8). 
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The extent to which Maori personally experienced exclusion from the process is 
unclear. One participant reported the Maori representatives at the presentation to the 
operations committee felt they (Maori) had been fully consulted and their contribution 
was valuable (Trans:9). The Maori representative I interviewed could not remember 
a great deal about the process, and the comments he made were more generic rather 
than specific criticisms of the SHWMS process. While much personal effort was made 
by Dolan to include Tangata Whenua in the discursive process, these failed, in terms 
of producing communicative rationality, due to inadequate institutional procedures 
on the part of the Council to facilitate bi-cultural decision processes. 
The stakeholders meeting had some opportunity to define the boundaries. Dolan 
and Pavelka presented the process to the group, but emphasised the development of 
strategy options was up to the group (Trans:Pavelka). Pavelka posed a set of 
questions, and the group decided on an agreed response, e.g., should observers be 
allowed into the meetings? Pavelka was sure the participants were clear on the 
framework and boundaries of the project (Trans). One participant thought the CCC 
had already decided what policies they wanted and were simply seeking legitimation 
(Trans:1). However, this view is difficult to substantiate. Within the task group's 
general scope there was evidence of considerable freedom to create policy (CCC, 
1993c). While it is arguable the final strategy does not significantly depart from what 
the Council would have produced themselves, there is no evidence this can be 
attributed to the Council simply seeking legitimation on decisions already made. The 
Council did not produce any policy suggestions until the task group produced the 
first draft of the SHWMS (CCC, 1993b). The previously published discussion 
document contained no policy suggestions, and Dolan 'thought it was important' not 
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to have a prior strategy (Trans:Dolan). The view that the Council had predetermined 
the strategy was not shared by other task group members. 
In summarising stakeholder's ac<:ess to problem definition, stakeholders were 
excluded from involvement in defining the problem to be dealt with in the SHWMS 
process. There were no procedural mechanisms by which some initial consultation or 
problem scoping in partnership with stakeholders could take place. Were this 
available, accessibility by stakeholders would have been greatly improved. This 
critique needs to be balanced against the fact that most participants accepted the 
process and its boundaries as presented by the Council, and therefore did not 
consider lack of accessibility a hinderance in the deliberation. Nevertheless, the 
acceptance of the problem definition by stakeholders does not eliminate potential 
communicative distortion, because the problem definition was not produced by a 
communicatively rational process. 
Problem definition was the first aspect of agenda setting. The second involves 
the selection of stakeholders. This selection process was accomplished as follows. 
First, the distribution of the Where To Now? (CCC:1992) document to: 
residents groups, environmental groups, business associations, waste collection and 
recycling businesses, representatives of the Tangata Whenua, businesses with 
substantial waste streams and community representatives, and then on request (Dolan 
and Pavelka, 1993:4). 
In total, 1700 copies were distributed. Thirty three submitters expressed an interest 
in being involved in the task group and were invited to the stakeholders meeting. The 
Council then checked to ensure no known interest groups were accidentally omitted 
(ibid). The concept of 'stakeholder' was essentially ad hoc, developed from the council 
178 
data base, letters of concern, day-to-day involvement with people and groups 
(Trans: Dolan) as well as others who sent submissions on the Where To Now? 
(CCC:1992) document. As Dolan pointed out, he was already interacting in a network. 
Prior to the stakeholder's meeting, Dolan and Pavelka made a careful check of 
those invited to ensure no groups were unrepresented. One person was invited to the 
task group who had not presented a submission. This was a personal contact of 
Dolan's (Trans:4). Some individuals or groups may have missed the opportunity. One 
participant noted it was easy to hear about the SHWMS if one worked in the industry; 
otherwise, one would have to watch the public notices in the newspaper calling for 
submissions (Trans:6). Nevertheless, stakeholder accessibility to this part of agenda 
setting appears quite high. The task group participants felt all stakeholder groups 
were accounted for. The only exception was a person involved in composting. 
Although he presented a submission, he omitted to state his interest in the task group 
and was therefore not sent an invitation. This was an oversight, for he would have 
been invited had he indicated his desire to be involved. With this exception, all 
groups or individuals with a known interest in waste management were given the 
opportunity to attend the stakeholder's meeting. There was a high level of 
accessibility to the agenda setting process. 
The stakeholders meeting (the second time period) was designed to outline the 
task group process and select the participants. Bob Watts introduced the meeting, and 
Dolan explained the aim of the task group. There was no opportunity for the group 
to address the issue of problem definition. This was because the scope and time-frame 
were already set and the meeting had another purpose, to form a task group. Again, 
. 
this discursive limitation does not constitute communicative distortion, unless there 
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is evidence that the problem definition excludes particular discourses. There is no 
evidence of this from the participants. 
The more significant process during this meeting was the selection of task group 
members. Dolan explained the purpose of the task group and the time commitment 
it involved. Pavelka presented the stakeholder categories she and Dolan had 
developed. The group discussed whether this represented a fair balance of interests 
(see Appendix One) (Trans:6). "There was opportunity for discussion and objection . ... It 
was agreed that there be opportunity for specialist speakers" (Trans:ll), provided the group 
agree. The group was then asked for names of those interested in joining the task 
group. Where there were more names than positions, those particular interest groups 
were asked to decide amongst themselves who would represent their group. This 
enabled the Council to avoid appointing the representatives. The environmental 
representatives decided fairly quickly, but one participant commented such 
appointments may not always be so easy (Trans:11). This approach retains discursive 
deliberation for, ideally, such decisions are themselves products of communicative 
rationality. 
There was one case of 'floating representatives' sharing one position (Trans:ll). 
There was a primary representative who usually attended, but was replaced by a 
stand-in if they could not attend. This raises an issue for communicative rationality. 
Based on obtaining intersubjective understanding between participants, this is 
undermined when different participants turn up. Intersubjective understanding could 
not develop with a revolving pool of representatives. The SHWMS decided that task 
group participants: 
i. 
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need to attend all meetings, not just meetings on topics of particular personal interest. 
This is to ensure that various topics are integrated and reflect the interdependence 
between the different aspects of waste management (CCC, 1993c, emphasis in 
original). 
Thus, the task group demonstrated a commitment to this aspect of communicative 
rationality. This was marginally undermined by the single case of two people sharing 
one position on the task group. 
The role of the facilitator was important in the selection of task group members 
because of the need for some behind-the-scenes negotiating with one over-represented 
sector (Trans:Dolan). The point was also raised that there was, at that stage, only one 
woman on the task group, and the group agreed to appoint a women's representative. 
If the aim of this was to reduce the gender imbalance, then it was unsuccessful, given 
\ 
the 1:8 ratio of women to men. If this appointment was designed to represent women 
in general, even more problems are created. It is not possible for one woman to speak 
for the interests of all wQ~en. Women speak with many voices and from many 
perspectives. This highlights a methodological problem in stakeholder selection, 
particularly in relation to defining exactly what 'interest' in waste management is, as 
well as 'who' ought represent such interests. Standpoint epistemology insists strong 
objectivity, i.e., a culture's best beliefs (Harding, 1991:119), can only be ensured when 
no potential knowledge is excluded or marginalised from a policy process. In this 
case, the SHWMS task group did not fulfil the theoretical requirements of a discursive 
design. 
Pavelka asked the group how it ought to be run. ~he suggested some ground 
rules for the process which were discussed and agreed upon (Trans:Pavelka). These 
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ground rules are discussed later (section '4:2:2:2'). Task group participants all felt 
satisfied with their ability to contribute to these deliberations and none felt that, with 
the exception of Tangata Whenua, there were any groups or interests unrepresented. 
There are two issues remaining however. First, the interviews I conducted were with 
the successful interests, those who made it onto the task group. There may have been 
unidentified, and therefore unrepresented interests. However, there is no evidence for 
this. The role of the independent facilitator was important in ensuring all those at the 
meeting had the opportunity to contribute and be heard. This role was enacted very 
successfully in the actual task group setting and therefore was important in the 
stakeholders meeting. The second issue concerns the charge that industry was under-
represented. There was only one industry participant representing 39% of the 
Christchurch waste stream (Trans:10). This raises the question of how stakeholders 
ought to be defined, e.g., by the amount of waste produced? Pavelka notes she and 
Dolan did not discuss this to any great extent, but were primarily concerned to have 
the diversity of views represented. If the SHWMS task group was a formal voting 
body, pro-rata representation may be essential. The aim of the task group was, 
however, to produce a communicatively rational strategy, not a strategy based merely 
on power bloc voting. Communicative rationality demands all standpOints be given 
a symmetrical distribution of chances to employ speech acts (Habermas, in Thompson, 
1981:92). The emphasis here is on standpoints. Provided such standpoints are granted 
equal discursive opportunity as other standpOints, there is no advantage or need to 
have a pro-rata representation of those standpOints because production of 
communicative rationality would not be assisted by a greater number of 
representatives. Communicative rationality is derived from deliberation over 
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standpoints, not representatives. For this reason, I do not consider the charge of 
under-representation to constitute communicative distortion. 
Most significant stakeholders were represented on the task group, although there 
was no initial representation of the City Councillors until Cr. Wright joined at a later 
date (Trans:4). Tangata Whenua were a major exception, as was the representation of 
women. Stakeholders had little access to the problem definition aspect of the agenda, 
but somewhat more opportunity in relation to sta)C~holder selection. Thus, there is 
evidence for some systemic communicative distortion in the process. However, the 
extent of communicative distortion cannot yet be fully assessed until the policy 
formulation process has been examined. At that point, reflexivity in the process will 
be assessed, thereby revealing the extent to which the problem definition, scope and 
time-frame hindered open discursive deliberation. 
4:2:1:2 Equality and Agenda Setting 
Equality of opportunity in agenda setting is dealt with briefly. As discussed 
above, there were significant opportunities for stakeholders to have access to 
stakeholder selection, but limited opportunity for problem definition. The critical 
question for equality concerns the opportunity of participants to take part in 
discursive deliberation. Because the task group and the protocol by which it operated 
were not yet formed, the CCC and Pavelka had greater discursive opportunity than 
other meeting attendees. Obviously, the task group idea was new to the meeting 
attendees, and they came to discuss the idea and to form a task group. Therefore, the 
Council and Pavelka had more information and control at this point, as the agenda 
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was already set by the Council. Nevertheless, there was a significant effort to include 
attendees in setting the task group procedures and protocol, and in choosing the task 
group members. The significant decision about the constitution of the task group was 
made in open deliberation facilitated by Pavelka. Thus, there is evidence of significant 
equality regarding this particular decision process. Further, opportunities were given 
throughout the meeting for discussion about issues raised. Because I only interviewed 
task group members, I cannot more adequately assess the operation of communicative 
distortions in relation to equality. That would require interviewing all the attendees 
of that stakeholders meeting. However, detailed analysis of the equality criterion is 
given in section '4:2:2:2'. 
4:2:1:3 Reflexivity and Agenda Setting 
The question here is to what extent did the agenda setting process enable 
reflexive evaluation of the problem definition and stakeholder selection? First, 
problem definition, including scope and time-frame, was not open to reflexive 
evaluation by the task group participants. This has been discussed previously. It has 
yet to be assessed whether the scope of the process generates communicative 
distortion. This is done during the analysis of policy formulation. The time-frame is 
more problematic. The size of the project given to the task group was considered very 
large (Trans:2, 5, 8) in relation to the time-frame. Dolan noted the major stress was 
time-frame related; he was concerned the strategy might not be ready on time. One 
participant considered extra time may have helped, but added that it probably would 
have been too much commitment for some. This issue of time commitment is reflected 
184 
in the fact that at the stakeholder's meeting, of the 15 people from the community (as 
opposed to some specific industry or environmental interests), only 3 indicated they 
were able or willing to commit themselves to the time needed for the strategy 
(Trans:4). One participant (Trans:4) commented time was not a problem. While there 
was pressure in the task group process to complete the strategy in the designated 
time, a longer time-frame would appear to be unacceptable for many. It may, in fact, 
have been too long, considering those who did not put their names forward. 
The time-frame was set by the Council and was not open to reflexive evaluation. 
This is most problematic in relation to Tangata Whenua. Thus, some systemic 
communicative distortion was produced out of the needs of different cultures. The 
CCC face institutional and political deadlines, and their staff have performance 
) 
criteria to meet (Trans:Dolan). Tangata Whenua have consultation requirements which 
are time consuming, at least in Western organizational terms. In other words, both 
cultures engage in divergent normative priorities which were not adequately 
accommodated in this process. As stated before, this is a generic problem which, 
despite the best intentions of Dolan and Pavelka, was unable to be resolved. This has 
significant implications for policy initiatives because the generic nature of the systemic 
communicative distortions produced by divergent normative priorities can only 
frustrate or obstruct the production of communicative rationality. Unless Maori and 
other stakeholders are able to meet on mutually agreeable terms, communicative 
rationality cannot emerge. The implication of this is continued production of 
inadequate knowledge and the loss of potential epistemic resources for problem 
solving. 
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Stakeholder selection, examined above, was more open to reflexive evaluation. 
Attendees at the stakeholder's meeting were given opportunity to both discuss and 
decide categories of representation, and who those representatives ought to be. 
However, as discussed above, there were some systemic limitations on the ability of 
all stakeholders to participate, thereby producing systemic communicative distortion. 
4:2:1:4 Information and Agenda Setting 
Unequal access to information is considered an important factor in producing 
distortion in communication (Kemp, 1985). The information available to the 
stakeholder meeting attendees consisted of the Where to Now? (CCC:1992) document. 
It was a document of "extraordinary high quality" (Trans:8) and was deSigned to be easy 
to understand. Using cartoon style illustrations, it "was written to be as interesting as 
possible to the readers" (ibid). For the most part, it did not contain highly technical 
information, and where there was doubt about adding additional information the 
adage "when in doubt, leave it out" was applied (Dolan and Pavelka, 1993:3). Tangata 
Whenua concerns were specifically addressed in a study by Te Wero Consultants and 
approved by the Runanga 0 Ngai Tuahuriri (ibid). 
Information was equally available and very accessible to stakeholder groups and 
individuals. The only information not readily available prior to the formation of the 
task group was CCC information on policies and budget restraints, as well as 
technical information which was shared during the task group meetings. The CCC 
had unequal access to information compared with other stakeholders. However, one 
of the task group's outcomes was that non-Council stakeholders became more 
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conversant with the Council's position, something which would have been difficult 
to achieve outside of the discursive forum of a task group. As one participant put it, 
"It gives you a chance to see the inner workings of the Council" (Trans:5). The Council, in 
relation to agenda setting, had a significant advantage over other stakeholders. This 
only constitutes communicative distortion if there is not "a symmetrical distribution of 
chances to choose and apply speech acts" (Habermas, in Thompson, 1981:92, author's 
translation). There was not, based on the information each group had available, a 
symmetrical distribution of chances to engage in speech acts. This constitutes systemic 
communicative distortion, for it disadvantaged other groups in setting the agenda. 
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the participants felt 
disadvantaged by this. While some participants were unsure or sceptical about the 
role of the Council (Trans: 3, 10, 12), at least initially, most felt the process had been 
fair. This is examined in greater depth in section '4:2:2:2'. 
There is evidence of systemic communicative distortion in the agenda setting 
part of the SHWMS process. However, the significance of these communicative 
distortions on participants is unclear. Stakeholder selection appears to have been a 
relatively accessible and equal process, with some reflexive capacity. This was not the 
case for the problem definition part of the process. It was framed by institutional 
requirements and was not, therefore, discursively open. However, policies were not 
suggested, only the scope of the strategy was. The time-frame was given and was 
largely acceptable to the task group, but appears partially responsible for the non-
involvement of Tangata Whenua. The last part of the analysis is the policy 
formulation process. This further identifies systemic. communicative distortion and 
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enables more accurate conclusions to be reached. I now turn to the process of policy 
formulation. 
4:2:2 Policy Formulation 
The discursive deliberation of the SHWMS is most clearly apparent in policy 
formulation, for this is where most deliberative communication took place. This 
section analyzes the task group meetings by assessing them in terms of the 'ideal 
speech criteria'. I begin with the accessibility criterion. 
4:2:2:1 Accessibility and Policy Formulation 
The criterion of accessibility assesses whether there were any barriers or 
hindrances to participants involved in the SHWMS process. Although perhaps self-
evident, ability to gain access to a deliberative process is a precursor to 
communicative rationality. In this case, there are two areas which pose potential 
accessibility problems. The first concerns practical costs of time and travel, while the 
second concerns the cultural and socio--economic setting of the SHWMS process. 
None of the participants experienced any major costs in being involved in the 
task group. Although payment of participants was discussed by the task group, it was 
not done primarily because of the precedence it would set (Trans:Dolan). One 
participant felt the Council could have reimbursed their travel expenses (Trans:5) 
 while another participant thought he had been reimbursed (Trans:9).5 Whichever was 
the case, costs did not prove a barrier to participation. One person had to occasionally 
hire a baby sitter,  a personal expense, but did not consider this a major impediment 
to attendance (Trans:13).6 Most participants recorded time as a cost. Some attended  
in work time, and therefore were being paid, while others attended in their own time. 
Again,   this did not prove a barrier to any,   although  one participant noted some 
people may have not attended because of time (Trans:13). There is no evidence for 
this  in the interviews.   However,   the time commitment may have caused  some 
potential participants not to put their names forward. This presents a difficulty for the  
CCC,   because I argue Tangata Whenua needed more time, while others may have 
found  the time commitment too great. Such issues must be negotiated in accordance 
with  the ‘ideal speech criteria’  to minimise communicative distortion  within that  
discourse.7  A critical implication is the Council giving up its right to determine time- 
frames.   This  may  require institutional adjustments   and  longer term  planning to 
accommodate such discursive processes. 
A more significant, although less conclusive, issue concerns the cultural and 
socio-economic make-up of the task group. A couple of participants noted the group  
was not overly representative (Trans:1, 5).    All participants, bar one, represented a 
 
  
5 This difference of recollection is most likely due to the considerable time between their participation and my 
interviews (approximately 12 months). Some participants said they could not remember some minor details. 
 
6 Participation costs regarding travel or baby-sitting may change if more women or Maori were included in 
the process. 
 
7 There is a regressive potential here, with each previous discursive process needing a still prior discursive 
process to establish conditions for free discourse. This is theoretically unavoidable because we are dealing with 
‘ideal speech’, something impossible to fully replicate in the real world. Therefore, closure must occur at a point 
participants agree on. Besides, communicative rationality would be unlikely to justify an endless regression, for 
that would be an irrational act itself, for it would constantly defer intersubjective understanding, the very aim of  
communicative rationality. 
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specific socio-economic location, the educated section of society (Trans:5). As one 
participant put it, "There were some very intelligent individuals" in the group (Trans:3). 
The meetings took place with participants seated in a circle around a board room 
table. While these factors are one reason the task group had so little significant 
conflict, they pose an interesting question whether participants who did not have the 
education, cultural background or familiarity and comfort with Western decision 
making environments, e.g., board rooms, would be enabled to discursively participate, 
or would feel alienated. This question did not appear to arise with the SHWMS, but 
it may be questioned to what extent the cultural or educational setting pre-disposes 
stakeholders towards involvement. It may also be questioned, although not answered, 
whether the definition of stakeholder being used, even though it was not explicitly 
defined, caused some people to devalue their actual status as a stakeholder. I Simply 
raise the possibility that the term stakeholder could be associated only with 
educational status, thereby producing an unintended barrier to involvement for some 
people. There is some indication this occurred in the task group. One participant 
commented that if someone had more 'seniority than he did, he felt he had better shut 
up' (Trans:8). This raises the issue of what, exactly, are these task groups about, 
collections of expertise or collections of affected interests. The answer will determine 
how accessible these groups actually are. I explore this more fully in Chapter Five. 
Whatever the answer, these questions demonstrate the usefulness of this criterion as 
a critical tool. 
There is only limited evidence of a lack of accessibility in the SHWMS process. 
This evidence is more of a question regarding the social and educational requirements 
of the group participants. Apart from this, there were few access problems for the 
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participants to the discursive deliberation of the SHWMS. The next potential location 
for communicative distortion is the criterion of equality. 
4:2:2:2 Equality and Policy Formulation 
Equality refers to the capacity of participants to freely take part in the discursive 
process. There are a number of aspects of the SHWMS process which relate to the 
equality criterion. Analysis of the ability of participants to challenge the views of 
others is made, and the roles of control exercised by Pavelka and Dolan are carefully 
examined. Decision making processes and the role of consensus are also analyzed. 
First, however, I examine the meeting protocol and analyze the ability of participants 
to communicate freely. 
The task group meetings involved protocol which provided a clear structure to 
the deliberations. This protocol was based on certain values held by Pavelka. She 
describes some of them as follows: 
People with an interest have a right to be heard, and what we are doing is negotiating 
really, not consulting, not just putting forward ideas but you would expect those ideas 
to have some punch, to carry weight, with outcomes. Another value is to allow all those 
differences to be expressed, together, so that people actually hear each other. I see it as 
an education process .... It's about creating as much proportional power as possible, 
making it as easy as possible for people to contribute (Trans:Pavelka). 
From these values, meeting protocol were suggested by Pavelka and discussed and 
agreed by the task group. They set the ground rules for an subsequent 
communication. They were: 
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- Meetings will be informal with direct discussion between participants; 
- Facilitator will keep the meeting 'on track'; 
- Participants will keep to discussing issues and not resort to personal abuse; 
- Participants will freely consult with their organizations; 
- Comments to the media will be made after discussion and approval by the task group. 
Other comments were: 
- Observers are welcome at the meetings; 
- The task group may break into smaller working groups if appropriate at a later stage 
(CCC:1993c). 
These ground rules provided a basis for open and free exchange of ideas. 
Informality was an important aspect of the process for it provided an environment 
where participants were able to work co-operatively. This informality was based on 
a Western concept of formality, i.e., formal meeting structures and procedures, and 
therefore displays its cultural orientation. While all the task group participants 
appeared comfortable with this particular style of 'informality', it is likely that not all 
potential participants would be comfortable with this particular style. Such informality 
would therefore need to be monitored to ensure it was appropriate to all those 
represented. 
All participants were able to speak freely and without undue hinderance within 
the group. One partiCipant felt the process took things out of the 'confrontational 
mode' and more into a 'discussion mode'. Referring to the history of the Metropolitan 
Refuse COmmittee, which had to 'fight every step of the way', "all of a sudden you 
would go from a battle situation to a discussion situation" (Trans:2). Another participant 
reported doing more listening in the first few meetings, but realised "no one was going 
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to hold it against you if you said something that wasn't perhaps along the right lines ... " 
(Trans:ll). When asked whether he felt he could speak freely, one participant replied, 
"Not always", but decided to assist the group and not 'push his own barrow' 
(Trans: 11). Another commented about being very confident about speaking, and that 
there was a lot of tolerance given to everyone (Trans: 12). It was easy to share one's 
views (Trans:5). There were, according to another participant, adequate opportunities 
for critical debate (Trans:4). The majority of participants felt their views had been 
adequately understood by other group members. One person thought the task group 
was "no good if you're shy", but felt others understood him (Trans:8). A number of 
participants thought there were some strong views in the group, but no one seemed 
to dominate (Trans:3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14). Despite different points of view, there was 
'surprisingly' little conflict; "Sounds boring, but I thought that everyone worked together 
very well" (Trans: 10). 
The control role refers to monitoring the group, ensuring those with less social, 
intellectual or persuasive ability are not disadvantaged in the process of deliberation. 
This role was primarily taken by Pavelka. Her specific task, as agreed to by the CCC, 
was as follows: 
To design and facilitate a series of meetings that will result in agreement of goals, 
objectives and policies for waste management in Christchurch. This agreement will be 
put forward to the Christchurch City Council as a recommended strategy by parties 
forming the task group. Facilitation will include preparing written records of meetings 
for members and telephone contact as appropriate (Private Correspondence, 
Pavelka, 1993). 
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Her role, in the words of one participant, was to "oil the wheels ... , keep things moving" 
(Trans: 10). A number of participants felt her role was critical to the success of the 
group (Trans:Dolan; Trans:l - 5, 9 - 12, 15), due to her ability to create discursive 
space for all group members. If someone was 'hogging the floor', she would turn to 
someone else to elicit their views by asking 'What do you think?' (Trans:6). She was 
considered by all participants to be impartial. Pavelka notes that facilitators must put 
aside opinions, not to have no opinions, just put them aside (Trans). She 
acknowledged her role had power; she did not think she used it, except occasionally. 
There is no evidence that she produced communicative distortion within the 
deliberations. On the contrary, her role was discursively agreed by the group and was 
an important reason for the discursive equality which existed within the group. 
Dolan also performed a control role, due mainly to his technical expertise. 
However, he made it clear he was only offering suggestions to the group. It was up 
to the group to approve or reject his ideas (Trans:5). He took a 'standoff pOSition' 
(Trans:10), and the group appeared to trust that neither he nor Pavelka would control 
or dominate the process (ibid). 
Decision making is another important aspect of the equality criterion. The 
formation of consensus was the decision making approach most used by the task 
group. Decisions concerned primary objectives and key principles to guide the future 
of solid and hazardous waste management in the city. I note this because the type of 
decisions made by the task group were general and conceptual. This probably 
enhanced the development of consensus on most issues. 
Pavelka explains that consensus occurs when: 
194 
we get anyone who is committed to being involved, who has been legitimised as being 
involved, ... to be able to accept whatever the final outcomes are ... or whatever 
principles the group espouses. That means almost going to the lowest common 
denominator to get there. It is about finding the common ground and the agreements 
that everyone can live with. If somebody can't, then we don't have consensus 
(Trans:Pavelka). 
The question posed by Pavelka, "Can you live with that?" (Trans:ll), was a critical 
component of this decision making procedure. When I questioned her about how she 
knew people could 'live with it' and were not simply succumbing to group pressure 
(which would violate the ideal speech criteria), she said it was primarily experience 
in watching out for people. Specifically asking someone what they honestly thought 
provided opportunity for that person to engage in discursive debate. She also noted 
that people do not tend to give up things which are really important to them. 
Resolution was only reached after quite a bit of discussion (Trans:9), and everyone 
had the opportunity to veto a decision (Trans:ll). One participant felt Dolan 'might 
have taken too much licence' with what he prepared for the task group (summary of 
decisions), but they also felt there were enough checks and balances (Trans: 13). 
Although Dolan argued forcibly on occasions, he did not always get his own way and 
had to concede to the group on occasions (ibid). 
Voting occurred only on a couple of occasions, due to the tight schedule the task 
group was under. One participant felt some things were vetoed because of Council 
politics (Trans:1), another that decisions tended to be compromises (Trans:3), and a 
third that there tended to be a degree of majority rule in the end (Trans:4). Apart 
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from one participant (Trans:3), who was hesitant about wholeheartedly endorsing the 
final strategy, the others felt the strategy was something they could endorse. 
No significant systemic communicative distortion emerged from this analysis of 
the equality criterion. Indeed, the discursive freedom afforded the participants 
appears quite high, with no one unable to communicate their views. Some 
participants were not entirely happy with the generality of the final document and the 
compromises it contained, and a couple noted the effort to meet deadlines curtailed 
the openness of discussion at some points. Nevertheless, all participants said they had 
opportunities to clearly state their views, be understood by the other participants and 
challenge views they did not agree with. This demonstrates significant discursive 
freedom was experienced by all participants. 
4:2:2:3 Reflexivity and Policy Formulation 
For my purposes here, opportunities for reflexivity, an on-going consideration 
of beliefs, values, facts and data, can occur on two levels. First, the level of group 
process concerns the extent to which it created opportunities for group reflexivity. The 
second level concerns the extent to which the process stimulated self-reflexivity by 
participants on their own beliefs and values. While any distinction between group and 
individual is theoretically problematic,8 it provides a useful way of addressing the 
issue of reflexivity. 
8 There is no simple distinction between group and individual. For example, to what extent can 'group' 
reflexivity take place without producing 'individual' reflexivity, or vice versa? As in the agency /structure debate 
in sociology (e.g., see Berger and Luckmann, 1967), individual reflexivity is shaped by social or group norms 
concerning reflexivity. Therefore, such a simple distinction between them, while didactically useful, remains 
theoretically problematic. 
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The first level requires analysis of reflexivity in the task group process. 
Participants appeared content with the task group agenda (Trans:3, 5, 14). One 
participant reported the group was frustrated with the agenda until they decided they 
could not rewrite the document Dolan had originally written (CCC:1992), so they 
adopted the general framework provided by Dolan (Trans: 14). However, this 
approach was the outcome of extensive deliberation and was accepted by the group. 
At the beginning of each meeting, a summary of the points agreed upon at the 
previous meeting were presented. If anyone felt these points did not adequately 
represent the previous week's discussion, they were debated until everyone was 
satisfied or could 'live with it'. At the end of each meeting, the following week's 
agenda was discussed and agreed to. All of this was open to debate. However, 
Pavelka regards challenges to a group's agenda as uncommon once it is set, and she 
is not sure she created such opportunities (Trans:Pavelka). The time-frame restricted 
open-ended debate because the task group was committed to addressing the full 
content of the agenda for each meeting. 
There is evidence of reflexivity in the group process. The SHWMS process was 
centred on consensus, as discussed above, and this necessitates intersubjective 
understanding. As Dolan noted, "In this process they had to listen, discuss, listen and 
agree. They could not just go along and advocate" (Trans). Another said the task group 
made everyone listen to each other and understand other's concerns (Trans:2). These 
comments illustrate a degree of reflexivity produced by the process structure. 
Participants were committed to attending all meetings, and Pavelka ensured each 
speaker was satisfied they had been adequately heard by the group. She would do 
this by occaSionally asking a participant for their views on what another speaker had 
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said. This reduced the tendency for participants to simply concentrate on their own 
concerns. 
The theme of learning through the process is an essential part of reflexivity. 
Most participants felt they learned something about waste management, although 
exactly what they learnt varied. Dolan said he did not learn anything substantive, but 
he did learn a lot about people's perceptions of waste management. One participant 
did not learn 'as much as some', but did learn about some of the latest figures 
(Trans: 1). Another felt the CCC learnt things by talking to people at the 'sharp end 
of it', i.e., the practitioners (Trans:2). One participant 'learnt heaps', especially about 
the inner workings of the Council (Trans:5). Many others indicated similar things 
(Trans:9-14) . 
Learning is also a part of self-reflexivity, the second level. Again, the majority 
of participants reported changes or modifications to their views as a result of their 
involvement with the task group. One felt everyone was not so hard and fast by the 
end of the process (Trans:6). Another was 'converted' from a 'spaceship analogy to 
practical reality' (Trans:8). One participant began with an aversion to the green 
movement, but ended the process with the greatest respect for them (Trans:15). Only 
one participant was reluctant to say they had modified their views, but did feel it was 
good for others to hear his views since they were 'coalface answers' (Trans:6). 
Reflexivity involves reconsidering not only values but facts and information. The 
operation of reflexivity involves determining the truth or deception in an argument. 
All participants believed other participants spoke truthfully, and no one felt they were 
being misled or deceived. Everyone was "very very honest" (Trans:3). Two participants 
felt there was overemphasis at times, although this was not seen as dishonest 
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communication (Trans:6, 8). There was enough skill and knowledge in the group to 
challenge incorrect or untruthful information (Trans: 11). As one participant 
commented, although it was easy to understand others, it "didn't mean you believed 
them. Everyone was up with the play" (Trans:6). Nevertheless, potential for 
miscommunication existed. One participant noted occasions when "a grunt becomes, 
'the group decided'" (Trans:8). 
The discursive design of the task group enabled a degree of reflexivity to take 
place. The group developed norms of free expression and questioning within a 
framework of co-operation. This provided the opportunity for reflexive evaluation of 
the emerging SHWMS within certain boundaries. The overall scope and time-frame 
of the process restricted reflexive opportunity for participants. While there were 
examples of mild reluctance in questioning group decisions (Trans:3), for example not 
wanting to be uncooperative, this only occurred with less important issues. Everyone 
felt able to state their case and be heard on issues important to them. Thus, there was 
little detectible communicative distortion due to suppressed reflexivity. 
4:2:2:4 Information and Policy Formulation 
Unequal access to information during policy formulation can strategically 
advantage some participants and disadvantage others. I examine what information 
was available, how it was provided and if it was understandable. 
Most of the information available to the task group came from Dolan 
(Trans:Dolan). One of his roles was to provide the group with enough information to 
ensure a suitable strategy could be produced. One participant recalled Dolan as being 
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well prepared, supplied drafts, did not dominate any session and did not push the 
Council view (Trans:6). A number of participants commented the information given 
by Dolan was easy to understand (Trans:5, 6, 8, 9). There was not too much 
'technobabble' according to one participant (Trans:11). Pavelka used small groups on 
occasions to help the task group assess information provided by Dolan. Summaries 
of discussions were written on a white board to ensure accuracy of information. 
Meeting summaries were another significant aspect '"'f information availability. These 
were written up and sent to all task group participants within 24 hours of the 
meeting, enabling time for review and examination (CCC:1993c; Trans:6, 12). There 
was also some information sharing between the participants (Trans: 11). There were 
a couple of participants who experienced some difficulty with the more technical 
aspects of the strategy (Trans: 9, 11). There is a "limit to understanding if you're a lay 
person. They [the Council] were aware of that. If you get bogged down in technicalities you 
tend to give up ... " (Trans:9). 
The task group was informed that more information was available if they 
wanted it (Trans:9). The information available to the task group was generally easy 
to understand and was equally shared among the group. There was no evidence that 
information was withheld by any participant to the disadvantage of another. Neither 
were any participants unduly disadvantaged by the technical complexity of the 
information. Pavelka expressed awareness that the influence of some participants was 
due to their knowledge of waste management. For this reason, Dolan ensured 
everyone had access to the information they needed. She trusted him to present the 
relevant information, also noting that in other cases she had facilitated such trust had 
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been unwarranted (Trans:Pavelka). There is, then, no evidence of unequal access to 
information causing communicative distortions in the SHWMS task group. 
4:2:3 Summary of Analysis of Process 
The analysis of the SHWMS process reveals participants believed they 
experienced little systemic communicative distortion. There was, however, significant 
systemic communicative distortion arising from the context and structure of the 
process. This distortion emerged principally from the scope and time-frame, the 
exclusion, albeit unintentional, of Maori, limited representation of women and 
restricted socio-economic conception of a stakeholder. The requirement that the task 
group only 'recommend' policy produced a systemic constraint on communicative 
rationality, for there was no guarantee the Operations Committee would conduct its 
own deliberations in a communicatively rational way. 
With the Significant exceptions above, the policy formulation process appears 
relatively free from communicative distortion. However, policy formulation occurred 
after the agenda was set. While participants were generally happy with the policy 
outcomes, such outcomes resulted, in part, from the agenda, and the agenda was only 
partially open to discursive deliberation. The stakeholder selection aspect of the 
agenda, with the above exceptions, was a very open process, providing good 
opportunities for stakeholders to take part in forming the task group. Problem 
definition was the site for most communicative distortion, with limited opportunity 
for accessibility, equality, reflexivity and information sharing. There is no clear 
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evidence, however, that this produced a distortive effect on the final discursive 
outcome. 
TItis analysis examined the SHWMS context, process and the operation of 
communicative distortion. However, I have not yet applied this analysis specifically 
to the three research questions. TItis entails producing some conclusions from the 
analysis and is the task of Chapter Five. It is to this chapter which I now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions 
TIlls thesis began with a critique of some dominant assumptions of public policy 
analysis, presented a critique of those assumptions and developed a reconstruction. 
of the policy process. This reconstruction is epistemologically based, developed 
through the standpoint epistemology of Harding (1991), the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
(1975) and the communicative theory of Habermas (1971a). The reconstruction I 
developed leads to the idea of discursive design. To this point, the thesis is 
theoretical. The next element involved the application of discursive design theory to 
a real world case study. The adequacy of the theory is assessed by examining the 
results of the analysis. This chapter draws some conclusions from the theory and case 
study analysis. The three research questions provide a framework for my conclusions. 
The questions deal with different aspects of this thesis. Theory and its application in 
analysiS, as well as the SHWMS process itself, are examined and conclusions reached. 
I suggest areas for future research throughout these conclusions. 
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5:1 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
5:1:1 First Research Question 
To what extent does the SHWMS process fulfil the theoretical requirements of the 
'ideal speech criteria'? 
The 'ideal speech criteria' of accessibility, equality, reflexivity and information 
demand unconstrained discourse. However, the SHWMS process took place within 
a context which placed Significant constraints on the 'ideal speech criteria'. The 
requirement on the task group to only 'recommend' policy took what communicative 
rationality there was in the strategy and subjected it to a form of political rationality 
(the CCC Operations Committee). Whether the Operations Committee's deliberations 
were communicatively rational is a moot point, for this cannot be assessed here. My 
point is simply that contextual constraints on the 'ideal speech criteria' existed. 
The problem produced by the requirement to only 'recommend' policy can be 
generalized as follows. In discursive processes, intersubjective understanding, and any 
communicative rationality produced, is undermined when decision making authority 
is deferred to other agencies. This produces a need to integrate discursive deliberation 
with formal decision making structures. In the SHWMS case, this would mean 
formalising the role of the task group as a decision mechanism within the operations 
committee, not just as an advisory addendum. This, however, presents some 
Significant difficulties because Councillors are publicly elected officials, whereas the 
task group was, to a certain degree, self-appointed. To what extent ought a non-
elected group be given statutory decision making authority? The relationship between 
discursive processes which fulfil the 'ideal speech criteria' and liberal democratic 
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decision structures requires further research. 1 This issue might be viewed as an 
inherent limitation of discursive design. Conversely, if communicative rationality is 
necessary to resolve many of the pressing problems facing our world today, then 
discursive design theory, rather than being the problem, highlights the issues as one 
of inappropriate (or potentially irrational) contemporary decision structures. 
In summary, the context produced a Significant level of systemic distortion due 
to the advisOry nature of the task group vis-a.-vis the Council. I now examine the 
SHWMS task group process, and specifically address the first research question. 
Conclusions are drawn from analysis of each of the 'ideal speech criteria'. 
5:1:1:1 Accessibility 
Access to the SHWMS's discursive deliberation by potential stakeholders was 
high. The major exceptions were access to problem definition, particularly scope, time-
frame and involvement of Tangata Whenua. These exceptions were the product of 
institutional constraints. The SHWMS process was designed around CCC criteria and 
did not suit the particular needs of Tangata Whenua. This raises the issue of cultural 
or institutional bias in the policy process. The Council's decision processes are based 
on Western values, e.g., a time-frame orientated to the needs of the Council, and acted 
as a cultural barrier to open participation by Maori. Decision processes, if 
communicatively rational, will need to be rearranged to reflect the values and needs 
of Maori, not just the needs of the Council. 
1 Dryzek (1995) argues discursive designs ought to be removed from the state and be run by social movements. 
Roger (1985) also explores the possibility of reviving the 'public square' concept, that is, the discursive space 
existing between individuals and the state (see also, Dryzek, 1990a). This argument appears cogent in light of my 
analysis of communicative rationality and the political structure of the CCC. 
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Such rearranging of decision processes may involve pre-problem scoping among 
known stakeholders. This would allow some discursive deliberation into agenda 
setting. Likewise, the time-frame could also be discussed, thereby giving opportunity 
for discursive deliberations by stakeholders. These suggestions would require longer 
term planning in order to accommodate extended deliberation. While discursive 
design might be charged with unnecessarily long time frames, and pOSSibly greater 
cost, the issue is really one of values. Current planning practices incorporate certain 
values which inform practice. I argue communicative rationality is necessary in policy 
analysis and decision making. If communicative rationality is a norm which is 
accepted, then adjusted time-frames for policy processes will not appear inefficient. 
In other words, policy analysts and decision makers need first to determine what 
norms and values their practices ought embody. Policy analysis has assumed 
instrumentally rational norms in much of its practice, norms which largely determine 
the structure of policy process. The possibility that the structure of policy processes 
may alter, is not, then, an argument against discursive design. 
5:1:1:2 Equality 
There was Significant discursive equality within the task group, fostered by 
intellectual and communicative equality of the participants. However, it needs to be 
remembered this was not a highly controversial issue, and therefore no significant 
pressure on the participants to object or resist the outcomes existed. The capacity of 
discursive design to deal with highly conflictual situations cannot be assessed from 
this case study. However, I note most of the partiCipants felt the SHWMS process 
could be used successfully in more conflictual environments, thus providing an 
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educational opportunity for task group participants to appreciate the value of 
discursive deliberation. 
5:1:1:3 Reflexivity 
While the overall framework for the strategy was set, and some opportunity for 
reflexivity denied due to time constraints, a high degree of reflexive potential in the 
deliberation existed. I note this potential, rather than actual reflexivity, because it is 
difficult to assess the actual reflexivity of the group without examining the content 
of the argument and debate (a task beyond the scope of this thesis). Nevertheless, this 
criteria requires discursive processes to provide opportunity for reflexivity, and this 
was highly evident through the level of learning, modification of views, and 
opportunity to challenge truth claims afforded the participants. The task group 
adjusted its membership to include a women's representative when it realised there 
was only one woman on the task group. However inadequate this response was in 
terms of representing the interests of all women, it demonstrates a degree of 
reflexivity in the group process. 
5:1:1:4 Information 
Finally, there was both sufficient and equal access to information. If the required 
information was any more technical, it may have produced inequalities. However, no 
person appeared disadvantaged through the information used in the task group. 
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In summary, the context and agenda setting produced a significant level of 
systemic distortion due to the advisory nature of the task group vis-a-vis the Council 
and institutional practices. This aside, there was a high degree of fulfilment of the 
'ideal speech criteria' in the process itself. While any future discursive deliberation 
needs to address the contextual and agenda setting issues, I conclude the SHWMS 
was a successful process of discursive deliberation, producing a communicatively 
rational document. 
5:1:2 Second Research Question 
(2) How useful are the 'ideal speech criteria' in identifying communicative distortions 
of the SHWMS process? 
This question forms a reflexive evaluation of the 'ideal speech criteria'. The 
question assesses the use of the criteria as a 'guide' in identifying distortions in 
communication. The criteria detected little communicative distortion in the SHWMS 
process. However, these criteria are dependent upon research methodology. 
Phenomenological analysis, for example, might be useful for investigating the 
experience of the participants, but it may miss detection of more structural distortions, 
distortions of which the participants may not be aware. Lack of awareness of 
communicative distortion by participants does not mean the non-existence of such 
distortion. Without the analysis of context, the institutional constraint discussed above 
may not have been detectable. In this case, the most significant communicative 
distortion came from structural and contextual features, not from interaction. This 
suggests the importance of structure, defined as the phYSical, procedural, social and 
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political environments in which the SHWMS took place.2 Because much of the 
distortion is structural, it can potentially be eliminated by paying attention to 
contextual features which impinge on discursive freedom in deliberation. The 'ideal 
speech criteria', then, linked with appropriate methodologies, proved a useful means 
of assessing structural distortion. 
There are some difficulties with the concept of communicative distortion. In its 
ideal form, any "non-symmetrical distribution of chances" to enter discursive deliberation 
constitutes communicative distortion (Habermas, in Thompson, 1981:92, authors 
translation). However, the SHWMS task group was under City Council budget 
constraints. These budget constraints were the product of political decisions over 
Council expenditure and not subject to discursive deliberation or the communicative 
rationality of the SHWMS task group. Does this constitute communicative distortion? 
If task group deliberation was constrained by decisions which were not themselves 
communicatively rational, then the answer is yes. This potentially introduces a 
regressive element into the issue. Policy decisions are never discrete and bounded, but 
are usually constrained by contexts produced by communicatively distorted processes. 
Does this mean one must revisit each previous decision process and subject it to 
discursive deliberation to ensure it does not produce communicative distortion further 
down the line? Obviously, this is impossible to achieve. Communicative distortion, 
then, might always exist at some level, especially in highly integrated and complex 
institutions. This does not deny the usefulness of the criteria, for there are many levels 
of communicative distortion which can be eliminated. Within a clearly defined policy 
process, the 'ideal speech criteria' prove very useful in the detection of communicative 
distortion. They also provide some remediation to the problem of cumulative 
2 See Chapter Four for discussion of structure and context. 
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distortion by 'breaking the cycle' of communicative distortion, thereby enabling 
subsequent policy deliberation the advantage of building upon communicatively 
rational policy. 
Another consideration concerns the use of the 'ideal speech criteria' as a means 
of criticism. Where policy processes have no opportunity for discursive deliberation, 
or where they marginalise some genuine stakeholders, the criteria might demonstrate 
limited accessibility, equality, reflexivity or unequal access to information. In this case, 
the criteria proved highly effective. Because the SHWMS process was deemed so 
successful by participants and the Council, and much of my analysis demonstrated 
high levels of discursive deliberation, the deeper structural distortions could have 
been overlooked. However, careful attention to the criteria, particularly accessibility, 
demonstrated the contextual limitations of the process. This is not to down play the 
achievements of the SHWMS process, but rather to indicate the potential of the 
criteria as a critical tool. 
The 'ideal speech criteria' proved useful in analyzing the SHWMS, in part, 
because there was little conflict. However, I do not consider the 'equality' criterion has 
been adequately assessed in this policy process, and suggest it needs application in 
a highly conflictual process. In particular, the phenomenological analysis used has yet 
to demonstrate it can identify problems of equality. Because the SHWMS process was 
so apparently successful, the participants generally spoke highly of it and did not 
indicate any Significant inequality within the actual deliberation. While there is no 
reason to believe the phenomenological analysis could not identify such distortions, 
adequate assessment requires further application. 
I believe the reflexivity criterion requires theoretical expansion. While analysis 
of learning and modification of views among participants is useful, a more thorough 
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assessment of reflexivity could involve an analysis of the discourse, i.e., the content 
of the deliberations. This would enable a more thorough assessment of the degree of 
reflexivity within the discursive process. However, this would be a retrospective 
analysis and be more useful as a critique. There still remains the requirement to 
design reflexivity into the discursive processes. I suggest careful attention be given 
to mechanisms for reflexive deliberation, thus providing opportunities for further 
research. 
In conclusion, while there are some important modifications yet to be made to 
some of the 'ideal speech criteria~, they demonstrated considerable utility in 
identifying communicative distortion in the SHWMS process. This, in turn, identifies 
problems to be addressed by careful design of discursive processes. For this reason, 
I conclude they constitute useful tools for discursive policy analysis. 
5:1:3 Third Research Question 
(3) What can be learnt from the SHWMB process that improves our understanding of 
discursive policy processes? 
The SHWMS offered an opportunity to study a discursive process. What I offer 
here are some practical considerations arising from the SHWMS process and some 
theoretical reflections. 
The role of an independent facilitator was essential in the success of the SHWMS 
process. The communicative theory I developed tends to underestimate the 
psycholOgical constraints to open communication.3 A skilled facilitator whom all 
3 Baum (1987) explores the operation of the unconscious in bureaucracy. He argues: "The costs of neglecting the 
psychological domain of organizations are unacceptable" (pg. 5). Although Baum's psychoanalytic perspective focuses 
on bureaucratic organization, it is relevant to discursive designs in the way it deals with unconscious behaviour. 
He uses four specific assumptions: (1) That people think both consciously and unconsciously; (2) that a significant 
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parties acknowledge as impartial is an important part in dealing with this issue. The 
process only worked because of a relatively high level of trust between the 
participants. A brief reflection on the skills Pavelka brought to the process will help 
identify some key characteristics for successful facilitation. She was clear on her goal, 
the production of intersubjective understanding (she did not use this term), and 
sought, where possible, to facilitate consensus. She had a high level of personal skill 
in dealing with participants, indicating an understanding of human behaviour. She 
ensured discursive space was equally available to ail, would redirect the discussion 
if someone was dominating and kept the process to the agreed agenda. Through the 
use of questions, she kept the participants 'in touch' with each other, thereby ensuring 
understanding developed. Lastly, she kept her personal opinions to one side, ensuring 
they did not intrude into the discourse. In terms of strong objectivity, it is perhaps 
ironic that the ability of the facilitator to remain' detached' is critical in enabling the 
'attachments' or 'particularities' of others to be expressed. Pavelka's skilled facilitation 
was, therefore, a central element of the SHWMS. Without such a role in discursive 
processes, it is unlikely the necessary trust and communication needed for 
intersubjective understanding would develop, especially in a conflictual environment. 
I conclude that independent facilitation is an essential component in a discursive 
design. 
Dolan also formed an important part of the process as policy entrepreneur. His 
involvement was essential in a number of ways. He had the trust of his manager, and 
was therefore able to develop the process. He had good people skills such as an 
part of unconscious thought involves anxiety and efforts to relieve it in relations with others; (3) that such anxiety 
is unconscious because people wish to avoid the pain associated with it; and (4) that adults tend to use 
psychological defence patterns they developed as children to deal with this pain (pgs. 6-7). I state this to make 
the point that human relations are complex, and communicative rationality produced by intersubjective 
understanding is no simple feat. For this reason, a skilled facilitator can help participants negotiate the many 
conscious and unconscious barriers to intersubjective understanding in a discourse. See also, Warren (1993). 
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ability to listen, highly developed verbal and written communication skills, was 
personable (participants liked and respected him). He understood the process and was 
genuinely open to new and alternative ideas. Without such skills, it is unlikely the 
process would have been so highly recommended by the participants. 
One issue which presents a potential problem in discursive processes is technical 
complexity. Although this was not a problem in the SHWMS process, the question can 
still be raised about how to ensure technical complexity does not restrict discourse 
solely to experts. This would produce communicative distortion by excluding other 
stakeholders. One response is to distinguish between norms and technique. 
Communicative rationality can produce agreement over norms and values without 
necessitating agreement over technique. This was essentially the case with the 
SHWMS. The task group, while dealing with technical issues, was primarily 
concerned with priorities and general policy, not instrumental technique. This, 
however, is problematic, for there may not always be clear distinction between norms 
and technical issues. However, my arguments against technocracy (see Chapter One) 
recognise that technique tends to dominate normative deliberation, rather than being 
bound by communicatively rational norms. There is, then, a case for discursive 
deliberation to focus on production of norms and the subjection of technical debate 
to those normative priorities. Policy analysts will still need to ensure all policy process 
participants are assisted in understanding technical information and are given 
opportunity within deliberation to understand what is going on. 
I argued in section '5:1:2' that much of the communicative distortion in the 
SHWMS process came from structural and contextual features and could be 
eliminated by careful design. I do not suggest all structurally produced constraints are 
equally amenable to resolution by design. For example, the CCC could conceivably 
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institute procedures requiring policy decisions to be produced by discursive 
deliberation of stakeholders. However, as previously discussed, the difficulties posed 
by decision mechanisms involving democratically elected representatives requires 
fundamental change to political structures. Also, fiscal decisions by central 
government pose significant challenges in relation to adequate representation of 
stakeholders. As the distance between stakeholders and decision mechanisms 
increases, access difficulties by stakeholders also increase. This implies discursive 
design is only appropriate for small scale or local decision making. Localised decision 
making increases the chances for intersubjective understanding, while increasing the 
links ~ the representative chain increases the locations for miscommunication and, 
subsequently, communicative distortion. But is it correct to assume communicative 
rationality can only function in localized situations? I argue our world needs 
communicative rationality, not just locally, but nationally and globally (see Dryzek, 
1990a, 1990b). The seemingly intractable international problems of environmental 
degradation, violent conflict, social injustice and so forth, involve conflicts of values. 
Communicative rationality, I argue, provides a means of producing mutually agreed 
solutions to value conflicts. Addressing such problems in large scale fora may bring 
with it many constraints. For example, intersubjective understanding may be reduced 
for some affected parties because they are either not represented, or their 
representatives are unable to adequately communicate the substance of the 
deliberations. Even if they are able, intersubjective understanding involves much more 
than proviSion of information; it involves relationships (see Chapter Two). While 
intersubjective understanding may increase for those actually involved at the 
international or national level, it may not increase for those not privy to the 
deliberations. Thus, this suggests a theoretical problem with discursive design because 
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it does not appear to acknowledge such constraints. In other words, the face-to-face 
deliberation implicit in discursive design necessarily limits the numbers involved. 
Rigorous application of the 'ideal speech criteria' to an international or national 
discursive process, therefore, is very likely to uncover communicative distortion. 
Nevertheless, the 'ideal speech situation' is an ideal, and communicative distortion 
will exist to some extent in any discursive process. It follows that such discovery of 
communicative distortion need not mean intersubjective understanding has not 
increased. Indeed, the presence of communicative distortion in the SHWMS process 
does not deny the fact there was also significant development of intersubjective 
understanding. Good design of discursive processes cap. minimise communicative 
distortion, although never eliminate it entirely. 
The self-selection of task group participants was a positive step towards 
communicative rationality, for it restricted the opportunity for any interests to 
manipulate the task group membership for their own benefit. There were concerns 
that the 'right' mix of people got onto the SHWMS task group, and there was an 
opinion that a different mix of people would change the co-operative style of the 
group (Trans:2). While this is a concern, it ought not override the self-selection 
process. Minimising unnecessary disruption to the group process requires competent 
facilitation and education of group members. People joining such a group to 
adversarially advocate their own ideas with no interest in reflexivity need to be 
educated in a more co-operative model. Intersubjective understanding necessitates 
reflexivity and co-operation. Adversarial approaches limit the possibility of 
communicate rationality by denying potential legitimacy of other views and interests. 
Such approaches suffer the same epistemic limitations as the dominant assumptions 
of policy analysis discussed earlier. On the other hand, communicative rationality 
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legitimates difference. What communicative rationality denies is the ability of 
adversarial approaches to adequately address public policy problems. In other words, 
adversarial approaches are functionally unable to generate epistemically improved 
knowledge. I therefore argue discursive design needs to promote co-operation. This, 
in fact, was one of Pavelka's aims, and indicates that education is an important aspect 
of discursive design processes. There was evidence that one or two participants were 
not particularly open, at least initially, to some differences within the group. 
However, this did not become a problem because the norm of intersubjective 
understanding was established early in the process, thereby legitimating difference. 
I suggest the norm of intersubjective understanding can be established in such 
processes, resulting in an increased ability to accept difference. 
Another reflection on the SHWMS process involves questions of inclusivity. For 
example, there were no children on the task group. The theory I developed opened 
the question of inclusion of all interests being represented in discursive deliberation. 
Children have interests in waste management, even if their interests are not yet clearly 
articulated. But what would have been gained, in a substantive policy sense, if a child 
had been on the task group? At face value, it may seem unnecessarily pedantic to 
have a child on the task group. But my theoretical perspective insists this be seriously 
considered. Reflexive questions which begin from the standpoint of 'Others' open up 
new possibilities for problem solving.4 
Criticism may be raised that such rigorous application of the 'ideal speech 
criteria' will result in absurd conclusions concerning representation in discursive 
4 On such questions see Carlin (1993). She provides a useful analysis of issues relevant to identifying 
stakeholders in environmental disputes. Her approach is reflexive, insisting the mediator to a dispute ask: "what 
if· .. ? What ifa women's group was present? What ifwe hild children on the panel? Whilt iffuture generations were given 
their own representative ... ? What if there was some kind of proportional representation between gender, race and class?" 
(1993:65). Such reflexivity enables analysts to assess a problem situation from different standpoints. 
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deliberation. For example, animals presumably have interests in waste management, 
and therefore ouzht to be represented. In response, I have four comments. First, 
recognition must be given to changing norms regarding who has a legitimate voice 
in public policy matters. It was not so long ago that women were not allowed to vote 
(the most basic voice in policy matters). No one in a Western democracy could 
seriously question this voting right of women today. By th~ ~ame logic, what other 
voices will be 'discovered' and given discursive space? Thus, the question of 
discursive space for children's voices may not be so far fetched. Second, we need to 
remember the goal of communicative rationality is to establish shared norms to assist 
practical problem solving. I am not advocating participation for participation sake. 
Rather, we need to clarify what will assist communities in effective problem solving. 
This leads to the third comment, the issue of stakeholder identification. Although I 
have not provided criteria for this, it is an important aspect of effective discursive 
deliberation. Because I argue valuable epistemic resources are potentially lost through 
exclusion or marginalisation of certain discourses, effort must be made to ensure such 
exclusion or marginalization does not occur in policy processes. Maximum inclusion 
in, or accessibility to, policy processes is necessary to produce the most 
communicatively rational policy response possible. Thus, careful attention to 
stakeholder selection (see, Carlin, 1993) is needed to ensure increased problem solving 
ability. I offer this view to counter the charge that discursive design will necessarily 
lead to absurd (i. e., fruitless) conclusions. My final comment notes again the 
importance of education. Fear, scepticism or cynicism of such 'open' participation in 
policy analysis demonstrates a need for people to understand discursive design 
theory. Because we view the world through our assumptions, any alteration of our 
views requires a change of assumptions. Discursiye design in policy analysis can only 
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occur as people, including policy analysts, reflexively evaluate their assumptions 
about policy processes, expertise and participation. 
This analysis has presented evidence demonstrating the positive 
contribution of discursive design in the development of communicatively rational 
public policy. There is still much research to be done and I summarise six possible 
areas. First, the relationship between discursive processes and democratic decision 
structures is a major issue and requires further research. There is, secondly, the need 
to design reflexivity into the discursive processes, requiring research into mechanisms 
for reflexive deliberation. Third, the 'equality' criterion has not been adequately 
assessed, and I suggest it be applied in a policy process with high conflict. Fourth, the 
use of discursive design in national and international fora and its relationship to the 
development of intersubjective understanding is an important theoretical question. 
Fifth, stakeholder definition is critical in determining who gets access to discursive 
processes. Issues such as who ought define stakeholders, and criteria or procedures 
for identifying stakeholders require further research. Finally, the interface between 
communicative and instrumental and technical rationalities needs further study. As 
I argued earlier, instrumental and technical rationalities cannot produce socially 
approved goals, and therefore need to be subordinated to communicative rationality. 
Thus, the integration of technical information and sodal values needs close 
examination. 
In summary, I have argued public policy analysis requires discursively designed 
policy processes. As the SHWMS case demonstrated, discursive design is more of a 
creative than technical process. The SHWMS process demonstrated this with the 
Variety of deliberative metho<;is, including some role play (Trans: 9). It relied upon 
goodwill and the ability to cultivate positive relations as much as it did on good 
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structure. Discursive design needs to be conceptualised as an interpersonal process 
rather than a purely technical process. lhls is both its strength and its weakness. In 
. as much as participants are empowered to engage in cooperative action with real 
people, communicative rationality will emerge. However, there is no guarantee people 
will choose this. Good deSigning, positive experiences and normative change towards 
cooperation will assist this, but certainty of outcome cannot be assured. Despite 
growing trends towards conflict resolution, mediation and other discursive 
approaches, reluctance to engage in such personally demanding processes with 
unknown outcomes may encourage some analysts to keep to their traditional and 
known paths. Discursive design is not a panacea for all policy ills, and its practice 
does not immunise one from failed policy processes. However, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, the current state of affairs is hardly satisfactory. Provided 
analysts are prepared to see themselves as facilitators, rather than repositories, of 
public knowledge, discursive design promises more rational public policy, granting 
communities increased capability for problem solving. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One: The SHWMS Task Group 
Industry: 
Recycling: 
Waste Disposal Companies: 
Hazardous Waste Treaters: 
Environmental Groups: 
Public: 
Community Boards: 
Christchurch City Council: 
Tangata Whenua: 
Community Groups: 
Manufacturers Association 
Canterbury Paper Co. Limited 
Waste Care 
Waste Management (NZ) Limited 
B. J. Dakin and Company Limited 
Epicentre 
Individual 
Three individuals 
Hagely-Ferrymead Community Board 
Councillor R. Wright 
Laurence Dolan, Solid Waste Planner 
Dave Harris, Solid Waste Manager 
Centre for Maori Studies and Research, Lincoln 
University 
Individual 
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Appendix Two: The Initial Question List 
This is the initial and complete list of questions developed from the three research 
questions. These questions are not operationalised. 
Questions to be considered when data gathering 
Structural Analysis 
(a) Context 
Institutions 
What is the management structure of the Waste M?nagement Unit? 
What changes has it undergone? 
What relationship does the unit have to the rest of the CCC? 
Were there any guidelines in relation to the preparation of the strategy? 
If so, what were they? 
How large is the unit? 
How long has it existed in its current form? 
Why was the strategy produced? 
How has it produced similar policy previously? 
Personnel 
Who was responsible for this strategy? 
What authorization did they need to use this particular process? 
Why was this process chosen? 
Were other staff involved? 
Were other staff supportive, indifferent or negative? 
Where did the idea originate? 
Was their personal (professional) risk involved? 
Who else was influenced in this process? 
Did anyone help modify this process? 
Legal 
What were the legal obligations of the unit? 
What legislation was involved? 
Did this legislation mandate any procedures? 
If so, what were they? 
Political 
What role did local politicians play? 
Who was aware of it? 
What was their attitude to it? 
Did their attitudes change over time? 
If so, in what way? 
Were they supportive, negative or indifferent? 
Would they support any future similar processes? 
Nature of Subject 
What was the scope of the subject? 
How many stakeholders were there? 
Was this subject controversial? 
If so, in what ways? 
Was there significant risk? 
Was there significant clash of values? 
Was there sufficient technical knowledge available? 
(b) Process 
Accessibility 
1 Agenda Setting (Le., the initial pre-task group agenda) 
How was the agenda set? 
Who set it? 
Did all stakeholders have free and equal access to the agenda setting? 
Were any stakeholders left out? 
How were the stakeholders defined and located? 
Were any groups or views marginalised by the agenda setting? 
2 Formulation 
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Did the meeting #times or locations discourage or disable anyone from involvement? 
Where were the meetings held? 
Did the setting and culture discriminate against any stakeholders? 
Equality 
How were the meetings run? 
What were the speaking arrangements? 
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How was speaking time allocated? 
What forms of communication were permitted? 
How were meeting protocol and procedures established? 
What procedures helped ensure that participants were free to share their feelings? 
Were they free to share their feelings, attitudes etc? 
Reflexivity 
How were the initial rules for the meetings set? 
Were they able to be questioned and reevaluated? 
Were arguments able to be challenged? 
How were disagreements resolved? 
Were there procedures in place for reflexive evaluation of past decisions? 
Control 
What explicit roles operated within the group? 
How were they established? 
Were they able to be questioned? 
What guidelines existed for these roles? 
How were decisions made? 
Information 
What information was available to the group? 
Did everyone have equal access to it? 
Was it able to be understood by everyone? 
If not, how was this handled? 
Was there sufficient time for the participants to become conversant with the 
information? 
Phenomenological Analysis 
(a) Personal context 
Why did they get involved? 
How did they find out about it? 
Have they been involved in similar groups before? 
If so, what? 
What is their relationship to waste management? 
What did they hope to get out of it? 
Did they have strong views? 
Did they understand exactly what a task group was? 
(b) Personal experience of the process 
Did they have firm expectations of the process? 
Was the process as they had expected? 
If not, in what ways did it differ? 
Were they able to be understood? 
Did they understand others? 
Did they have a personal agenda (convictions, beliefs)? 
Did they feel that they were able to share these with the group? 
If not, why not? 
Did they feel the group listened to them? 
If not, why not? 
238 
Did they feel able to challenge views that they thought were wrong or inadequate? 
Did they feel that others told the truth? 
Did anyone, in their opinion, inappropriately dominate the meetings? 
Did they feel that this was a group of equals? 
Did they experience any personal benefits from this process? 
Did they have any negative experiences? 
Would they rate this exercise as a success (or failure, or something inbetween)? 
What reasons could they give for this? 
Would they be willing to do it again? 
Were there any personal costs of involvement? 
How could the process be improved next time? 
Are there any limitations to this process? 
What could they be? 
Do they think they have given the CCC a valuable policy statement? 
Would they endorse the strategy wholeheartedly? 
Did they learn anything about waste management issues? 
Questions for CCC Staff 
What were the time constraints on the process? 
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What did the process cost? 
In what ways does the policy differ from what Dolan would have produced using 
more traditional consultation methods? 
What was their initial feeling/attitude towards the task group concept? 
How would they evaluate its success? 
What were its positive features? 
What were its limitations? 
In what other policy situations could they see this process working? 
Would they endorse this concept in general? 
Would they endorse this concept with conditions attached? 
What, in their opinion, are the prospects for such a process? 
Appendix Three: Questions for Task Group Members 
This is the list of operationalised questions used in the interviews. 
Context 
1. What is your interest in Waste Management? 
2. How did you get involved in the Task Group? 
3. Why did you get involved? 
4. Have you been involved in similar groups before? 
5. What did you hope to get out of it? 
6. Did you have any practical difficulties in attending the meetings? 
7. How were the meetings run? 
8. Did you have access to all the information that was provided? 
9. Was it easily understood? 
10. Did you have sufficient time to become conversant with the information? 
Process 
11. Did you have firm. expectations of the task group? 
12. Was it like you had expected? 
13. If not, in what ways did it differ? 
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14. Did you have any strong convictions and beliefs you were concerned about 
before you joined the task group? 
15. Did you feel you were able to share these with the group? 
16. Did you feel that the other members understood your perspective? 
17. How easy was it to understand the others and their points of view? 
18. Did you feel the group listened to them (others)? 
19. If not, why not? 
20. Did others have strong convictions at the start of the meetings? 
21. What were they? 
22. Did these strong convictions change during the process? 
23. Did you feel that you could challenge views that you thought were wrong or 
inadequate? 
24. Did you feel that others were speaking truthfully? 
25. Did anyone dominate the meetings at any time? 
26. How did this occur? 
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27. Did tills have any effect on the group? 
28. Would you describe this as a group of equals? 
29. Did you experience any benefits from this process? 
30. Did you have any negative experiences? 
31. Could you rate this process as a success or failure? 
32. In what sense was it a success or failure? 
33. Would you be willing to do it again? 
34. Were there any personal costs for you in being involved? 
35. How could the process be improved next tir-~? 
36_ Do you think that this is a good way to make public policy? 
37. Do you think it has any limitations? 
38. Do you consider that you have given the CCC a valuable policy document? 
39. Would you wholeheartedly endorse this policy? 
40. Did you learn anything about waste management? 
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Appendix Four: Draft Letter Sent To Participants 
This is an example of the letters sent to participants requesting an interview. Most 
letters followed this example, but one or to were marginally different depending on 
the person being written to. For example, I requested an interview with Cr. Ron 
Wright due to his role as a city councillor. 
Dear ..... 
I am writing to you regarding your involvement on the Christchurch Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Management Strategy task group. 
For the last few months I have been developing a research topic for the Masters 
of Applied Science Degree that I am undertaking at the Centre for Resource 
Management, Lincoln University. My primary interest is in decision making processes 
for public policy. 
This is where the Waste Management Strategy comes in. The process that you 
were involved in is a very interesting example of community policy making. What I 
am interested in finding out is how well the participants thought it worked, its pros 
and cons, and its value in making public policy. 
With this in mind I would like to talk regarding your experience, thoughts and 
ideas about the task group. This would take no more than an hour, though if this was 
too much, then whatever time you could give me would be gratefully received. 
I will conduct an informal interview. Although I have some general questions 
about the task group, I am particularly interested in your experience and opinions of 
it. Any information you give me will be treated with utmost confidentiality, and no 
one will see the interview transcripts except myself and my supervisor. Unless you 
specifically say so, your identity will not be revealed in the final thesis. 
I hope that you will be able to assist in this research as it is an ideal 
opportunity to carry out an in depth analysis of the value of facilitated task groups 
in developing public policy. I will ring you in a few days to see if you are able to see 
me, and to arrange a suitable time for the interview. 
Please don't hesitate to call me if you have any queries. 
Yours faithfully 
